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Preface	  
We sat together on the cheap plastic bench, taking stock, taking a breath. I am 
terrible at small talk, but she didn’t seem to mind my sitting down with her. We 
watched the children running about. Some looked very young to me, not more than 
five years old and they were showing off; showing us that they were grown up, that 
they could look after themselves. They were shouting and swearing, offering a 
challenge to our adult authority. They stole glances at us; we ignored them. They 
didn’t shock us. 
She runs youth groups, she told me. Often young children come on their own, not 
more than six or seven, without the money they should bring to pay for the session. 
She doesn’t turn them away, she knows that they would have nowhere else to go 
and doesn’t like to think of them wandering the streets. The policy is that she 
shouldn’t release a child until an adult, someone on the list, has come to claim 
them. But she knows that if she didn’t let some children go by themselves, nobody 
would claim them. They would be hers forever if she followed that rule. So she lets 
them walk away into the evening, by themselves. 
She looks like anyone else in the neighbourhood, is anyone else, really. She grew 
up not far from here, is a single mum. But her daughter wasn’t allowed the freedom 
to wander the streets that the children we are watching have. It was funny, she 
said, that here we are judging their parents for letting them out to buy energy drinks 
from the shop and run wild, swearing at people, and yet her neighbours judged her 
because, they said, she wasn’t letting her daughter get streetwise like a good 
parent should. I said that was funny, because if someone let their child out to 
wander for hours without adult supervision where I lived, someone would phone 
social services. Our ideas of good parenting are totally the opposite of what they 
think round here, she said. We could agree on this, everyone believed their way 
was for the best.
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Abstract	  
Social marketing is a technique for behavioural change that has been around 
since the 1960s, when prominent academics argued that the tools and 
techniques of marketing could be used for social as well as commercial ends. 
More recently, the orthodox approach to social marketing - based on the 
marketing management paradigm - has been challenged and new approaches 
are emerging. One such development has been characterised loosely as ‘co-
creation’, which in a social marketing context is understood to mean behavioural 
change interventions that are developed collaboratively with the target audience, 
rather than by remote experts. 
I present here an autoethnographic study of an 18-month ‘co-created’ social 
marketing project that sought to reduce risky drinking in two deprived 
neighbourhoods. Locating myself epistemologically within the post-structural 
approach articulated by critical sociologists (e.g. Laurel Richardson and Norman 
Denzin), I have written two analytical stories about the project based upon field 
notes, project documents, emails and recollections. One story is akin to a thick 
description, the second organised around four emergent themes: negative space, 
legitimacy, resistance and performativity. 
Drawing upon literature from participatory research, international development 
and activist scholarship, I present a contribution in three parts. First, a detailed 
ethical and epistemological critique of social marketing’s claims to legitimacy as a 
methodology of social change; second, the development and theoretical 
justification of autoethnographic writing as a method for analysing participatory 
and action research projects; and finally, an exploration of the relationship 
between identity (internally cultivated and externally imposed), social inequality 
and social activism via evocative writing as “the very possibility of change” 
(Cixous, 1976, p. 879).  
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Chapter	  1: In	  which	  I	  begin	  
“A research presentation…is a discourse in which you expose yourself ,  
you take risks… The more you expose yourself ,  the greater your chances 
of benefit ing from the discussion and the more constructive and good 
wil led, I am sure, the crit icisms and advice you wil l  receive” (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant,  1992, p. 218). 
Lewis Carroll’s subversive critique of 19th century language and social structure 
was accomplished via the medium of nonsense poetry and prose (Farrell, 2007). 
The Alice stories are thought to generate unease in the reader’s mind by 
exposing an individual’s struggle to “conform to cultural systems to which they 
are not especially well suited” (Lane, 2011, p. 1030). This thesis wrestles with 
such a problem; I am such a problem. I must have changed the title more than 50 
times. This final version, the joined metaphors of a telescope and Alice in 
Wonderland as a unifying concept for my contribution, came from my realisation 
that my writing had changed in focus. Rather than looking outward to the worlds 
that surrounded me, I had turned the focus inwards, to myself, in a version of 
Foucault’s ‘Parrhesia’ (1983) the act of “telling the truth without either 
embellishment or concealment for the purpose of criticizing oneself or another” 
(Robinson, 2014, p. 4b). When you look through one end of a telescope, you can 
see a long way into the distance but you can only see a small part of the picture. 
When you look through the telescope the wrong way scale and perspective are 
inverted, everything looks… different. 
When I was first inspired by the Alice stories as a way of conceptualising what 
this PhD is about, I was thinking of my struggle to negotiate the tensions inherent 
in using participatory methods within a powerfully positivistic public health 
commissioning framework; explored via a detailed study of one particular project. 
But as I rewrite this introduction now, near to the end of the process, I realise that 
there was a great deal more to struggle against. Consequently, as Bourdieu and 
Wacquant portray, I have exposed a great deal in this work; I have been critical 
of myself, of my discipline and of objectivist notions of research. I expose my 
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struggle to be more critical still, yet more reflective and more honest, to navigate 
a path between an inclination towards experimentation and unconventionality in 
style and structure and desire to actually, well, get a PhD.   
The real starting point for this work as it stands today, the point at which I really 
felt I stood a chance of getting somewhere, was when I read Julie Davis’ (2004, 
p. 4) account of writing her own thesis, during which she discovered that “writing, 
like acquiring data, is also a ‘way of knowing’ …a method of discovery and 
analysis, and that form and content are inseparable”. Writing as a way of 
knowing. This was rather a revolutionary idea and one that I was keen to explore, 
mostly because it resonated so strongly with the way that I seem to know. If this 
really was a thing, a proper academic framework within which to work, then I had 
found the paradigm for me.  
This chapter begins with an explanation of how I came to locate my work as 
autoethnographic, which began as a pragmatic navigation of various 
opportunities and constraints and ended in the feeling that I had found the 
paradigm and method that naturally suited my talents and worldview. Next, I 
explain how the project that forms the basis of this study came into being, as well 
as providing some information about the place in which the project was enacted: 
a deprived neighbourhood. Following this, I offer a brief introduction to the two 
literatures upon which I draw primarily, social marketing and participatory 
research, as well as explaining how I perceive that these two approaches to 
social change are linked. Following this, I articulate the aims of this thesis, which 
are primarily methodological. I conclude this chapter with an overview of the rest 
of the document.  
1.1. Evolution	  of	  the	  study:	  Alice	  and	  a	  telescope	  
Writing as a way of knowing, a creative and generative process with 
epistemological validity in and of itself (Richardson and Adams St. Pierre, 2005), 
is indeed a thing. But it is the oasis at end of this story, which started in the 
wilderness. For a long time I didn’t know what I was doing, in the literal as well as 
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the figurative sense; I didn’t even have a clear idea of my topic or research 
question. This section explains the thought processes, informed by 
methodological reading, which led to the selection of autoethnography for this 
work. I begin with an explanation of some of the constraints that shaped my 
decisions, followed by a brief explanation of the alternatives that were explored 
before reaching my current position. In essence, this section tells the story of my 
discovery of autoethnography. 
I have always felt myself to be slightly on the outside in academia, because I am 
a distracted, only partially present colleague. Like Blake (2007, p. 416) I am an 
“embodied researcher who must balance work, home and community 
responsibilities”. I am not an unattached student working full time on their PhD in 
the traditional academic apprenticeship model, I started part-time study in 2004, 
when my first child was just under 12 months old. My PhD has dogged my 
footsteps through the baby and toddlerhood of two children and more recently, it 
has been balanced with a demanding research post 4 days a week. It has 
changed shape countless times and been neglected too often. I realised that I 
would have to do something drastic to salvage it in the summer of 2012 and that 
drastic something ended up being changing direction (yet again) and making the 
focus of the PhD a participatory project I had recently finished about risky 
drinking in two deprived neighbourhoods. I thought this would be wise partly 
because I had received positive feedback from a range of people that the project 
was important work, but also I had become fascinated with the whole philosophy 
of participatory research (see Cahill, 2007a; Cameron and Gibson, 2005; Fine, 
2006; Fine and Torre, 2006) and wanted the luxury of exploring it. And in purely 
functional terms, it made sense because I had access to all the data. 
I am not explaining all this in the hope that the reader will judge the work less 
rigorously because I have struggled to produce it. I am telling this story because 
the thesis is that struggle; it is me and I am it. One cannot be understood without 
the other. It is a slice of my ethnographic self (Richardson, 2013; Richardson, 
2000; Coffey, 1999). So with the encouragement of my new lead supervisor Tim, 
I began to write in earnest. I started with the familiar, a social marketing chapter, 
which is also where I started as an academic. I sketched out other chapters on 
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participatory research and on social inequality (the latter since integrated into the 
current structure), but I still didn’t really feel I knew where I was going. Then I 
attempted the methodology chapter, and stalled. Participatory research is 
supposed to be a method of action but the action had already happened, some of 
it had happened more than a year ago. And there was no participation now; there 
was just me and a big pile of field notes about drinking. I was stymied. 
Participatory research was not my methodology. I felt that the conventional 
methodology chapter Tim was encouraging me to write should by rights be my 
results chapter, because with participatory research, planning, action and results 
are entwined, inseparable (Davis, 2004; Ozanne and Saatcioglu, 2008). And yes, 
I could have used my memories and notes from the project to write it as if it was 
happening right then. But that wasn’t what had happened, and I felt 
uncomfortable perpetrating what would have seemed to me a deception. I wanted 
something that felt like authentic scholarship. Not simply to produce something 
that looked like a PhD ought to look.  
At first my reading and writing about action research, the methodology that 
underpinned the participatory project, seemed to offer a solution. Action research 
is not a linear approach (Wadsworth, 1998). Instead, the metaphor of a spiral 
(Kemmis, 2001; O’Brien and Moules, 2007) is often used to explain the process 
of combining action with research in pursuit of change, but the literature does not 
proscribe or even describe the spiral as a mechanical series of steps (Kemmis 
and McTaggart, 2005). Rather, it represents a self-reflective cycle of planning, 
action, observation and reflection, followed by reassessment of plans, more 
action and yet more observation and reflection. The reality of action research is 
messier still, more fluid and responsive, than the neat spiral depicted in the 
literature (Davis, 2004); initiatives take an unexpected path or end in abject 
failure and chance meetings lead to unexpected opportunities. Thus, rather than 
judging the research upon whether it has followed faithfully a set process, 
success should be determined by whether the researcher has “a strong and 
authentic sense of development and evolution in their practices, their 
understandings of their practices, and the situations in which they practice” 
(Kemmis, 2001, p. 595). This notion of myself as a reflective practitioner seemed 
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apposite. The project had indeed followed a messy spiral of planning, action and 
reflection. There had been failure and serendipity. I did feel as though I had 
evolved in my practice as a researcher.  
In the educational action research literature (Leitch and Day, 2000), ‘reflection’ 
appears to be synonymous with ‘thinking’ in the sense that it relates to acts of 
cognition that occur during learning (e.g. Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyers, 1995, on 
creativity and insight). Reflective practice on the other hand can be 
conceptualised as an “epistemology of practice” (Schön, 1983, p. 49) that 
consists of three types of reflection: reflection-in-action, reflection-on-action and 
reflection-about-action. The first encompasses the implicit thought processes that 
accompany and continually modify and reframe (Loughran, 2002) ongoing 
practice. The second type relates to a retrospective analysis of past practice so 
as to gain knowledge about those experiences, engaging in a deliberate and 
systematic process of analysing one’s actions in context (Moran, 2007; Samaras 
and Gismondi, 1998) The third type of reflective practice has roots in Critical 
Theory (Leitch and Day, 2000) and is intended to stimulate reflection upon the 
social, economic and political aspects of one’s practice (Zeichner, 1993). 
Adopting this critical stance, reflection directed outwards to the social system of 
public health commissioning as well as directed inwards to individual practice 
would link, I thought, this thesis to ideas of emancipatory action research 
(Kemmis, 2001). 
And thus, my problem of finding an authentic mode of scholarship seemed as 
though it was answered by the notion that action researchers ‘freeze’ moments of 
their practice for later reflection, analysis and interpretation (Davis, 2004). These 
‘frozen’ moments of practice can be found in the field notes and project 
documents. And I had all the emails as well, documenting the ebb and flow of our 
communication and our relations as we negotiated our way through the project. 
So, I began to reconstruct my researcher self in this vein. In the summer of 2013, 
I wrote that I wanted the thesis to be judged as a reflective account of practice. 
But I was still unclear as to the analytical processes I ought to be following. I had 
put all the data, including the project documents and emails, into NVivo and gone 
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through the rather laborious process of coding it all. But I found this dissatisfying, 
unenlightening; even tortuous (Cahill, 2007b, p. 182). In my diary, I wrote: 
Open	  coding	  of	  all	  this	  data	  seems	  a	  bit	  pointless	  at	  the	  moment.	  Is	  this	  activity	  
worthwhile	  or	  am	  I	  just	  sticking	  with	  it	  because	  every	  researcher	  starts	  their	  training	  
in	  positivism?	  (Extract	  from	  research	  diary,	  5th	  November	  2013).	  
I continued my reading in the reflective enquiry literature, learning that the actual 
enquiry itself can be carried out in a variety of ways, including autobiography, 
dialogical conversations, stories (Evans, 1994), reflective writing and journals 
(Holly, 1989). And here, the trail leads back to Laurel Richardson and writing as a 
way of knowing.  
Investing in that weighty doorstop of a tome the Sage Handbook of Qualitative 
Research in order to have access to Richardson and St. Pierre’s chapter (2005) 
opened up a rich world of qualitative enquiry with research conceptualised as a 
site of toil and transformation, critique and compliance, of play and of serious 
work. I realised that I was not really that interested in myself as a reflective 
practitioner of action research, I was much more interested in the research 
process itself, particularly its potential for challenging convention, for stirring up 
social action. With some irony though, later this interest spiralled back to the 
personal: my writing and my ethnographic self. And thus the thesis in its current 
form was born: a critical, creative and somewhat unconventional 
autoethnography of an (almost) participatory research process. In this tradition, I 
felt I could belong.  
Therefore, Wonderland exists in layers. At the most intimate is discipline and 
institution, followed by academia in general: the business of knowledge 
production and dissemination. Then come the various cultures I navigated during 
the course of this work: the project itself, a transient world the team created that 
has passed out of existence save for memory and record; the deprived 
neighbourhoods in which the project took place and the system of public health 
commissioning in the region. Finally, the cultures that have influenced my 
ethnographic self, including what has been described as the ‘fourth wave’ of 
feminism online (Cochrane, 2013) and the new (to me) world of feminist post-
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structuralist qualitative research. Wonderland in its full complexity (or at least the 
parts of it I discovered during the writing of this thesis) was only revealed towards 
the end of the writing process, so in this introductory chapter I will only introduce 
the fragments I saw when I started: social marketing, the project and, briefly, 
deprived neighbourhoods. The next chapter is a critical review of social 
marketing with particular attention paid to the context of deprived and socially 
excluded target groups, the one after that a review of participatory research. For 
reflections on the wonderlands of academia, feminism, post-structuralist 
qualitative research and my reconstructed ethnographic self, the reader will have 
to constrain their curiosity until the final two chapters. I don’t want to spoil the 
ending.  
1.2. We	  merry	  band	  of	  sisters	  
This story has a huge supporting cast, all of whom have been kept anonymous in 
this thesis to preserve their privacy. This section introduces the main characters 
in the story and their roles, before explaining how the project itself was 
conceived. Following this, I define some significant terms relating to the project 
that will appear throughout this thesis: I explain why I have chosen to refer to 
Parkhood and Urbanwood, the locations for the project, as neighbourhoods 
rather than communities and I provide a definition of deprivation in the context of 
UK public health policy.   
Only six main characters are named (though pseudonyms for people and places 
are used to preserve confidentiality), all of whom are females in their late twenties 
and early thirties. Our similarity in age, gender and professional status was a 
coincidence, probably, though our commonality of experience and perspective 
doubtless influenced the project in ways that will be explored in the results 
chapters. Anna was a Research Associate on a fixed term contract, hers was a 
field-based role and she became the face of the project in Parkhood and 
Urbanwood. Louise was Communications Manager for the Primary Care Trust 
(PCT), the organisation that commissioned the project; her role was to develop 
and implement communications strategy (including social marketing, but she also 
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managed all public relations for the PCT) for her patch. Louise has since moved 
on from this role, though we are still in touch. Sarah was (and is) the local 
counsellor for Urbanwood and a passionate advocate for the people who had 
elected her. Phoebe was (and is) co-founder of social impact consultancy 
‘Codesigns’, a trained designer and specialist in collaborative engagement and 
co-design. Codesign Associates are members of Phoebe’s team who supported 
the project at varying stages in various ways; their skills and roles are explained 
within the chapter, as they are relevant to the story. Finally me; at the time of the 
project I was a Senior Research Fellow at a university in a neighbouring city and 
the principal investigator of the project. The story is always told from my 
perspective. Before we began working on this project together, Louise, Phoebe 
and I had joined forces on a collaborative project about breast cancer and before 
this, in 2010, Phoebe and I had worked together on yet another collaborative 
project on the topic of lung cancer among men in deprived areas. None of us 
knew Sarah personally and Anna was brand new.  
The project began its life as dialogue in early 2011 between Louise, the director 
of my research centre and I. The meeting was intended to be a general 
discussion; Louise had seen my name at a conference and was aware of my 
project on lung cancer, a topic Louise herself was about to embark upon. In this 
meeting, we discovered a mutual frustration with the ‘issue-led’ approach to 
intervention development that appeared to us to be prevalent at the time; an 
approach that seemed to result in the same few wards being targeted by several 
health interventions, seemingly created in isolation from one another. Smoking, 
alcohol, healthy eating and exercise, all aimed at the same few neighbourhoods, 
all developed independently by different people. We noted that what these 
neighbourhoods had in common in most cases was deprivation with concurrent 
high levels of health inequality (Marmot and Wilkinson, 2006). 
Frequently in policy documents, reports and academic literature (e.g. see 
Hastings, Bramley, Bailey and Watkins, 2012; Camina, 2004) as well as in the 
discourses of public health, deprived areas are written and spoken about as 
deprived communities, as opposed to neighbourhoods. What do I mean by a 
deprived neighbourhood and I why do I avoid the term community (which is more 
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common parlance) throughout this thesis? The construct of community, with its 
rich and abundant intellectual heritage, is integral to the history of social thought. 
The word itself can be traced to the 14th century, with origins in the French word 
comuneté and the Latin word communitatem (Sichling, 2008). However, the word 
is, according to Paddison (2001), one of the more ‘slippery’ in the social 
sciences. Much of the discourse on community is concerned with its fate in the 
wake of industrialisation, urbanisation, migration, market capitalism, technological 
advances and consumer culture (Muniz and O'Guinn, 2001); what Wellman 
characterises as “the community question” (1979, p. 1201). It is the legacy of this 
community question that seems to obfuscate more recent discourses around 
communities as units of social action. Sentimentality about an old-fashioned folk 
community, in which relationships were founded in ties of kinship, friendship and 
the sharing of a common identity (Chaskin, 1997) is important in understanding 
modern interpretations and is thought to stem from Toennies’ (1887) codification 
of community versus society (Sichling, 2008). Thus, the term ‘community’, 
defined as oppositional to individuality, brings with it a raft of associations that 
can hamper its theoretical and political value as a unit of social analysis. For this 
reason, the more neutral and uncomplicated term ‘neighbourhood’ has been 
adopted for this thesis. Neighbourhood is related to community; indeed the two 
are often used as synonyms. However, a neighbourhood typically relates to the 
area around a residence where people engage in sets of informal, face-to-face 
interactions based upon proximity to their homes (Davies and Herbert, 1993). 
Thus, it is more delineated in spatial dimensions than a community, which can 
encompass wide geographical distributions of members in, for example, a 
community of interest like a brand community (Muniz and O'Guinn, 2001).  
In contrast, the term ‘deprived’ is relatively straightforward to define. The UK’s 
Department of Communities and Local Government defines deprivation as 
“unmet needs caused by a lack of resources of all kinds, not just financial” (p. 2). 
Resources are grouped into: income, employment, health, access to housing and 
other services, freedom from crime, quality of living environment and access to 
education, skills and training (2010). The relationship between deprivation and 
neighbourhood in this thesis is founded in the observation that there are a 
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growing number of spaces where the majority of people are disadvantaged 
(Meegan and Mitchell, 2001); according to Dowler (2001), the UK has more 
extreme levels of poverty and greater inequality than elsewhere in Europe. As 
well as a lack of resources, the way in which disadvantage is experienced in 
these spaces is thought to be qualitatively different: it is more difficult to access 
services, both public and private; transport facilities are relatively poor; the 
environment is degraded, for example properties are allowed to fall into poor 
repair or deliberately vandalised (Meegan and Mitchell, 2001). Not least, there is 
significant stigma, both social and economic, associated with living in these 
deprived neighbourhoods.  
At the time of our very first discussions, we wanted to explore the possibilities 
presented by viewing such a neighbourhood as a social ecology (Collins, Tapp 
and Pressley, 2010) and considering what factors made people appear more 
likely to need advice about smoking and drinking less, eating a healthier diet, 
taking more exercise, being more alert to early symptoms of cancer and so on. 
Interventions based upon these holistic insights could be aimed less overtly at 
specific health behaviours and more towards tackling the underlying causes of 
poor health, we speculated. We talked enthusiastically about a community 
garden, which would provide exercise, social interaction and increase wellbeing, 
perhaps even increase consumption of fruit and vegetables. This insight isn’t new 
(see for example Prochaska, Spring and Nigg, 2008), and we knew that 
community developers have worked this way for many years. But we wanted to 
use this approach to show that concentrating on each health issue in isolation 
without acknowledging the underlying structural factors was an inefficient and 
probably ineffective way to do social marketing. The next section provides a brief 
introduction to this particular approach to social change. 
1.3. Citizenship	  and	  soap	  
Marketing has rather an unfortunate image tainted with a whiff of corporate 
greed, a touch of artificially inflated consumer desires and a Machiavellian 
willingness to manipulate in pursuit of economic success. Running contrary to 
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this unsavoury reputation, fierce debate has raged within the discipline for at 
least sixty years about marketing’s potential to make a positive contribution to 
society, accelerated by an article in the Journal of Marketing by Phillip Kotler and 
Sidney J Levy (1969). Their thesis held that marketing was a pervasive societal 
activity that could in fact sell citizenship like it could sell soap (Weibe, 1951). 
Despite attracting censure at the time, Kotler and Levy’s ideas won through and 
inspired a discipline widely practiced today as social marketing i.e. the application 
of marketing principles and tools to achieving socially desirable goals (Kotler and 
Zaltman, 1971; Donovan, 2011). This section provides a brief explanation of 
social marketing, before clarifying the relationship I perceive between it and 
participatory research, an orientation to enquiry that aims to combine knowledge 
and action to stimulate social change (Heron and Reason, 1997). 
Two elements of the depiction of social marketing provided in the previous 
paragraph probably require further explanation: first, marketing itself; and 
second, the notion of a socially desirable goal. Jack Trout, an eminent self styled 
‘Marketing Guru’, writes that marketing is “simply figuring out what you have to do 
to sell your product or service for a profit” (Trout, 2003, p. 9). The Chartered 
Institute of Marketing in the UK defines marketing in similar terms, as “the 
management process responsible for identifying, anticipating and satisfying 
customer requirements profitably” (CIM, 2009, p. 2). At its root then, marketing is 
said to be about ability to influence human behaviour (Andreasen, 1994) and, as 
Gerard Hastings (2007) points out, this ability offers enormous power to anyone 
equipped with the relevant skills and knowledge to be a marketer. But rather than 
using this power for profit, as Trout and the CIM describe, social marketers aim to 
use it to benefit society. In social marketing therefore, the term ‘customer 
requirements’ becomes rather more metaphorical than literal, as ‘customers’ are 
the targets of a social intervention to influence behaviour; and a customer’s 
‘requirements’ translates to an understanding of why they behave in a way that is 
deemed undesirable (for example, not eating enough fruit and vegetables) 
combined with an understanding of what might encourage them to make different 
choices. Some recent examples of using marketing in pursuit of socially desirable 
goals include challenging homophobic attitudes (Hull et al., 2013); reducing the 
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risk of carbon monoxide poisoning (Damon et al., 2013); encouraging children to 
eat healthily (Stead, Arnott and Dempsey, 2013) and reducing risky drinking 
among students (Thompson et al., 2013). 
As will be explained in the next chapter, social marketing is probably best 
understood as a method of change rather than a theory or discipline; social 
marketers are typically conceptualised as “hired guns” (Dann, 2007, p. 54) rather 
than people with their own political aims (though I challenge this idea later in the 
thesis). As such, it draws upon other disciplines for technique and underlying 
theory. Tools and techniques are transferred and adapted from commercial 
marketing see Peattie and Peattie (2003) for a review. Theory taken primarily 
from psychology (Andreasen, 1994; Hastings and Saren, 2003; Kotler, Roberto 
and Lee, 2002), but also and more recently, sociology (Spotswood and Tapp, 
2013) typically underpins a social marketing strategy. 
The study I present here explores another alternative to the conventional 
assumption of cognitive, self-reflexive behavioural triggers and to the cultural lens 
offered by Spotswood and Tapp: participatory or collaborative approaches 
(Bryant et al., 2007). Collaboration with ordinary people has long been advocated 
by public health practitioners (NICE, 2008) and in the health promotion literature 
(Glanz, 2008; Lefebvre and Flora, 1988; Israel et al., 1998). Ideas like community 
engagement, which assumes public services that involve their users are likely to 
be of higher quality and more relevant to the communities they serve (SCDC, 
2010). Others include co-production, which in the context of public services 
posits that “people who use services contribute to the production of services”, 
based on the insight that service users bring expertise and assets which can help 
improve those services (Needham and Carr 2009, p. 4). Foundations for these 
methods include community organisation, community participation or the planned 
approach to community health model (Stead et al., 2007). There is also interest in 
what has been termed the Assets Based or Community Capacities approach (El-
Askari et al., 1998; Kretzman and McKnight, 1996), which focuses on a 
community’s resources, skills, talents and ideas for generating change, i.e. their 
potential for social production (Arvidsson, 2008) rather than on their needs and 
deficits (Sharpe et al., 2000).   
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A rich and instructive heritage for participatory approaches like these is woven 
through a variety of disciplines in the social and health sciences, such as 
education (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005; Freire, 2000), community development 
(Fals-Borda and Rahman, 1991), theology (Berryman, 1987) and post-colonial 
international development (Chambers, 1997; Hickey and Mohan, 2005). The 
approach that appears to have most in common with recent innovations in social 
marketing practice (Collins, 2014; Collins, Spotswood and Manning, 2012; Stead, 
Arnott and Dempsey, 2013; Domegan et al., 2013; Bryant et al., 2007) has been 
categorised by Hickey and Mohan as “populist” (2005, p. 242) and is influenced 
by the World Bank Participation Learning Group and UN agencies (Rahman, 
1995). This method emphasises the role of the ‘target audience’ - in social 
marketing parlance - as knowledgeable and capable and repositions agents as 
facilitators rather than as experts leading change from the top.  
Like many methods with very broad application, participatory approaches have 
many different applications and underlying perspectives. One such perspective 
that is particularly relevant to this thesis is participatory research, which is not so 
much a method as a family of methodologies that have coalesced loosely around 
the dual notions that firstly, knowledge should lead to worthwhile social action 
(Fals-Borda and Rahman, 1991); and secondly, that there are good reasons to 
involve research ‘subjects’ as collaborating partners (Kindon, Pain and Kesby, 
2007; Cahill, Sultana and Pain, 2007). Thus, divisions between researcher and 
researched are dismantled (Gaventa, 1988). These approaches are “concerned 
with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes” 
(Reason and Bradbury, 2001, p. 1), which might include education, development 
of consciousness and creativity or expression through projects, acts and 
struggles (Somekh, 2006). 
At core this “orientation to enquiry” (Kindon, Pain and Kesby, 2007, p. 13; Kesby, 
2005), which emphasises a constructed reality in which there are multiple 
perspectives, is founded on these two concepts of action and participation 
(Davis, 2004). But things aren’t as straightforward as a reliance on an 
understanding of the words ‘action’ and ‘participation’ might suggest. Perhaps 
because there is no clear agreement in the literature about what ‘action’ is and its 
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relationship to social change (Reid, Tom, and Frisby, 2006); and probably more 
significantly, what change it is intended to stimulate and why (and for whose 
benefit, Whitehead, 2009). Hotly contested also is the idea that participation is in 
and of itself a beneficial, and indeed neutral, approach (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; 
Cooke, 2004; Cleaver, 1999; Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Tandon, 2008). The next 
section explains the relevance of these concerns and the intended contribution of 
this work. 
1.4. Meat	  and	  potatoes	  
Previous sections in this chapter have included statements about what I have 
wanted to achieve at various stages, as this study evolved into its current form. 
These have included a desire to ‘sort out’ the different literatures that touch on 
participatory as opposed to top-down methods; a desire to explore the culture 
clash of participatory working within a positivistic framework; the development of 
a critical, even Parrhesic stance towards my practice and that of other social 
change practitioners; and the rather more general and philosophical question of 
how the action happens, how the change that we all speak and write about 
actually occurs. But in essence, despite the rather complicated journey my 
ethnographic self has taken, this PhD is about methodology. The remainder of 
this short section explains the methodological contribution I offer, which can be 
applied to social marketing research as well as to intervention design.  
In the previous section, I explained that collaborative or participatory methods for 
designing interventions present an alternative to the psychologically or 
sociologically grounded approaches that have typically underpinned social 
marketing in the past. Participatory methods might seem particularly attractive in 
light of some of the criticism that has been levelled at social marketing more 
recently. For instance, Brenkert’s (2002) critique seems to point directly to 
participatory methods: he judges social marketing to bypasses the usual 
democratic processes of grassroots action and political discourse, stripping the 
targets of behavioural change of their voice and rights to self-determination. 
Accusations that an overemphasis upon an assumption of rational decision 
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making at the expense of a full consideration of context can lead to “victim 
blaming” (Hoek and Jones, 2011, p. 33) and stripping of voice is another relevant 
criticism, upon which I will expand in Chapter 2.  
This is not to say that social marketers are unconcerned with ethics (for a 
summary, see Dann, 2007; Andreasen, 2001 and Chapter 7). But I argue that the 
use of participatory methods in themselves do not solve these problems. While it 
has been suggested that such methods offer a promising way to empower 
“surplus” (Hickey and Mohan, 2005, p. 239) or “at-risk” populations (Pechmann et 
al., 2011, p. 23), like the people living in deprived neighbourhoods who are often 
the target for social marketing interventions (Hastings, 2007), this premise is not 
uncontested. Indeed, criticism that participation has failed to achieve meaningful 
change has been mounting over the last decade (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). It 
has been suggested that mainstream participatory methods may be hampered by 
inattention to issues of power and politics (Hickey and Mohan, 2005) exacerbated 
by the problem that such methods may be underpinned by an unsophisticated 
understanding of the mechanism and constitution of power (Mosse, 1994; 
Kothari, 2001). Another criticism concerns an overemphasis on local concerns to 
the detriment of pervasive problems of inequality (Mohan and Stokke, 2000) and 
a conceptualisation of the relative functions of structure and agency that is 
inadequate (Cleaver, 1999). Finally, it has been argued that mainstream 
participatory approaches may be too voluntaristic in regarding any form of 
participation as superior to non-participatory practices (Chambers, 1997) without 
considering the risk that those with disempowering agendas may adopt (or co-
opt) initiatives that serve their purposes (Rahman, 1995). The issue of co-option 
in particular adds an interesting dimension to the ongoing debate about the role 
of commercial organisations in social change initiatives (Lefebvre, 2012).  
Drawing upon literature from participatory research, international development 
and activist scholarship, I locate my contribution to knowledge primarily in the 
realm of ethics. Specifically, I point to the danger in adopting the radical 
discourses of participation without challenging some of the foundations of social 
marketing. I aim, through a critical reflective autoethnographic practice, to 
expose, “to contest and to reconstitute unproductive, unjust and alienating” 
Page 24 of 317 
(Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005, p. 597-8) language, discourses and the ways in 
which power relations are not typically acknowledged in standard modes of 
commissioning, implementing and evaluating social marketing initiatives, 
particularly those that claim to be participatory. Problematic assumptions include 
a tacit consensus of social good, which may draw authority from the perceived 
legitimacy of the speaker; aided by an assumption of neutral positionality. I 
synthese these points into the literature on social marketing ethics, specifically 
the idea that increasing participation can be a solution to the ethical dilemma of 
how to articulate a definition of the social good; proposing instead of total reliance 
on uniform codes, social marketers consider reflexive praxis, which holds ethics 
as locally negotiated, dialogic and political. I also offer some practical 
suggestions for policymarkers and social marketers wishing to embrace 
participatory modes of intervention design ethically. The next section explains 
how my contribution is set out in the remainder of the thesis.   
1.5. Overview	  of	  thesis	  
In Chapter 2, I offer a critical review of the social marketing literature organised 
into three broad sections: the first presents an explanation of what I have termed 
the orthodoxy for social marketing, this is a depiction you would find in any 
mainstream social marketing textbook and serves as a basis for the next section, 
which summarises the critiques that have been offered of this perspective. The 
final section of Chapter 2 presents three significant influences on the most recent 
literature, which I have organised into those that coalesce around a systems or 
ecological perspective, those who favour community-led approaches and those 
interested in co-creation and collaboration.  
Chapter 3 tackles participatory research. I begin with a brief attempt to set the 
scene before launching into the two main root systems; traditions that appear 
geographically founded in either the northern or the southern hemispheres, the 
latter the birthplace of the more radical and emancipatory interpretations of 
participatory research, from which I take much of my own inspiration. Following 
this brief history, I explain the ontological and epistemological foundations of 
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participatory research today, an orientation to enquiry founded on the notion that 
oppressed and marginalised people’s knowledge can be suppressed by 
conventional modes of knowledge production. Following this, I present a couple 
of critiques: firstly, that largely it has ignored other emancipatory research 
traditions like feminism and secondly, that participatory research is in itself a 
source of power and therefore should be resisted. Taking up the theme of 
resistance, I summarise the ways in which institutional bureaucracy can hamper 
participatory researchers, followed by a brief foray into the territory of activist 
research. I conclude with an exploration of an important concept, one that has 
unfortunately received relatively little attention in the literature: the role of space, 
both metaphorical and physical, in participation.  
Chapter 4 segues from one methodology to another, outlining the approach I took 
to creating the knowledge presented in this thesis. I begin by outlining the 
ontological and epistemological positions I have adopted, then introduce 
autoethnography as a methodology. Before explaining in detail the interwoven 
stories that comprise my research method, I outline and respond to some of the 
main critiques, of which there are several that cut to the very core of the 
legitimacy of autoethnography as a valid method. I conclude the chapter with a 
review of the ethical issues I encountered and how they were dealt with. 
Chapters 5 and 6 tell the story of my participatory research project, serving both 
to communicate and to create the findings of this study. In Chapter 7, I 
synthesise my findings with the social marketing literature in order to generate a 
contribution to knowledge in this area. In so doing, I highlight the problem of an 
assumed consensus that there is a universal social good, drawing upon the 
critiques presented in Chapter 3 to show how such an assumption can further 
marginalise people who lack social power. With reference to the importance in 
participatory research of reflexivity and positionality, I underline a concern that 
social marketers are speaking themselves out of existence and thus allowing 
important questions about power, politics and ideology to remain comfortably 
unasked. Finally, I highlight the danger in an uncritical adoption of the language 
and process of participation, arguing instead for reconceptualisation of the role of 
ethical frameworks in social marketing, drawing upon ideas from participatory 
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and feminist research. In the final chapter, I present a “text of illegitimacy” 
(Richardson, 1997, p. 137) that arose from my desire to experience more fully the 
epistemological significance of writing as a way of knowing.  
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Chapter	  2: In	  which	  I	  say	  where	  I	  came	  from	  
“How cheerfully he seems to grin, 
How neatly spreads his claws,  
And welcomes l i t t le f ishes in, 
With gently smiling jaws!”  
(Alice, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, p. 9) 
2.1. Introduction	  
As an academic ‘discipline’ social marketing is rather an oddity. The term was 
coined during a fierce debate between prominent academics, sparked by a paper 
in the Journal of Marketing in 1969 by Philip Kotler and Sidney J Levy entitled 
‘Broadening the Concept of Marketing’. Kotler and Levy’s thesis was that 
marketing was “a pervasive societal activity that goes considerably beyond the 
selling of toothpaste, soap, and steel” (Kotler and Levy, 1969, p. 10); rather more 
than the business activity of finding buyers for a firm’s output. “Too far!” retorted 
David Luck, writing in the same journal in 1969 (p. 53). Luck’s concern wasn’t 
that the non-profit examples given by Kotler and Levy were dissimilar to 
commercial applications or were invalid; rather he was uneasy about the 
implications of broadening the definition of marketing because he couldn’t identify 
suitable new boundaries. His concern was that “If a task is performed, anywhere 
by anybody, that has some resemblance to a task performed in marketing, that 
would be marketing” (Luck, 1969, p. 53). Thus, any organisation planning its 
services, any individual considering how best to get their point across would be a 
marketer. In Luck’s opinion, this would not do. Marketers should concern 
themselves with markets, “of course, and markets must be characterized by 
buying-and-selling” (Luck, 1969, p. 54). But despite the censure their ideas 
attracted at the time, Kotler and his colleagues’ ideas won through and inspired 
the discipline widely practiced today as social marketing (i.e. the application of 
marketing principles and tools to the achievement of socially desirable goals, 
Kotler and Zaltman, 1971). Building on the definitions provided in Chapter 1, in 
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this section I introduce social marketing as an academic discipline in preparation 
for the review of the social marketing literature that is the substance of this 
chapter.  
According to Andreasen (2002), social marketing has met all reasonable criteria 
for validity as a field: it has its own textbooks and chapters in generic marketing 
texts; it has a dedicated journal (and now another, launched in 2011 by Emerald 
Publishing Group), conferences and research centres. But he acknowledges that 
it lacks “academic stature” (2002, p. 4), pointing to the absence of any formal 
social marketing degree. To this I would add that both social marketing journals 
are of low ranking and my own experience, which has been that social marketing 
does not have the same disciplinary status as, say, psychology or sociology. I 
once attended a National Centre for Research Methods summer school and, 
following the typical introductory small talk about who was from what discipline I 
was told by an astounded human geographer: “Really? I’m surprised they let you 
in”.  
According to the Higher Education Statistics Agency (2012) social marketing 
doesn’t even exist; only marketing, which is defined as “techniques involved in 
the management of an organisation's relationship with its customers and the 
world at large” merits a classification. A scan of academic research centres backs 
up this impression that social marketing is an adjunct of commercial marketing 
and therefore belongs in a business school. In the UK there are two research 
centres with an explicit social marketing focus: the Institute of Social Marketing in 
the University of Stirling’s School of Management and the Bristol Social 
Marketing Centre in the Faculty of Business and Law at the University of the 
West of England. Internationally, there is a Social Marketing Institute at the 
McDonough School of Business of Georgetown University, USA and the Centre 
for Social Marketing Research in the Faculty of Business at the University of 
Wollongong in Australia; suggesting social marketing belongs with its commercial 
cousins in the eyes of most university executives. The only exception seems to 
be the Florida Prevention Research Center at the University of South Florida, 
which resides in College of Public Health.  
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So if social marketing isn’t really a proper academic discipline, what is it? In 
Andreasen’s terms, social marketing is actually more akin to a methodology, a 
technique, a hammer with which to hit the nails of social problems (Dann, 2007), 
rather than a discipline. Thus, it is in “competition” (2002, p. 5) with other 
methods of social change such as those practiced by psychologists, social 
workers, educators, community mobilisers, sociologists, media advocates and 
lobbyists. Often, this technique that social marketers practice is referred to as an 
‘intervention’ (Andreasen, 2002; Brennan, Voros and Brady, 2011). According to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, the term can relate to interference by a state in 
another’s affairs (for instance, a military intervention); an action taken to improve 
a medical disorder (a surgical intervention); or an occasion upon which a group of 
friends or family members elect to confront a person with an addiction or other 
behavioural problem, in an attempt to persuade them to address the issue 
(2013).  
Health and social care ‘interventions’ might occur in a primary care (Solberg, 
Maciosek and Edwards, 2008; Babor and Higgins‐Biddle, 2000) or family setting 
(Moran, Jacobs, Bunn and Bifulco, 2007) and are typically delivered by 
professionals or people who have received training in the intervention technique 
(Lewin et al., 2006). That social marketing appears to have adopted with 
relatively little reflection the neutral, medicalised interpretation of the ‘intervention’ 
is not surprising given that term’s roots in public health (Lefebvre and Flora, 
1988), but is interesting given that in the language of participatory research, the 
term means an aspiration for radical changes in society. Changes in areas like 
social and economic structures, employment rights and rights more broadly: to 
property, education and health and conversely also “to the reactionary position 
whose aim is to immobilize history and maintain an unjust socio-economic and 
cultural order” (Freire, 2001, p. 6). Nevertheless, it is the relatively value neutral 
interpretation of the term that has become prevalent to describe social marketing 
projects: as attempts to intervene in a particular situation in order to change 
individual behaviour.  
The review of social marketing literature in this chapter is organised around three 
broad themes. I begin in part one, with a relatively brief explanation of the core 
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principles of social marketing as advocated by the most influential scholars in the 
field, which I regard as the current orthodoxy in the sense that these are the 
principles most likely to underpin introductory training courses in social marketing 
and to form the backbone of social marketing texts written for practitioners. Part 
two summarises the foremost criticisms of this orthodoxy, namely that it is 
founded upon an overly simplistic construction of a rational individual motivated 
by self-interest, that it fails to account for social and health inequality in a 
meaningful way and that the customer orientation metaphor can be obfuscatory. 
Part three presents what appear to be the primary contenders for developing the 
field, which can be grouped into two categories: systems or macro-social 
perspectives and theories of participation and co-creation.  
2.2. Part	  1:	  Orthodoxy	  
As well as delineating social marketing as a sub-discipline of marketing, as 
explained in Chapter 1, proponents have been faced with the task of explaining 
to the wider field of behavioural and social change what social marketing is and 
what differentiates it from other approaches. This section explains the key 
principles of social marketing as set out in the literature, with particular attention 
to the concept of exchange.   
In attempting to demarcate territory for social marketing in the wider behavioural 
and social change space, scholars have proposed various typologies and 
markers of identification that have come to be accepted as an orthodoxy for 
many social marketers. In the most simple terms, Andreasen (2006) explains that 
social marketing has three elements: firstly, a customer orientation (which he 
describes as “slavish attention to target audiences”, p. 94); secondly, a sensible 
process for organising and implementing social marketing campaigns; and 
thirdly, the application of relevant concepts and tools, examples being the Stages 
of Change model (Prochaska and DiClemente, 1984) or the Model of Goal 
Directed Behaviour (Ajzen and Madden, 1986). Earlier work by the same author 
(2002) identifies six benchmarks of social marketing that have been widely 
adopted in other literature (see for example McDermott, Stead and Hastings, 
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2005; Stead et al., 2007): (i) that achieving a change in people’s behaviour is the 
ultimate goal against which interventions should be judged (Lefebvre, 2012; 
Andreasen, 1994; Stead et al., 2007; Blair-Stevens, Reynolds and Christopoulos, 
2010); (ii) that projects consistently use audience research throughout the 
intervention process (Maibach, 2003; French and Blair-Stevens, 2010); (iii) that 
target audiences are segmented (i.e. that a heterogeneous population is split into 
smaller, identifiable groups that share relevant geo-demographic or 
psychographic characteristics, so that they may be treated differently); (iv) that 
the creation of attractive exchanges (Bagozzi, 1975) is a central element of any 
strategy (see also Noble et al., 2007; Andreasen, 2002; Peattie and Peattie, 
2003; Laczniak, Lusch and Murphy, 1979; Pels, 1999); (v) that all four “Ps” 
(Product, Price, Place and Promotion, which in social marketing might be 
analogous or literal) of the marketing mix are considered in the development of 
any strategy (Maibach, 2003; Grier and Bryant, 2005); (vi) that factors that might 
constitute ‘competition’ for the desired behaviour change are accounted for 
(Peattie and Peattie, 2003; Hastings, 2003a; Grier and Bryant, 2005; Kotler, 
Roberto and Lee, 2002; Peattie and Peattie, 2003; Peattie, Peattie and Clarke, 
2001; Valentino, Beckmann and Buhr, 2001; McKenzie-Mohr and Smith, 
1999).Yet another principle that has featured in the social marketing literature is 
the notion that any behaviour change must be voluntary (see Grier and Bryant, 
2005). This way of working has been called the “marketing-to” approach (Lusch, 
2007, p. 261) because the process tends to be managed by “experts” who 
attempt to act upon a target audience that is assumed to be passive.  
The notion of exchange is foundational to conventional conceptualisations of 
social marketing. Economic exchange is a straightforward idea: two parties each 
possess something that may be of value to the other (for example, one has food, 
the other currency) and they agree to exchange one for the other; a process 
Peattie and Peattie term “a mutual and dependent transfer of value” (2003, p. 
369). The exchange paradigm emerged early in the marketing literature as a 
helpful framework (Bagozzi, 1975) and in Bagozzi’s view, exchange was the crux 
of contemporaneous debates on broadening the concept of marketing. Those in 
opposition to the broadening movement argued that marketers should concern 
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themselves with the most fundamental forms of exchange, that found within 
markets, “of course, and markets must be characterized by buying-and-selling” 
(Luck, 1969, p. 54). Though more recent work on markets themselves would 
suggest that they are anything but simple, as will be explored in section 2.4. 
Exchange is assumed to function via the medium of self-interest, whether 
conscious or unconscious (Nord, 1973; Homans, 1958). Bagozzi (1975) identified 
three types of exchange: restricted, generalised (a distinction he attributes to 
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, 1969), and complex exchange. Restricted 
exchange is dyadic and, at the time, was thought to underpin much of the 
marketing literature. Two principles of this type of exchange are identified: first, 
that it is characterised by an attempt to maintain a perception of equity between 
the two participants. This is primarily for reasons of self-interest on the part of the 
marketer, as they are assumed to “know that they will not obtain repeat 
purchases if the consumer is taken advantage of and deceived” (Bagozzi, 1975) 
p. 33). The second principle is that of reciprocity; a concept Bagozzi describes as 
the “quid pro quo” (ibid.), i.e. the knowledge that something of value must be 
exchanged for something else of value. Conversely, generalised exchange does 
not conform to a typical understanding of quid pro quo; instead it represents a 
system within which each actor imparts but instead of exchanging directly, they 
receive from someone “other than to whom he [sic] gave” (p. 33). Bagozzi uses 
an example of a commercial organisation making a charitable donation: if a 
potential customer notices that the donation has been made and then does 
business with the donor, a generalised exchange would have occurred. Complex 
exchanges are defined as a system of relationships within which multiple 
exchanges occur. Bagozzi’s example here is the complex circular exchange that 
is theorised to occur when a viewer watches a television programme. This theory 
rests upon the validity of an intangible exchange of value, such as the viewer’s 
time and attention in exchange for entertainment or information. The complex 
system comes into play with the involvement of the advertiser and advertising 
agency that place advertisements and potentially attract new business as a result 
of the viewer’s willingness to exchange entertainment for their attention.  
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Many social marketers argue that their work involves the provision of “meaningful 
benefits” (Noble et al., 2007, p. 395), which might include products, information, a 
compelling argument or even an incentive; in exchange, the target audience 
changes their behaviour (Andreasen, 2002). Described thus, this theory of 
exchange is closest to restricted exchange, a private transaction between social 
marketer and behaviour change target. Such approaches are thought to appeal 
because they parallel simple theories of commercial exchange (Peattie and 
Peattie, 2003), a vote in exchange for a promise of a particular political action 
(Laczniak, Lusch and Murphy, 1979) for instance. Other social marketers argue 
for a conceptualisation that is closer to complex exchange as it acknowledges the 
existence of differing exchange paradigms (Pels, 1999) exemplified in social 
marketing in the relationship between ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ targets (see 
for example Hastings, 2003b; Hastings, MacFadyen and Anderson, 2000). Thus 
exchange appears to have been accepted, with relatively little critical reflection, 
as a core principle of social marketing (French and Blair-Stevens, 2010). It has 
been suggested that this acceptance has come to pass more on the basis of 
habit and adherence to marketing management dogma rather than the creation of 
a compelling argument (Peattie and Peattie, 2003).  
However, some argue that there are fundamental differences between 
commercial and social marketing that make direct and uncritical transfer of 
theories and techniques problematic (Peattie and Peattie, 2003), particularly as 
social marketing is regarded as the trickier “game to master” (Bloom and Novelli, 
1981, p. 87; Goldberg, 1995; Andreasen, 2012). Bloom and Novelli (ibid.) 
identified a number of mainly practical challenges, such as the difficulty of 
accessing reliable data with which to segment. Andreasen (2000) goes further, 
pointing out elemental obstacles faced by social but not commercial marketers, 
including non-existent or even negative demand for changes that frequently ask 
for a great deal of effort and involvement from ‘customers’ of the change 
programmes; in return for which they receive benefits that are deferred, invisible 
(i.e. the benefit is in the avoidance of a possible negative outcome, rather than 
accruing a positive one) or that are to the advantage of third parties. In addition to 
the challenge of social marketing’s propositions being difficult to ‘sell’, Hastings 
Page 34 of 317 
(2003a) notes that social marketers and public service providers are frequently 
tasked with targeting the most at risk (Pechmann, et al., 2011), disempowered, 
base of the pyramid (Prahalad, 2005) ‘customers’ whose choices are greatly 
restricted by a lack of wealth, opportunity, literacy, political power and access to 
markets (Santos and Laczniak, 2009; De Soto, 2000). Conversely, commercial 
marketers have greater freedom (Heskett, 1986) to ignore such ‘customers’ with 
impunity.  
The earliest debates in social marketing focused on whether it was appropriate to 
expand definitions of ‘the marketing concept’ beyond commerce (Luck, 1969; 
Tucker, 1974). Contemporary issues appear to be less concerned with whether 
marketing can be used for social aims, but how best to apply it to that purpose. 
This debate is being conducted at several levels, with the most attention being 
paid once again to issues of definition and scope: we are still arguing amongst 
ourselves about what social marketing is and how it should be applied 
(Spotswood, 2013). Part two of this chapter, which follows this section, is 
organised thematically around these points of contention, starting in section 2.3 
with the least controversial criticism of Kotler’s original vision: that social 
marketing is excessively concerned with psychological drivers of individual 
behaviour and therefore pays too little attention to context.  
2.3. Part	  2:	  Heresies	  
Context is all 
The principles of social marketing outlined in the first section are myopic, 
according to a thought provoking and precognisant article by Thomas Tucker 
(1974). In his opinion, by viewing the consumer at a micro level Kotler, Levy and 
Zaltman (1969; 1971) were creating a concept of marketing based solely upon 
the viewpoint of the marketing manager without consideration of the wider 
societal context. This concern is borne out by more recent criticisms, as this and 
subsequent sections will argue. 
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It can be argued that models of behaviour change, enacted by individuals who 
are free to make intelligent and informed decisions (Hoek and Jones, 2011; 
Kennedy and Parsons, 2012), via the medium of simple exchange and 
predicated upon an assumption of rationality as a primary driver of behaviour 
(Homans, 1958), have underpinned a significant portion of theory and practice in 
social marketing. Popular behavioural theories include the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; Holdershaw, Gendall and Wright, 2011; Stead et al., 
2005); the Health Belief Model (Rosenstock, 1974; D'Souza et al., 2011; Earp, 
2002; Ross et al., 2011) and Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1997; Stead, 
Gordon and Angus, 2007; Baranowski et al., 2003; Beech et al., 2003). Further, it 
can be said that reliance upon the individualistic paradigm encourages an over-
emphasis on cognitive decision making based upon a conception of people as 
rational utility maximisers (Shanker, Cherrier and Canniford, 2006) and thus 
neglects the emotional and even sub-conscious habitual drivers of behaviour. 
According to Goldberg (1995), this psychological paradigm invites the bias of 
treating the behaviour as the ‘figure’ at the expense of the ‘ground’ (Winett, 
1995). This may have the consequence of overemphasising individual agency 
(i.e. the capacity of individuals to act, individually or collectively, as agents on 
their own behalf, Ritzer, 2008; Ritzer and Gindoff, 1994) over structural factors 
like education, social class, customs and norms (Angel, 2011). Thus calling into 
question the notion that behaviour change can always be ‘voluntary’ and indeed 
whether it is fair to hold the individual responsible for behaviour change 
(Raftopoulou and Hogg, 2010; Brenkert, 2002). 
An alternative perspective recognises the complexity of human behaviour, 
emphasising sociality and acknowledging that people are consciously and 
subconsciously shaped by others (Franzoi, 2000; Deutsch and Gerard, 1955) 
and by their environment (see for example Dahlgren and Whitehead, 2007). This 
acknowledges that behaviour is often influenced by contextual factors beyond an 
individual’s control (Goldberg, 1995; Hastings, MacFadyen and Anderson, 2000; 
Peattie and Peattie, 2003). Calls to recognise the role of context are perhaps the 
least contentious critique of mainstream social marketing theory presented here 
and this perspective is gaining considerable momentum in the literature 
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(Andreasen, 2006; Lefebvre, 2012; Hastings and Donovan, 2002). However, 
models like Social Ecology (Collins, Tapp and Pressley, 2010), which is founded 
on the ecological paradigm (McLeroy, Bibeau, Steckler and Glanz, 1988) and 
offers a systematic way of studying behaviour in context (Dresler-Hawke and 
Veer, 2006; Elder et al., 2007), have yet to become as popular in social 
marketing as psychological or psychosocial behaviour change models. A different 
ecological metaphor for social marketers, the construct of a market, has also 
surfaced recently in the social marketing literature (Lefebvre, 2012) and will be 
discussed in subsequent sections.  
This section has summarised the arguments in favour of a conceptualisation of 
social marketing that accounts for structural drivers of behaviour as well as 
psychological motivations. The next section expands upon the issue of inequality 
as relates to social marketing. 
All being equal… 
	  “We	  all	  know	  the	  problems	  of	  our	  poorest	  neighbourhoods	  -­‐	  decaying	  housing,	  
unemployment,	  street	  crime	  and	  drugs.	  People	  who	  can,	  move	  out.	  Nightmare	  
neighbours	  move	  in.	  Shops,	  banks	  and	  other	  vital	  services	  close”	  Prime	  Minister	  Tony	  
Blair	  (Social	  Exclusion	  Unit,	  1998,	  p.	  7).	  	  
It is acknowledged by many social marketers that behaviour is influenced by 
context as well as cognition and, as explained in the previous section, often the 
people social marketers are asked to target with their behaviour change 
interventions suffer restrictions upon their ability to exercise agency. This section 
expands upon a contextual factor that is particularly relevant to the project in 
Parkhood and Urbanwood that forms the setting for this study: living in relative 
poverty in an urban deprived neighbourhood.  
There is widespread consensus in the literature that the worse someone’s socio-
economic position, the worse their health is likely to be (Graham, 2007); 
numerous factors contribute to this health inequality which may not be in 
themselves spatial (Glennerster et al., 1999), rather they are shaped by broad 
social, political and economic forces (CSDH, 2008) such as housing policy and 
access to health and social care (see Bambra et al., 2010, for a review). For 
Page 37 of 317 
example, Townsend, writing in 1979, points out that regardless of the way 
deprived areas are defined, “unless we include over half the areas in the country, 
there will be more poor persons or poor children living outside them than in them” 
(p. 560). Nevertheless, despite strong arguments for macro causes of poverty 
and social exclusion, there is thought to be compelling evidence of a relationship 
between space and inequality. Societal increases in prosperity, for example, do 
not necessarily trickle down to the poorest areas (Glennerster et al., 1999) and it 
has been observed that certain geographic areas are particularly associated with 
health inequality (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001). One explanation for this can be 
found in the lack of power that results from social exclusion; people in deprived 
areas have limited access to whatever is driving the increased prosperity for the 
more fortunate groups. Another factor is thought to be the free operation of land 
and property markets that reinforce the social and spatial segregation of rich and 
poor people (Madanipour, 1998). Theories of the free market hold that this 
inequality in urban areas is cyclical: as the urban landscape changes, property 
values rise and fall naturally (Glennerster et al., 1999).  
As well as lower life expectancy (Shaw et al., 2005), residents of so called 
“underprivileged” (Meegan and Mitchell, 2001, p. 2176) neighbourhoods have a 
low sense of belonging, fear for their personal security, low expectations of 
mutual support from neighbours and little sense of belonging (ibid.) as well as low 
self-worth (Kawachi, 2000). The way this exclusion can be concentrated spatially, 
allied to the stigma associated with living in such a neighbourhood, is believed to 
exacerbate powerlessness because spaces themselves exist to function as units 
of state organisation and power (Madanipour, 1998).  
This stigma is said to contribute to the phenomenon of social exclusion, which 
piles a lack of access to public resources and decision-making (Madanipour, 
1998) onto a plate already full with economic disadvantage, resulting in 
disempowerment.  Further, the way this exclusion is concentrated spatially is 
believed to exacerbate powerlessness because ‘underprivileged’ people are less 
likely to be able to access the services they need outside their neighbourhood or 
by accessing commercially available solutions (Thomas, 1991). This 
powerlessness has a number of documented psychological, sociological and 
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cultural effects, such as increased aggression and feelings of stress (Abrams, 
Hogg and Marques, 2005). For these reasons, it can be argued that it is both 
unfair and counterproductive implicitly to blame individuals experiencing this 
inequality for their ‘bad’ lifestyle choices (Marmot, 2010; Green, 1984) by 
targeting them with broad brush social marketing strategies founded upon a 
metaphor of exchange between equals and thus predicated upon high levels of 
individual agency.  
Having set out the particular challenges faced by people who live in deprived 
neighbourhoods, the next section examines critically the customer orientation 
metaphor that underpins orthodox social marketing thought, with particular 
emphasis on its implications for marginalised groups, like those living in deprived 
neighbourhoods.  
All hail the customer 
Earlier, I suggested that in social marketing the notion of a ‘customer’ is rather 
more metaphorical than literal and in the previous section I argued that not all of 
social marketing’s customers are created equal. In this section I subject the 
customer orientation metaphor to critique on the basis that it constructs a 
situation whereby voluntary exchange is assumed to occur between parties of 
equal standing and agency; which may be unhelpful, and indeed unfair, in some 
situations. 
Metaphor invokes similarity as well as contrast between disparate concepts 
(Cornelissen, 2003), as with the customer orientation metaphor, which 
conceptualises people in the role of a ‘customer’ for interactions ranging from the 
delivery of public services to the design of unwelcome interventions to change 
behaviour. The notion of a customer orientation is thought to resonate well with 
public services (and more recently social marketing, Russell-Bennett, 2012), 
because the idea that ‘customers’ should be ‘served’ corresponds with an 
assumed desire of public servants to help the public (Fountain, 2001). The 
special characteristics of services – intangibility, inseparability (which has been 
linked to co-production and heterogeneity, Zeithaml, Parasuraman and Berry, 
1985) – familiar as they are to services marketers, bring the role of the customer 
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as the ultimate arbiter of successful delivery to the fore in ways that other 
conceptualisations, like citizenship, may not. It is evident that some public service 
delivery has been improved through the adoption of services thinking. Russell-
Bennett (2012), for example, describes a case in which applying the principles of 
service marketing improved blood donation rates by increasing flexibility of 
appointments and improving communication.  
However, the emphasis upon customer satisfaction associated with this 
metaphor carries an implicit notion that the customer is being privileged, even 
empowered in some way, by their role as the focus of the social marketer’s 
efforts. This observation appears increasingly relevant given the trend in the 
marketing and consumer research literature to assume that power is shifting from 
producers to consumers (Shanker, Cherrier and Canniford, 2006). In the case of 
interventions targeted at people who may not actually want to change their 
behaviour (as was found to be the case with people living in deprived 
neighbourhoods in relation to physical activity, Spotswood, 2011) the customer 
orientation metaphor stretches further still, particularly when the rhetoric of 
voluntary change is maintained (Albrecht, 1996).   
As well as the potential for constructing a false perception of the ‘customer’s’ role 
outlined above, a metaphor founded upon customer orientation may serve to 
obscure the complexity and dynamics of power that surround behaviour by 
creating the impression of a dyadic relationship between the service provider and 
their customer when in fact, in both public services and social marketing, a 
network of customers and clients – otherwise described as stakeholders – can be 
found upstream, midstream (Lagarde, 2012) and downstream in the form of 
funders, policymakers and influential groups, as well as the eponymous customer 
of the behaviour change effort. Similarly, a recognition that historically, theoretical 
approaches to market orientation privileged one stakeholder – the customer – 
above others (Ferrell, 2004); allied to the an observation that stakeholder 
relationships are both complex and worthy of attention (Maignan, Ferrell and 
Ferrell, 2005) has been accepted for some time in the commercial marketing 
literature (for a review, see Hult et al., 2011). 
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Yet another implication of a customer orientation metaphor is that it can imply an 
assumption of rational, free choice and thus can invite those that have little 
knowledge of the realities of being part of a marginalised group to fall into a 
counterproductive ‘victim blaming’ ideology (Green, 1984; Hoek and Jones, 
2011). It can be tempting to wonder, for example, if people know that risky 
drinking has poor health and social outcomes, why they do not reduce their 
consumption. Do they not care about their health or their family? Are they too 
foolish to understand the implications of their actions or too lazy to change? This 
way of thinking is not only unrealistic because it assumes that a ‘free choice’ 
exists in most circumstances, but it is undesirable because it hampers 
understanding of the link between behaviour and context. A related problem may 
be that while the customer service metaphor may help to create operational 
improvements in the delivery of public services, it is thought likely to exacerbate 
inequalities by obscuring outcomes that render some customers less powerful 
than others (Fountain, 2001). One reason for this concern is the potential for 
public servants to serve those who are easier to serve (see for example Bohte 
and Meier, 2000, on goal displacement). Similarly, a core principle of social 
marketing, segmentation, is thought to place public service providers on a 
“slippery slope” (Fountain, 2001, p. 63) of ambiguity in decision making about 
resource distribution among segments. These issues may also risk encouraging 
social marketers towards too narrow a focus upon their ‘customers’ at the 
expense of wider, structural problems.  
So far in this chapter, I have outlined what I term orthodoxy for social marketing, 
predicated upon stimulating voluntary change in individual behaviour via the 
medium of exchange. I have presented three distinct but interlinked critiques of 
this orthodoxy, namely that it fails to account adequately for social and 
environmental context; that it assumes high levels of individual agency when 
structural inequalities and social exclusion may limit the ability of people to 
exercise it; and that conceptualising the targets of a behaviour change effort as 
customers may obscure the dynamics of power and invite an overly simplistic 
perspective on how change can be stimulated. In the particular context of this 
thesis - deprived urban neighbourhoods - these critiques invite the conclusion 
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that, at best, social marketing is rather pointless and at worst, it has the potential 
to do harm. By this I mean that in some circumstances, as well as documented 
unintended consequences such as stigmatisation of obesity (Carvalho and 
Mazzon, 2013), an uncritical application of orthodox social marketing in deprived 
areas could allow those in power implicitly to blame people for their behaviour 
and for their failure to accept what could be regarded as an attractive package of 
benefits in exchange for behaviour modification. Taking this thought to its ultimate 
conclusion leads to the worrying possibility that individualistic perspectives on 
behaviour change could lead to explicit blame and ultimately withdrawal of state 
support from socially excluded and disadvantaged groups on the basis that they 
have snubbed all reasonable offers of assistance. But this line of thinking is 
sailing close to personal ideology rather than academic literature, so while I will 
return to political and ethical considerations in subsequent chapters, I will cease 
these musings for the time being. Part three offers a critical review of the most 
recent thinking on how social marketing should develop as an approach to 
planned social change.  
2.4. Part	  3:	  Revolutionaries	  
The holists 
The previous sections laid out a number of criticisms of orthodox social 
marketing; which all point, somewhat uncomfortably, to the possibility that social 
marketing may exacerbate inequalities rather than help to resolve them. These 
concerns are not new, and revolutionary perspectives have been gaining traction 
in the literature for several years. I have grouped these broadly into two 
categories: those arguing in favour of an holistic approach to planned social 
change, which is the topic of the remainder of this section; and those advocating 
more open, participatory and communitarian approaches like that employed in 
the project in Parkhood and Urbanwood. The latter is reviewed subsequently. 
These orthodoxy-challenging approaches are at an early stage of development in 
social marketing, though they draw upon other disciplines where the theory is 
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more mature. Consequently, the literature is fragmented and typically associated 
with a particular individual or group’s perspective.  
The holistic approach is exemplified in the Total Market Approach (TMA), which 
dispenses with the market as a metaphor and engages head on with complexity 
via systems thinking (Domegan and Hastings, 2012), suggesting that the role of 
social marketing may be to provide a framework for a planned approach to social 
(rather than commercial) innovation (Lefebvre, 2012). The TMA, which Lefebvre 
has adopted as a sort of ‘brand’ for systems thinking, actually emerged in low-
income countries, where social marketing programmes typically offer subsidised 
products, such as contraceptives (Drake et al., 2010; Drake, 2011). Thus, the 
TMA aimed to bridge “gaps between the public, NGO and private sectors” 
(Lefebvre, 2011, p. 66) in situations where vulnerable or at risk consumers need 
protection from market failures. ‘At risk’ consumers are defined as “marketplace 
participants who, because of historical or personal circumstances or disabilities, 
may be harmed by marketers’ practices or may be unable or unwilling to take full 
advantage of marketplace opportunities” (ibid, p. 23), i.e. consumers that have 
been excluded from full participation in the market.  
However, Lefebvre’s (2012) more general articulation of the TMA perspective 
acknowledges that it is helpful to view behaviour as multifaceted and context 
laden rather than rational and driven by relatively simple causes, and this means 
the range of actors and their interrelationships under consideration grows in scale 
and complexity. Lefebvre lists the private and third sectors, government and 
policymakers, formal organisations and informal networks who choose to 
participate (or not) in a complex network (Lusch, Vargo and Tanniru, 2010), 
comprised of groups of micro institutions and their societal context (Bartels and 
Jenkins, 1977). All this is conceptualised as a ‘marketing system’ (Lefebvre, 
2012; Dowling, 1983; Duhaime, McTavish and Ross, 1985).  
Inspired in part by the work of the Stanford Center for Social Innovation (Phils, 
Deiglmeier and Miller, 2008), the TMA is defined as “the application of marketing 
principles to shape markets that are more effective, efficient, sustainable and just 
in advancing people’s well-being and social welfare” (Lefebvre, 2012, p. 120; 
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Lefebvre, 2011; Hastings and Domegan, 2014). In harmony with the House of 
Lords enquiry into behaviour change (2012), which noted the need for more 
research on the subject of multi-disciplinary approaches, TMA appears to be a 
way of operating in response to complexity that may call upon communication, 
regulation, finance or other strategies, including collaboration with commercial 
participants. In fact, any technique that might advance social welfare “through the 
application of marketing principles” (Lefebvre, 2012, p. 120) is fair game. It could 
be argued that this approach conceptualises social marketing as integral to the 
policy process, rather than a mechanism for behavioural change brought in at the 
end. 
It seems relevant here to offer an observation about the difference between the 
way commercial and social marketers position themselves in the hierarchy of 
their respective spheres: On the one hand, much social marketing theory is 
positioned as a tool to be wielded by heavyweights like epidemiologists and 
policymakers. Commercial marketers, on the other hand, demand a seat at the 
boardroom table (the Chartered Institute of Marketing calls it a “key management 
discipline”, 2009, p. 2). Lefebvre appears to be proposing that social marketers 
ape their commercial counterparts in asking to be promoted to conductor of the 
orchestra of disciplines whose aim is to improve people’s lives. If social 
marketers were in this strategic position, integrated with the entire policy process, 
then hypothetically they could ask for changes to housing policy, large-scale 
investment in adult education programmes, better support of young parents and 
people struggling with mental and physical health problems in deprived areas. 
They could develop efficient, low-cost public transport and invest in organisations 
working to build community capacity, which would probably improve the situation 
with regards to the sorts of behaviours that social marketers are often 
commissioned to tackle, such as smoking and drinking. But it seems unlikely that 
social marketers will be given such a remit.  
Lefebvre suggests that the TMA will encourage social marketers to think less 
about individuals and more about the marketplace in their analysis and 
implementation. Given this shift in focus from individual to system, it seems 
helpful to explore the idea of a market, the core construct that social marketers 
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are advised to use in their planning, in a bit more depth. There is a vast literature 
on markets, spanning the social theory of Max Weber (Swedberg, 2000); 
economic sociology (Smith, 2007); morality and market failure (Zak, 2011); 
political science and foreign policy (Francois and Wooton, 2010) and financial 
economics (Ikenberrya, Lakonishok and Vermaelenc, 1995) to name just a few 
examples. This breadth and depth of theory suggests that a market may not be 
as simple a framework as Lefebvre’s early work might suggest. In a neo-classical 
interpretation, markets are thought to exist in a state of perpetual evolution driven 
by changes in the entities and the relationships between them; rather like 
Heraclitus’ doctrine of perpetual flux “nothing ever is, everything is becoming” 
(Russell, 2004, p. 52). Unlike Heraclitus though, who is thought to have believed 
in the strife of opposites coming together, Storbacka and Nenonen (2011) 
suggest that markets fall naturally into harmony, consistency and “fit” (p. 243) 
between interdependent elements (Meyer, Tsui and Hinings, 1993; Miller, 1996). 
Thus, as Lefebvre pointed out, markets can be conceptualised as a form of self-
correcting ‘business ecosystem’ (see also Vargo, Maglio and Akaka, 2008) that 
always returns to stasis (i.e. punctuated equilibrium, Gould and Eldredge, 1993).  
These hints at a neoliberal belief in “the magic of the marketplace” (Nitsch, 2001, 
p. 445) to establish fairness and balance seem juxtaposed conceptually with 
Lefebvre’s thesis that the market itself (its rules and practices) needs to be 
changed so that it functions not simply for the profit of powerful stakeholders, but 
“to better serve the needs of individuals and society through the application of 
marketing principles” (p. 120). Thus, advocates of TMA appear to propose a 
market driving, as opposed to the more typical market driven philosophy (the 
former characterised as attempting to influence the structure of a given market in 
a way that enhances one’s ‘competitive position’, or in this case, social welfare 
and the latter the more traditional approach of understanding and reacting to the 
existing structure of a given market, Jaworski, Kohli, and Sahay, 2000). This is 
important because of its relationship with the problem of inequality and social 
exclusion identified earlier in this chapter: if an ideology underpinned by the 
modernist axiom of freedom through choice (Shanker, Cherrier and Canniford, 
2006) holds that markets themselves are an efficient mechanism with which to 
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allocate resources, without taking into consideration that structurally some groups 
are excluded from participation, then the TMA will be no better at dealing with 
inequalities than orthodox conceptualisations of social marketing. 
Kennedy and Parsons (2012) tie systems approaches like the TMA explicitly to 
politics, suggesting that when a government undertakes marketing as part of a 
long-term strategy of behaviour change, in concert with policy and regulatory 
changes, taxation, community mobilisation, research or training and education, it 
is actually engaging in positive social engineering. Social engineering is a term 
that has negative associations, with the societal and behavioural modification that 
occurred under totalitarian regimes in Soviet Russia and Maoist China 
(McMahon, 2002). However, Kennedy and Parsons seek to redefine it as a 
process that involves “arranging and channelling environmental and social forces 
to create a high probability that effective social action will occur” (Alexander and 
Schmidt, 1996, p. 1). In other words, an approach that attempts to address 
enabling conditions (such as political or economic forces); precipitating 
circumstances (factors that might predispose people to accepting a new idea or 
to innovate, Duhaime, McTavish and Ross, 1985); societal motivation (that even 
if there is strong pressure for change, it will only occur if there is willingness and 
energy in society). Finally, actions are the proposed fourth element in the 
systems approach, which could include a social marketing intervention, as well 
as other government actions. It is interesting to note that these four factors that 
underpin Kennedy and Parsons’ positive social engineering approach arose from 
research into societal change and modernisation projects in developing countries 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Dube, 1971). Social engineering, thus defined, has 
moved a considerable distance away from the creation of attractive propositions 
to offer to rational beings in exchange for voluntary behaviour change. Further, it 
appears to deal with the issue of complexity decisively, by embracing and indeed 
exploiting it, rather than seeking to reduce it to measurable variables.   
All of the ideas covered in this section seem to point towards the creation of a 
new, albeit many would argue better, structure within which individual choice is 
shaped (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). This may not necessarily be a problem in 
itself, however it remains somewhat paternalistic in the sense that an unidentified 
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‘other’ is empowered to decide upon how individual wellbeing and social good is 
defined (in the case of social engineering as understood here, this would be the 
government, but the arbiter of social good isn’t specified in the literature on 
systems thinking and TMA), and then to enact these, potentially without recourse 
to public scrutiny or any sort of democratic process. An alternative perspective 
claims directly to engage with issues of choice and empowerment, seeking to 
collaborate openly with the ‘target audience’ of behaviour change programmes to 
create, with them, solutions that increase personal and social welfare. This will be 
discussed in the next section. 
The communitarians 
"Relearning some old lessons about fairness and participation," the UN says, "is 
the only way to eventually overcome the crisis and pursue a path of sustainable 
economic development” (UNCTAD, 2012, p. 167). One such lesson appears to 
be the value of working with communities.  According to Raco and Flint (2001), 
this idea has underpinned local reorganisation by the UK government over the 
last 30 years. The UK Coalition Government, which came into power on 11th 
May 2010, emphasised its Big Society policy, “working to help people take action 
to solve their own problems and create strong, attractive and thriving 
neighbourhoods” (DCLG, 2013). This section begins with a brief introduction to 
the wider policy context of community-based approaches, before homing in on 
how methods inspired by community organising and community development 
have emerged in social marketing. 
Policy thinking that emphasises the role of the active citizen and community as 
partners in local service delivery is by no means new (DETR, 1998). An active 
citizen is one who is defined as a democratic agent, empowering themselves by 
offering a challenge to the organisations and institutions that shape their lives; 
their power is not located in actual or metaphoric consumerism (Raco and Flint, 
2001). This appreciation for geographically targeted community or 
neighbourhood-based interventions (Chaskin, 1997) does not appear to have 
slowed in the 15 years. Rather it has evolved further, with approaches like the 
Asset Based or Community Capacities approach (Mathie and Cunningham, 
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2003; El-Askari et al., 1998; Kretzmann and McKnight, 1996), which emphasise a 
community’s resources, skills, talents and ideas as opposed to their needs and 
deficits (Sharpe et al., 2000), growing in popularity.  The term ‘community’ 
appears to be a cornerstone of these approaches and consequently, despite my 
preference for the term neighbourhood, as explained in section 1.2, it seems 
sensible to provide some elaboration of this ubiquitous idea.  
According to (Camina, 2004), analysis of communities is frequently undertaken 
dichotomously from either a predominantly socio-political perspective or one 
informed by a spatial or physical understanding. Sichling, (2008) however, 
suggests that the term ‘community’ can have five distinct purposes: to signify a 
unit of social organisation, to distinguish among social classes, to locate people 
geographically, to denote shared interest and to indicate shared identity and 
characteristics. Meegan and Mitchell (2001) suggest a similar range of factors by 
which communities can be identified: geographical proximity, common interest, 
conduct or social relations and physical or social character.  
Another stance is found in the tension between “the producers of space and the 
makers of place” (Taylor, 1999, p. 12). It is argued that ‘spaces’ are units of state 
organisation; artificial entities created to deliver services efficiently and assert 
governmental power. Conversely, ‘places’ are constructed through human 
interaction, engagement and sociality “as the simultaneous coexistence of social 
interrelations and interactions at all spatial scales” (Massey, 1994, p. 168). Thus, 
they mediate interactions between individuals and within communities, 
functioning as a locus of being (Raco and Flint, 2001) for social relations, part of 
the “routine, taken-for-granted nature of everyday life” (Giddens, 1995, p. 64). 
Even within relatively small areas geographically speaking, places can adopt a 
variety of form and size. Political conflict can play a role in constructing 
community identity, which can be produced and reproduced, not necessarily in 
the same form as before (Dalby and Mackensie, 1997). Along side this fluidity of 
relationships that is assumed to be associated with the construct of place is the 
question of whether communities are constructed because all the members are 
known to one another socially or whether the community is in some aspects 
imagined by the members. As Anderson explains in the context of nationalism, in 
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many communities members do not know most of their fellows personally, yet “in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1985, p. 49). A further 
complication is the observation that even communities that may appear 
homogeneous at first glance are very likely to have internal structures. For 
instance, Massey (1994) points to the different senses of place experienced by 
men and women in many communities.  
In very simple terms then, the word ‘community’ encompasses a variety of 
groupings, whether the distinguishing criteria are geographical or comprised of 
social, cultural or political factors. But, whatever lens one elects to view 
communities (of which there are several), it is apparent from the literature that 
there are many forms of community, including those that exist in the absence of a 
shared place or space (i.e. communities of interest).  Equally, one place hosting a 
single community “is probably quite rare” (Camina, 2004, p. 3).  
The rationale for working to tackle issues at community or neighbourhood level 
rather than with individuals or on a societal scale derives in part from the 
observation that the complex and interrelated circumstances that underlie an 
identified ‘problem’ (such as an unusually high level of alcohol related hospital 
admissions) can usefully be delineated spatially (Chaskin, 1997) as well as by 
more general characteristics like age, gender or occupation. As well as practical 
arguments in favour of community or neighbourhood level interventions, there is 
also a powerful discourse spanning disciplinary boundaries that posits community 
interventions as ‘a Good Thing’. Certainly, current political rhetoric in the UK 
seems to have subscribed to this perspective, as outlined above. It can be 
argued that this discourse stems from what Chaskin calls the “decline of 
community thesis” (p. 522), i.e. that urbanisation and an associated breakdown of 
the traditional bonds that held people together has led to a decline in ‘community’ 
and that the consequences are broadly undesirable. While this construction of 
community has been criticised for its overly romanticised conception of a village 
life (a conception that current research suggests never really existed, Camina, 
2004) the policy discourse at present links community interventions, as opposed 
to those targeted at individuals or at society as a whole, with a desire to build 
citizenship and community capacity; with a desire to empower through 
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collaborative decision making and with attempts to “rebuild the ‘fabric of 
community’” (Chaskin, 1997, p. 522).  
Community Based Prevention Marketing (CBPM) and Community-Based Social 
Marketing (CBSM) are two methods labelled explicitly as ‘social marketing’ that 
appear to favour community engagement methods. These ‘branded’ methods 
have much in common with one another: both aim to inform intervention design, 
originated in North America and were spearheaded largely by a single academic 
(Professor Carol Bryant and Dr. Doug McKenzie-Mohr respectively). Both appear 
to have been developed in response to particular issues: health promotion and 
disease prevention in the case of CBPM and pro-environmental behaviours with 
CBSM. CBPM draws explicitly upon community organisation methods (Bryant et 
al., 1999) and involves working in partnership with communities to apply a social 
marketing framework based upon exchange theory and the 4Ps (Kotler, Roberto 
and Lee, 2002). Formative research and segmentation techniques are used to 
identify perceived costs and benefits of the ‘product’ and to isolate distinct 
markets to receive the intervention (Parsons and McCormack Brown, 2004; 
Forthofer and Bryant, 2000). A marketing plan is created with the community; and 
messages, materials and strategies pre-tested (Salazar, 2004; Salazar, Bryant 
and Kent, 1997). Conversely, the intention of CBSM is to merge expertise from 
social marketing with psychological knowledge (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000; 
McKenzie-Mohr and Smith, 1999), and in fact it does not emphasise collaboration 
with target communities per se. CBSM is a process that encompasses four or five 
steps: first, a practitioner of this approach should seek to undercover barriers to 
desirable outcomes and then, based upon these insights, choose what specific 
behaviours to promote. Next, a programme is designed to overcome barriers and 
promote desirable behaviour. Then, the programme should be piloted and finally, 
evaluated. In their book, McKenzie-Mohr and Smith (1999) include a fifth stage: 
rolling out the successful pilot to the whole community. Other than regarding 
geographical communities as a target for behaviour change programmes, it is not 
clear why the term ‘community’ is so strongly associated with this approach as its 
philosophy appears to be routed primarily in the psychology of the individual, 
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though some suggested strategies do cover such topics as challenging social 
norms.  
Aside from the specific ‘brands’ of CBPM and CBSM, a more general approach to 
collaborative intervention development is emerging in social marketing practice 
(Collins, Forthcoming; Collins, Spotswood and Manning, 2012; Domegan et al., 
2013; Stead, Arnott and Dempsey, 2013) that draws upon methods developed by 
community organisers (Minkler and Wallerstein, 2008; Stead, Arnott and 
Dempsey, 2013). Whilst these participatory methods offer thought-provoking new 
directions for social marketing, they also have an association with community and 
international development, as well as participatory research (Fals-Borda and 
Rahman, 1991; Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Rahman, 1995). Ostensibly, 
participatory methods offer a promising way to empower at-risk populations like 
people living in deprived neighbourhoods (Lefebvre, 2012); this is the crux of the 
overlap I perceive between social marketing interventions and participatory 
research and in this apparent commonality I locate some of the contribution of 
this work. I will elaborate on these connections throughout the remainder of this 
thesis. These methods also chime with the ‘consumer empowerment’ movement 
in the commercial marketing literature and, on the face of it, with increasing 
momentum of the theoretical approach known as co-creation of value and the 
Service-Dominant (SD) Logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2004), which will be explored in 
the next section. 
The co-creationists 
Since 2004, a significant stream of work in marketing has centred on co-creation 
as part of the discourse on S-D Logic. In fact I intend to argue here that an 
association between the S-D Logic and community or participatory approaches is 
largely an unfortunate misconception created in part by their linguistic similarity 
and in part by the level at which the ‘co’ (used to denote an interaction of some 
kind) is located, theoretically. In very straightforward terms, I contend that in S-D 
Logic, the theoretical interaction is between resources and in community and 
participatory approaches the interaction is between people. In order to make this 
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case however, first I need to lay out my interpretation of the S-D Logic, based 
upon a review of the principal literature.  
Value co-creation theory is founded in the recognition of what proponents call a 
more comprehensive and inclusive logic for marketing, a “service-dominant view, 
in which intangibility, exchange processes, and relationships are central” 
(Ferreira and Proenca, 2009, p. 2). The S-D logic is based upon the insight that 
consumers do not buy ‘goods’ or ‘services’, they buy offerings, which in turn 
render services that create value (Gummesson, 1994); thus, the idea of a 
resource takes on a new meaning. Vargo and Lusch (2004) explain that, where 
resources were once conceptualised as static items that humans could capture 
and use, now they are regarded as neutral entities that only become active once 
humans engage with them. Yoda like, “resources are not, they become” (Vargo 
and Lusch, 2004, p. 2). Resources can be categorised as operand and operant 
resources. Operand resources are entities upon which an act must be performed 
in order to realise value, such as land or minerals; and operant resources are 
resources that act upon operant or other operand resources, such as creativity or 
technology (Constantin and Lusch, 1994). Goods-Dominant (G-D) logic privileges 
the operand resources (customers are conceptualised as falling to this category) 
and identifies value as embedded in physical products. In S-D logic, operant 
resources are primary because they produce effects, and both consumers and 
firms possess them. Further, customers perceive and determine, indeed they co-
create, value in use (Vargo and Lusch, 2004).  
So, when the term ‘co-creation of value’ is used in S-D logic, it refers to an 
acknowledgement that both producers and consumers possess resources, and 
that both parties must act to integrate their resources to enable value-in-use to be 
co-created. Thus, this way of thinking about co-creation of value can be seen 
primarily as a way of constructing a theory of the process of value realisation, 
referring to the processes by which both consumers and producers collaborate, 
or otherwise participate, in creating value (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004; 
Pongsakornrungsilp and Schroeder, 2011). Consequently, while the term ‘co-
creation’ may have been conflated with the notion of participatory approaches to 
intervention design (Domegan et al., 2013), for the purposes of this thesis they 
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are regarded as separate entities, with S-D logic having limited relevance, 
despite the illusion of similarity created by the terminology. 
Another perspective that has more relevance draws upon an observation that the 
last two decades of marketing thought have been characterised by a subtle shift 
in the way consumers are conceptualised. From passive entities that sit patiently 
at the end of the value chain (Pongsakornrungsilp and Schroeder, 2011), 
consumers have been recast as active agents that resist efforts to “constrain, 
control and manipulate them” (Gabriel and Lang, 2008, p. 334). This has been 
described a profound transformation in the producer-consumer relationship 
(Arvidsson, 2005; Pettinger, 2004) from producer-recipient to collaborating 
partner (Wikström, 1996). Thus, co-creation (same term, somewhat different 
interpretation) is also thought to be a necessary response to the challenges of 
sophisticated and demanding customers who resist categorisation and control 
(Holt, 2002; Fırat and Dholakia, 2006). In extending this argument, some 
scholars have assigned to co-creation an ideological mantle; by characterising 
consumers as creative collaborators, they become empowered to seek self-
fulfilment through their labour and to create value that would otherwise go 
unrealised (Bonsu and Darmody, 2008). This interpretation of co-creation is less 
about a theory of how value is realised via resource integration, and more about 
an assumption that the traditional balance of power between an organisation and 
its consumers is shifting. Thus, this version of ‘co-creation’ bears more similarity 
to participatory research, as will become apparent in Chapter 3. 
With this reasoning, the concept of co-creation appears to invite a revolution in 
the way markets are conceptualised, classing them as democratic spaces within 
which firms strive to engage creative and resourceful consumers in joyful and 
empowering collaboration for mutual benefit (Bonsu and Darmody, 2008; Schau, 
Muñiz and Arnould, 2009). Rather like Lefebvre’s vision for markets that are more 
effective, sustainable and just, value co-creation has been linked to an “evolution 
of capitalism” (Bonsu and Darmody, 2008, p. 356) towards creationist capitalism 
(Ruckenstein, 2011; Boellstorff, 2008) or an ethical economy (Arvidsson, 2008) 
made possible through consumer empowerment (Kozinets, Hemetsberger and 
Schau, 2008). 
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These interpretations are interesting for two reasons: firstly, that once again they 
speak to issues of power, choice and freedom in theories of consumption and the 
market; and secondly it links to Lefebvre’s ideas about redefining, indeed 
recreating, our understanding of markets. Indeed, according to recent work by 
Vargo (2011), S-D logic represents a pre-theoretic lens that invites a different 
perspective upon the economic and social world. Vargo suggests that the first 
step in building a theory of S-D logic lies in constructing a new theory of markets. 
He suggests that S-D logic is a model, or “service ecosystem” (p. 220), that 
conceptualises all actors as resource integrators, connected in shared systems of 
exchange, i.e. markets, governed by socially constructed convention. As 
explained earlier, these suggestions for market definition (Storbacka and 
Nenonen, 2011; Layton, 2011) appear to chime with neo-classical economic 
ideas of markets as business ecosystems that fall naturally to consistency and 
equilibrium, understood primarily in financial terms.  
Conversely, the ethical economy (Arvidsson, 2008) is thought to consist of 
emergent, grassroots innovation, typically by non-commercial participants for 
whom financial gains are not the primary concern; rather, value is realised 
through making a social contribution of some kind (von Hippel, 2006); an 
example can be found in the Time Banking movement (Lasker et al., 2011). 
Arvidsson (2008) terms this social production (Benkler, 2006) an alternative 
“value logic” (Arvidsson, 2008, p. 326) within which different ways of participating, 
such as those facilitated by social media or consumption (Muniz and O'Guinn, 
2001) are becoming a source of value (e.g. Toffler and Toffler’s ‘Revolutionary 
Wealth’, 2006). The ‘value’ that is sought in the ethical economy is not monetary 
or financial capital, it is realised through improving one’s social standing in one’s 
community, through networks and respect, or ‘ethical capital’ (Arvidsson, 2008). 
Arvidsson attributes these developments to three factors: firstly, the increasingly 
coherent consumer culture following World War II, facilitated by media and 
technology. The second antecedent is claimed to be an assumed loss of 
connection to traditional community structures with the growth of the service and 
knowledge economy (i.e. what has been termed elsewhere the “decline of 
community thesis”, Chaskin, 1997, p. 522). A final cause is believed to be an 
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increasing emphasis upon higher education, which created an increasing number 
of ‘knowledge workers’ who have been taught to value self-realisation through 
their labour. These are the so called ‘empowered’ consumers (Shanker, Cherrier 
and Canniford, 2006). The term ‘empowerment’ is quite significant I contend, and 
some of the consequences of this idea are reviewed critically in section 3.8 in the 
next chapter. In conclusion, this section has put forward the suggestion that co-
creation of value from the S-D logic is conceptually distinct from other types of 
co-creation, collaboration and participation found in consumer research and more 
widely. Furthermore this section has explored contemporary ideas on the 
conceptualisation of the market and the empowered consumer that are impacting 
on the discourse on social marketing. 
2.5. Concluding	  comments	  
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide an overview of social marketing 
theory as it currently stands. I have divided this into what I term an orthodoxy, 
underpinned by exchange theory and the 4Ps of the marketing mix; followed by 
an articulation of the various revolutionary approaches founded in systems 
theory, community participatory approaches and co-creation. I have attempted to 
show how the relationships between social marketing orthodoxy and those that 
plot their revolutions against its doctrine are complex and interlinked, founded 
partly in the relatively uncontentious observation that orthodox approaches are 
overly concerned, both theoretically and metaphorically, with individual 
psychology at the expense of context, which is thrown into sharp relief when 
social and economic inequality and exclusion are brought into the equation. 
Some would argue, and they are in august company with Professors Alan 
Andreasen and Philip Kotler (Dibb and Carrigan, 2013), that social marketing is a 
“brand of individual behaviour change” (Andreasen, 2002, p. 8) and as such, 
should only be employed in situations where individual, rather than structural or 
community change, is an appropriate goal. But other influential social marketers 
are working towards embedding social marketing into the “DNA and mind-set” of 
“government, state, regional or local public institutions”, seeking to position social 
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marketing as “part of the solution that senior managers and politicians can use to 
help them solve their problems” (French, 2012, p. 1, 2). Given this aim, these 
questions about social structure seem significant.  
What social marketers seem less keen to do, however, is advocate systemic 
social and cultural change, preferring to work towards incremental improvements 
within the current system. Where this observation becomes particularly relevant 
is when it is hinted that social marketing is emancipatory and empowering; to 
quote Professor Jeff French once again, ideologically, social marketing can be 
positioned as “a reflection of a citizen centric approach to social programme 
delivery and one that emphasises mutual responsibility as well as social 
cohesion” (2012, p. 3). But as I outlined in section 1.4, I share the concerns of a 
few voices (Brenkert, 2002; Raftopoulou and Hogg, 2010) that social marketing 
intervention may in fact bypasses the usual democratic processes of grassroots 
action and political discourse, and thus the people social marketers believe they 
are helping may in actuality be stripped of their voice and rights to self-
determination and participation. Thus, to draw upon discourses of citizenship and 
participation seems to me to be a co-option of these ideas, rather than 
engagement with them. The next chapter seeks to explore these discourses of 
participation and emancipatory knowledge, in the context of which I aim later to 
explore some of the questions that this chapter has posed about social 
marketing.   
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Chapter	  3: In	  which	  I	  say	  where	  I	  thought	  I	  was	  going	  
3.1. Foreword	  
 “Do not monopolize your knowledge nor impose arrogantly your 
techniques but respect and combine your skil ls with the knowledge of 
the researched or grassroots communities,  taking them as full  partners 
and co-researchers” (Fals-Borda, 1995, p. 1).  
I wasn’t satisfied with my work on this chapter so I rewrote it, but only after I had 
finished Chapters 5 and 6. When I went back to the literature, it read very 
differently to the way it did when I was trying to understand it the first time. Now, I 
can nod along to the dilemmas and frustrations that participatory researchers 
write about. For example, the way Caitlin Cahill writes of the young women she 
worked with in New York… 
“The	  report	  featured	  a	  hypothetical	  profile	  of	  a	  young	  woman	  of	  color	  which	  was	  a	  
composite	  of	  ‘at	  risk’	  stereotypes...	  The	  research	  team	  developed	  their	  project	  Makes	  
Me	  Mad:	  Stereotypes	  of	  young	  urban	  womyn	  of	  color	  [sic],	  as	  a	  way	  to	  ‘speak	  back’”	  
(Cahill,	  2007c,	  p.	  271).	  
…could have been written about the way people in Parkhood and Urbanwood 
feel about being identified as ‘problem neighbourhoods’.  
3.2. Introduction	  
There is a great deal of literature that deals with the notion that researchers might 
collaborate with their ‘subjects’ rather than treating them as passive sources of 
information. Collaborative methods are woven through a variety of fields in the 
social and health sciences, such as education (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005); 
community development (Fals-Borda and Rahman, 1991); theology (Berryman, 
1987); post-colonial international development (Chambers, 1997; Hickey and 
Mohan, 2005); social psychology (Fine, 2006; Fine and Torre, 2006); criminology 
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(O'Neill, 2012; O'Neill, Woods and Webster, 2004); geography (Cahill, 2007a; 
Cahill, Sultana and Pain, 2007; Kesby, 2005; Kindon, Pain and Kesby, 2007) and 
health (Israel et al., 1998; Cornwall and Jewkes, 1995; Khanlou, 2010). Some are 
more radical than others.  
Often, ideas of participation are combined with ideas of social action or action 
research. But while there are similarities between participatory research and 
action research, the differences in their origin and some of their assumptions 
about power and politics means that it is helpful to draw a distinction between 
these interwoven traditions, as much as possible given the cross fertilisation that 
has occurred (Taylor et al, 2004). Therefore, while acknowledging that 
boundaries are blurred, in this Chapter I identify the root of the difference as the 
explicitly critical emphasis of participatory research with its end goal of social 
transformation, which is described in the Southern story in section 3.3; in contrast 
to the more reflective focus of action research, which developed in industrialised 
countries (Whyte, 1995) and typically espouses an end goal of improved practice 
(Whitehead, 2009; Brown and Tandon, 1983). This is outlined in the Northern 
story in section 3.3.  
This distinction is my partly my own line in shifting sands (though others have 
drawn similar conclusions, see Gouin, Cocq and McGavin, 2011); where things 
become confusing is when participatory researchers seek social transformation 
through improved practice (Cornwall and Jewkes, 1995) and action researchers 
seek to improve their practice by tackling social injustice (Kemmis and 
McTaggart, 2005). Nevertheless, this imperfect distinction helps delimit the field 
and enables me to locate this thesis and myself in the realm of explicitly critical 
and emancipatory participatory researchers, the inheritors of the Southern 
tradition, rather than with the less radical forms of action research more typically 
found in management studies, health promotion or the study of classroom 
teaching. Hadfield (2012) draws the same distinction, classifying the two types as 
critical and pragmatic.  
In the two sections following the Southern and Northern stories, I elaborate upon 
two important characteristics of contemporary participatory research: firstly, that it 
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is cultivated ‘on the spikes of injustice’. By this I mean that participatory 
researchers seek to give voice to those who are typically marginalised, both 
generally by the society they live in and by the research process. And secondly, 
in section 3.6, an exploration of the epistemological foundations of participatory 
research, which hinge upon a rejection of the objective distance between 
researcher and researched. Having located my own sympathies with the 
emerging feminist post-structuralist perspective on participatory research, next I 
present some feminist critiques of mainstream participatory and action research 
literature, which is followed by two further areas of critique: the first in section 3.8 
links to the role of post-colonial development (which is defined as an expert-led, 
top down transfer of ideals and techniques from ‘developed’ to ‘developing’ 
countries, predicated on the assumption that ‘developing’ countries should 
naturally wish to emulate Western nations), with the concern that participatory 
methods are not as empowering as the rhetoric might suggest. The second is not 
a critique of participatory methods themselves, rather it homes in on the 
bureaucratic difficulties academic participatory researchers have experienced 
because the method is so different from conventional research techniques. The 
penultimate section of this chapter explores the boundaries between participatory 
research and activism and the final section explores the issue of space, both 
metaphorical and physical. 
3.3. A	  story	  of	  the	  northern	  hemisphere	  
In terms of a named methodology, Action Research appears to have developed 
before participatory research. Social psychologist Kurt Lewin is frequently 
credited with coining the term in 1946 (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005; Bargal, 
2006; Kindon, Pain and Kesby, 2007), describing a process in which “theory 
would be developed and tested by practical interventions and action” and that 
“ends and means were grounded in guidelines established by the host 
community” (Stull and Schensul, 1987, p. 88). This section charts the early roots 
of action research, before showing how it has intermingled with various traditions, 
including those outlined in detail in the next section.  
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The work of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations in the UK is thought to 
have given expression to many of Lewin’s ideas, generating through work in 
industry in what has been termed an early “British tradition” for an action 
research methodology (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005, p. 560). Kemmis and 
McTaggart identify further developmental stages that have contributed to the 
current position: a second generation, The Ford Teaching Project (Maw, 2006) is 
thought to have evolved from the work of the Tavistock Institute. Whilst 
recognising the value of this approach, it was considered by some to be overly 
practical (Carr and Kemmis, 1986) at the expense of critical consciousness. Thus 
emerged the third generation of more explicitly emancipatory action research in 
education (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005); one of those that blurs the boundary 
between critical and practice focused traditions (Adelman, 2010). A similar 
movement was gathering pace in sociology at around the same time, with William 
Foote Whyte and Sol Tax’s concern with the crisis of representation (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005; Richardson, 1997); seeking to enable people to speak about their 
lives in research without the mediating voice of an outside expert (Reed-
Danahay, 1997). 
What Kemmis and McTaggart identify as a fourth generation of action research - 
but others argue is the first generation of participatory research (Kindon, Pain 
and Kesby, 2007) - came to light in the 1960s and 1970s from the synergies 
between emancipatory action research and conscientização, the Latin American 
critical pedagogy movement spearheaded by Paolo Freire in Brazil (1970; 2000). 
Marja-Liisa Swantz’s participatory research (Hall, 2005) in Tanzania; Rajesh 
Tandon’s community-based research in India and Orlando Fals-Borda’s 
participatory action research in Colombia (Kindon, Pain and Kesby, 2007; Hall, 
2005) are also identified from the perspective of the Northern story as part of this 
radical participatory movement. These scholars tasked themselves with 
awakening a critical consciousness among communities so as to enable them to 
expose and confront “structures of oppression” within the state, political rule and 
economic and social structure (Hickey and Mohan, 2005, p. 241). This form of 
participatory research has been called an epistemology of practice grounded in 
the struggles of oppressed peoples (Kindon, Pain and Kesby, 2007) that has 
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been linked with the work and values of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi 
(Narayan, 2000). These, of course, are the seminal scholars of the participatory 
research tradition and their version of their story will be told in the next section.  
Subsequently, international development practitioners have explored participatory 
research as a methodology of empowerment (probably the most influential of 
these developments was Participatory Rural and Urban Appraisal, Chambers, 
1997); though the participatory practice of development organisations like the 
World Bank has not been without its staunch critics (Cooke, 2004). Indeed some 
have argued that versions of participatory research evolved as a direct challenge 
to these development practices (Sohng, 1996). In the 1980s and 1990s, 
participatory researchers found common ground with critical social scientists 
(Whyte, 1991) with the erosion of classic anthropological and sociological norms 
such as objectivism, and with growing interest in critical theory, feminist and 
critical race theories (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Kemmis and McTaggart identify 
a number of approaches in the resulting “family” (2005, p. 560): Critical Action 
Research, for example, is sensitive to power dynamics, particularly in relation to 
social class, strongly associated with educational research and characterised as 
“the self-reflective collective study of practice” (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005, p. 
560).  
Less radicalised versions include Classroom Action Research, which is focused 
on improving teachers’ practice and students’ learning. In an organisational 
context, there are Action Science and Action Learning, Soft Systems and 
Industrial Action Research (Flood, 2001; Huzzard and Björkman, 2012), all of 
which seem to emphasise the development and reflectivity of practitioners over 
social critique. A similar method, Community-Based Participatory Research 
(CBPR, Minkler, Wallerstein and Wilson, 2008), has origins in public health. 
CBPR is thought to have found its niche in that largely positivist field though its 
recognition that individuals suffer systematic health inequality (Marmot and 
Wilkinson, 2006; Scambler, 2012); are embedded in complex circumstances that 
shape both their behaviours and the resources to which they can access to 
maintain their health (Rayner, 2009; Kreiger, 1994; Simons-Morton, 2013); that 
some communities are known to be marginalised (Cook and Wills, 2012; O’Keefe 
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and Hogg, 1999) and that sensitivity is needed when researchers work in 
“diverse cultures” (Israel et al., 1998, p. 174; Kwate, 2008; Watson, 2008).  
But when researchers in public health write about participatory methods, often 
they sound to me as though they are diffidently arguing for just a little space 
alongside proper scientific research; that they acknowledge their weakness but 
suggest in small voices they can fill gaps that positivism cannot (though there is 
awareness of the problem of power dynamics, Wallerstein and Duran, 2006). 
Worryingly, some health researchers appear to have taken this positivist 
perspective further, advocating that participatory research can be applied 
systematically, suggesting for example that criteria based on motivation theory be 
developed so as to select participants in such a way as to achieve “credible, 
valid, and applied outcomes” (White, Suchowierska and Campbell, 2004, p. 4). 
Which rather misses the point, as I will show in the following sections. 
3.4. A	  story	  of	  the	  southern	  hemisphere	  
 “Do not trust el i t ist  versions of history and science, which respond to 
dominant interests,  but be receptive to counter-narratives and try to 
recapture them” (Fals-Borda, 1995, p. 1).  
 
Rajesh Tandon (2008) situates the development of what we would now call 
participatory research in a much broader socio-historical context than is 
recognised in the Northern story; beginning with what he calls “subaltern 
practices of community organising” (p. 285) expressed through art, music, poetry 
and drama. He draws attention to the philosophies of Gurus Nanak and Kabir; 
the latter whose writing is thought to have particular resonance with oppressed 
peoples, as a "protest against social discrimination and economic exploitation" 
(Lorenzen, 1991, p. 5). From this historical vantage point then, participation of 
oppressed peoples in generating their own knowledge has always existed, 
despite suppression and delegitimisation by dominant regimes. In this section, I 
offer a brief history of the context in which participatory research arose, followed 
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by an explanation of the method’s development with particular reference to the 
life and work of Paulo Freire. 
In the 20th century, such ‘subaltern’ movements attracted the notice of 
management theorists, resulting in initiatives like the Hawthorne studies 
(Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939) and work with British coal miners (Mayo, 
1933). However, by far the most significant influence on the Southern story of 
participation, according to Tandon, is the phenomenon of post-colonial 
development. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, a top down approach dominated 
development practice; with little regard for, or indeed awareness of, subaltern 
community practices. In the late 1960s and 1970s however, development 
organisations began to wake up to the potential of subaltern activities, prompted 
by mounting concern over the exploitativeness (both politically and in terms of 
natural resources) of the top down development model. Within this political 
context, Tandon identifies two strands of the Southern story: the first the critical 
pedagogy movement spearheaded by philosopher-activists Paulo Freire, Myles 
Horton and Julius Nyerere; whose ideas have been linked with those of Ghandi 
(Tandon, 2008; Narayan, 2000). The second source of ideas for contemporary 
participatory research focused attention on structural dimensions, highlighting 
incompatibilities between the legacy of colonial systems designed to control the 
masses and the relatively recent goal of facilitating participation among the poor. 
An example of this approach can be found in the United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development’s (UNRISD) Popular Participation program. This 
strand will be picked up later in this section, but as Paulo Freire seems to have 
been a particularly significant influence in this movement, I will expand upon the 
story of his life and work in some detail before explaining how his influence fits 
with the other elements of the southern story.   
Paulo Freire (1921-1997) was born in the Brazilian city of Recife to a middle 
class family that was soon to experience first hand the “plight of the wretched of 
the earth” (Shaull, 2005, p. 30) as a result of the economic crisis of 1929. This 
experience is thought to have had a profound influence on Freire in two 
significant ways: firstly, he became determined that no other child should have to 
know the agony of hunger that he had experienced; and secondly, he realised 
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that the dispossessed existed in a culture of hopelessness, of silence, in which a 
critical response was impossible. Of the relationship between poverty and 
education, he said: 
“I	  wanted	  very	  much	  to	  study,	  but	  I	  couldn't	  as	  our	  economic	  condition	  didn't	  allow	  
me	  to.	  I	  tried	  to	  read	  or	  pay	  attention	  in	  the	  classroom,	  but	  I	  didn't	  understand	  
anything	  because	  of	  my	  hunger.	  I	  wasn't	  dumb.	  It	  wasn't	  lack	  of	  interest.	  My	  social	  
condition	  didn't	  allow	  me	  to	  have	  an	  education…When	  I	  began	  to	  eat	  better,	  I	  began	  
understanding	  better	  what	  I	  was	  reading.”	  Freire,	  quoted	  in	  Gadotti	  (1994,	  p.	  5).	  
In his early 20s, Freire gained a place in the Faculty of Law of Recife and in 1946 
started work for SESI (Social Service of Industry, an organisation for employers 
to assist workers) in their education department. While he criticised SESI for their 
idealism, which he felt put obstacles in the way of the working class achieving 
their own identity, it was his experiences there that Gadotti identifies as a 
significant turning point in the development of his theories: first in understanding 
the way that oppressed groups learned about their world in their own language, 
“the language of the people” (Freire, 2000, p. 96), and secondly, the value of 
learning through practice.  
His own experiences with education are also thought to be foundational to his 
later theories; including the link between the aesthetics of language and the 
freedom of creativity, his words translated in Gadotti’s reflections as “creativity in 
teaching is linked to creativity in politics. Authoritarian teaching, or an 
authoritarian political regime, doesn't allow the freedom necessary for creativity. 
Creativity is necessary in order to learn” (1994, p. 8). In the late 1950s and early 
1960s, Freire’s concern as Professor of Educational Philosophy and Director of 
the Social Outreach Program at the University of Recife was to inspire his 
students to learn the language of the people; enabling them to conduct research 
in “the service of the people” rather than as “instruments of the reproduction of 
inequality” (Brandão, 1984, translated and cited by Lownds, 2005, p. 45).  
In 1962, Brazilian president João Goulart sanctioned Freire’s method officially, 
possibly as a way to swell the ranks of those eligible to vote (only those who 
could read were so). This method was refined as part of Freire’s role as co-
ordinator of the Adult Education Project of the Movement of Popular Culture in 
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Recife, during which he facilitated “culture circles” (1973, p. 81), in which he and 
his participants attempted through group discussion to clarify situations and seek 
action. Some of his themes were nationalism, democracy and illiteracy, which 
were presented to the circle in dialogic form with visual aids; later Freire adopted 
the same basic method for teaching adults to read in Recife, during which he 
found the discussions “critical, stimulating, and highly motivating. The illiterate 
perceives critically that it is necessary to learn to read and write, and prepares 
himself to become the agent of this learning” (p. 86). 
But in 1964, a coup toppled the progressive Goulart regime and Freire, along with 
many other left wing intellectuals, became an enemy of the state (Lownds, 2005). 
Military police confiscated Freire’s slide projectors housed in the Brasiliana 
library, which they burned along with the paintings that had been used as visual 
aids in Freire’s work (ibid.). Freire spent over a month in prison courtesy of the 
new regime, followed by sixteen years of exile, during which he spent some time 
teaching at Harvard University, only returning to Brazil in 1980 (Lownds, 2005). 
During his exile, he wrote his most well known book ‘Pedagogy of the Oppressed’ 
which set out the foundations of his philosophy: the notion that people are 
incomplete beings, but that each individual has the ability to become fully 
humanised through critical reflection and dialogue and thus transform the world. 
He distinguishes between the oppressors and the oppressed, but rather than 
condemning the oppressors he regards both as victims of a dehumanising and 
unjust social order. Other books included: ‘Education for critical consciousness’ 
(1973); ‘Education, the practice of freedom’ (1976); ‘Pedagogy in Process’ 
(1978); ‘The politics of education: culture, power and liberation’ (1985); 
‘Pedogogy of the city’ (1993); and ‘Pedagogy of freedom’ (1998).  
Diaz-Greenberg et al. (2000) identify four principles of Freire’s approach: 
dialogue and dialectic, conscientization and praxis. Critical consciousness 
(Freire, 1973; Minkler and Cox, 1980; Campbell and MacPhail, 2002), which has 
been translated from the Portuguese Conscientização to English also as 
conscientization (Freire, 1970; Nevin, Bradshaw, Cardelle-Elawar and Diaz-
Greenburg, 2009), described as an individual becoming critically aware of 
themselves in the world, is perhaps the most well known. Critical pedagogy is 
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described by Freire as a process that facilitates people’s development of critical 
consciousness via an “active, dialogical, critical and criticism-stimulating method” 
(1973, p. 83, emphasis in original).  
Freire defines his idea of critical consciousness partly in relation to the degree of 
sophistication with which people understand causality. “Naïve consciousness 
sees causality as a static, established fact and is thus deceived in its perception” 
whereas “critical consciousness always submits that causality to analysis; what is 
true today may not be so tomorrow” (1973, p. 82). Therefore “critical 
consciousness is integrated with reality, naïve consciousness superimposes itself 
on reality and fanatical consciousness, whose pathological naïvété leads to the 
irrational, adapts to reality” (p. 83). 
According to Diaz-Greenwood (2000), people transcend naïve consciousness 
through dialogue and dialectic, which are about creating a ‘space’ for 
understanding one’s own voice, being willing to listen and thus developing an 
awareness of one’s own point of view and its opposite. She quotes a student, 
who describes the dialogic process as one that “make[s] the soul come out 
naked” (p. 875). Praxis is characterised as the process of through which 
individuals reach critical consciousness through action and reflection, a concept 
familiar throughout the action research literature (Davis, 2004; Kemmis and 
McTaggart, 2005) and beyond (Arendt, 1958; 1998); which is thought to 
transform an individual’s experience of the world (Diaz-Greenberg and Nevin, 
2003). Freire’s critical pedagogy, along with the people centred philosophies of 
the other pioneers, were significant influences in the development of methods like 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) in the late 1980s (Tandon, 2008; Chambers, 
1997). 
By the mid 1980s, considerable effort was being expanded to include 
“beneficiaries” (Tandon, 2008, p. 289) in the design of programmes, particularly 
in relation to health, education and the management of natural resources. By the 
1990s, many development organisations, including USAID (Atwood, 1993), had 
adopted participatory principles officially. The World Bank espoused formally a 
Participation Policy in 1994 (Aycrigg, 1998). Around the same time, geo-political 
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changes such as the demise of various totalitarian regimes, including the ending 
of apartheid, led to increasing interest in the concept of civil society (De Oliveira 
and Tandon, 1994); within which the participatory philosophy became subsumed. 
But patchy success and concerns over co-option led some scholars and 
development practitioners to wonder whether participation was in fact simply a 
new version of tyranny (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). I elaborate upon this particular 
issue in section 3.8. 
Thus, the Southern story paints a picture of a participatory research that is a 
radical and political activity that regards the knowledge generated by the 
research process and the critical consciousness developed as a result as 
anything but neutral and objective. This is a position underpinned by specific 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that will be explained in the 
following sections, with reference to contemporary interpretations and 
applications of participatory research.  
3.5. Cultivated	  on	  the	  spikes	  of	  injustice	  
At its core, participatory research is an approach that turns the traditional 
dynamic of remote researcher and submissive subject on its head by seeking to 
involve in the process those who are usually ‘studied’. This inclusion 
democratises (Fine, 2006; Fine and Torre, 2006) the articulation of research 
questions, selection and design of method, analysis, presentation, dissemination 
and follow-up action (Cahill, Sultana and Pain, 2007). In this section, I offer a 
brief review of the political foundations of contemporary participatory research.  
Advocates of participatory research believe that people, especially those who 
belong to groups that historically have been oppressed - their own knowledge 
stigmatised (Kidd and Kral, 2005) - know a great deal more about their lives and 
experiences than researchers do and therefore should shape the questions and 
frame the interpretations of the research (Cahill, Sultana and Pain, 2007). There 
is no deferral to dominant research paradigms. Consequently, participatory 
research is said to be “cultivated on the spikes of social injustice” (Fine and 
Page 67 of 317 
Torre, 2006, p. 255) in two ways: it democratises the research process, so that 
the researcher is no longer the aloof scientist who has monopoly on what is 
studied and how it is interpreted; and secondly, participatory projects are 
designed to give voice to those on the “bottom” (Matsuda, 1995, p. 324) and the 
“margins” (Afshar and Maynard, 2000, p. 806). Why is breaking the monopoly on 
truth by giving voice to the margins and the bottom significant? As Mari Matsuda 
explains in the context of critical legal studies:  
“When	  you	  are	  on	  trial	  for	  conspiracy	  to	  overthrow	  the	  government	  for	  teaching	  the	  
deconstruction	  of	  law,	  your	  lawyer	  will	  want	  black	  people	  on	  your	  jury.	  Why?	  
Because	  black	  jurors	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  understand	  what	  your	  lawyer	  will	  argue:	  that	  
people	  in	  power	  sometimes	  abuse	  law	  to	  achieve	  their	  own	  ends,	  and	  that	  the	  
prosecution's	  claim	  to	  neutral	  application	  of	  legal	  principles	  is	  false”	  (1995,	  p.	  323).	  
Though she doesn’t mention it explicitly, I think Matsuda is referring to the 
concept of privilege, which has been defined as “the unearned benefits and 
advantages that accrue to members of dominant groups as a result of the 
ongoing exploitation and oppression of members of dominated groups” 
(Monahan, 2014, p. 73). In Matsuda’s example, white jury members benefit from 
the privilege of not having experienced an abuse of the law by a person in power, 
and therefore they cannot conceive that such abuses could exist in a system that, 
to them, seems fair and utterly neutral. 
The same is said to be true of research, particularly as privileged groups 
(western, white, male, able-bodied, heterosexual) historically have dominated 
research in which less privileged groups are the objects (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005). Because people who belong to privileged groups are largely ignorant 
(Monahan, 2014) of their status, often because they are not sexist, racist or 
indeed anything-else-ist in their personal belief system, they will simply not see 
that their ‘objectivity’ is in fact the subjectivity of the dominant position. Thus, the 
researcher’s claim to a dispassionate and objective stance is interpreted by 
critics of conventional approaches as oppressive in itself (Smith, 2005) because it 
will simply perpetuate the hierarchal status quo rather than challenge it.  
Challenge and indeed change (Maguire, 2001), shattering what Hannah Arendt 
calls the “lying world of consistency” (quoted in Schiff, 2014, p. 58), is an 
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acknowledged aim of this type of participatory research. Smashed as well is the 
“the false consensus of neo-liberal institutional life” (Fine and Torre, 2006, p. 
255), achieved by mounting a challenge to the apparent everyday inevitability of 
injustice. Fine and Torre wrote about institutional life in an article about a 
woman’s prison, but later in that same paper (and later in this thesis) they and I 
extend this critique to academic life as well. So unlike the public health 
researchers arguing that CBPR can help those operating within the dominant 
paradigm understand the objects of their research better, participatory research 
sets itself in open opposition to privileged, objectivist researchers. The 
consciousness raising aims of this type of participatory research has strong roots 
in the educational and political philosophy of Paolo Freire, as outlined in the 
previous section. The next section expands upon this theme with a consideration 
of the ontological and epistemological foundations of participatory research. 
3.6. The	  moral	  dangers	  of	  distance	  
“Do not depend solely on your culture to interpret facts,  but recover 
local values, traits,  beliefs,  and arts for action by and with the research 
organizations” (Fals-Borda, 1995, p. 1).  
The title of this section is borrowed from a fascinating paper that charts the 
creation of a fictional textbook called “Methods for Researching Oppression and 
Resistance” (Fine, 2006, p. 83). The notion of distance in research as something 
that is undesirable, even dangerous, rather than something for which researchers 
should strive sets participatory research apart from more conventional 
approaches to knowledge creation; though things aren’t quite as simple as a 
stark modernist versus postmodernist dichotomy (Atkinson, 2006). In this section, 
I lay out the ontological and epistemological foundations of participatory research 
as presented in the literature, with particular reference Habermas’ critical theory. I 
conclude with a review of the most recent contributions, which argue for an 
interpretation of participatory research located in feminist post-structuralism. 
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One of the few areas in which the many and varied traditions of participatory 
research agree on is how it works in practice. All flavours of participatory and 
action research are based upon an iterative process, a spiral of action and 
reflection sometimes known as “spiral science” (Kindon, Pain and Kesby, 2007, 
p. 10). Participatory research is a social process (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005; 
Kral, 2014), which draws upon the embodied knowing of participants, the self-
reflective and self-critical abilities of the researcher and their ability to develop 
participants’ capabilities through their experience of the research process 
(Cornwall and Jewkes, 1995). Common in the literature also is the stipulation that 
participatory and action researchers are not distant, objective figures.  
Reason, (1998; 1994) situates his epistemological critique of conventional 
approaches to social research in a historical perspective, identifying three phases 
of human intellectual development: the first, characterised by myth and 
romanticism, positions humans is inseparable from their world. In the second, 
which Reason doesn’t identify as such in this paper but I assume refers to the 
Enlightenment, humans progressively separate themselves from their world, as 
“a Promethean biological and metaphysical rebel” privileging scientific 
detachment over embodied knowing, engaging in an “heroic impulse to forge an 
autonomous rational human self by separating itself from the primordial unity with 
nature” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 441). 
This unashamedly androcentric perspective, with much metaphorical questing 
and heroism (one can almost hear the faint fanfare of trumpets) still dominates 
our thinking today, Reason argues. With a surprising lack of recognition for the 
“writing out” of women’s contributions to, well, everything (Lengermann and 
Gillian, 2006, p. 3; Russ, 1983), he situates this individualism as masculine 
endeavour that suppresses participation (which he identifies as feminine). While I 
disagree vehemently with this assignation of socially constructed categories to 
different ways of thinking, associated as this practice is with perpetuating 
oppression rather than challenging it (I expand upon the feminist critique of the 
participatory research literature in section 3.7), it doesn’t necessarily detract from 
the basic point that the third phase of knowledge, a “postmodern moment” 
(Reason, 1998, p. 10), is upon us. Though rather than following a postmodernist 
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epistemology, Reason has been a leading figure in the development of a 
participatory paradigm (see also Guba and Lincoln, 2005), within which “the 
world we experience as 'reality' is subjective-objective, a co-creation [there’s that 
term again] that involves the primal givenness of the cosmos and human 
experience, imagination and intuition, thinking and construing, and intentional 
action in the world” (Reason, 1998, p. 11).  
While we can be confident that participatory research is not founded on a realist 
or critical realist ontology or a positivist epistemology, at least as defined by Guba 
and Lincoln (2005), the assumptions that do underpin it are not simple to locate 
in one particular paradigm, as there seem to be several competing influences. 
One such influence is critical theory, in particular the work of Jürgen Habermas, 
whose writings on communicative action and the public sphere underpin the 
arguments in favour of a participatory approach in what has been termed the 
“northern tradition” (Wallerstein and Duran, 2006, p. 313). In Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action (1987), people are thought to reach unforced consensus 
about what action to take by way of intersubjective agreement as a basis for 
mutual understanding; opening up communicative space (1996), which in turn 
builds solidarity and legitimises the action (the issue of space is explored later in 
this chapter). These pillars form the foundational criteria for what constitutes 
knowledge (Habermas, 1972) in this northern tradition (Elliott, 2005; Kemmis and 
McTaggart, 2005).  
Kincheloe and McLaren provide a very broad definition of a researcher in the 
critical theory paradigm that includes: the socially and historically constructed 
nature of reality and the inseparability of knowledge from knower; an unstable 
relationship between concept and object which is often mediated by the social 
relations of capitalism; the centrality of language to the formation of subjectivity; 
the privileging of some social groups and the oppression of others for varying 
reasons, often linked once again to capitalism; and that mainstream research 
practice has been implicated in the replication of oppressive social structures 
(see also Kinchloe and Steinberg, 1997). In their words, a critical researcher is 
someone who: 
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“…attempts	  to	  use	  her	  or	  his	  work	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  or	  cultural	  criticism	  and	  who	  
accepts	  certain	  basic	  assumptions:	  that	  all	  thought	  is	  fundamentally	  	  mediated	  by	  
power	  relations	  that	  are	  social	  [sic]	  and	  historically	  constructed;	  that	  facts	  can	  never	  
be	  isolated	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  values	  or	  removed	  from	  some	  form	  of	  ideological	  
inscription”	  (2005,	  p.	  304).	  
In other words, a researcher who locates herself in this tradition is not neutral and 
distant from her research or from her participants. Thus participatory research is 
located largely in Habermas’ emancipatory category, rather than the technical or 
practical (Ozanne and Saatcioglu, 2008; Elliott, 2005). Kincheloe and McLaren 
explain in the introduction to their chapter that their “ideosyncratic ‘take’” (2005, 
p. 303) is but one interpretation that others may find problematic. They are 
correct. Not in the sense that others disagree with their characterisation (it is so 
broad that it would be difficult to find fault in this regard) but I infer that in its very 
inclusivity it may gloss over important distinctions.  
One such distinction is between the critical and pragmatic “camps” (Hadfield, 
2012, p. 573). The dilemma is that participatory research is not conducted 
exclusively in circumstances where there is obvious social injustice; examples of 
suck a lack of obvious inequality might include an organisation or a classroom in 
the UK (Davis, 2004). I have encountered similar situations in my own research, 
for example in a collaborative project with women in a middle-class area to raise 
awareness of the range of breast cancer symptoms among their peers, there 
were no obvious social justice issues: the town was affluent, all the participants 
were educated, confident and articulate. They took minutes of their meetings and 
developed spreadsheets to track their activity. They were invited to represent 
themselves on a local ‘health and wellbeing’ board and are still working towards 
their aims as I write, four years later. Elliott argues, somewhat ironically, that the 
popularity of critical perspectives marginalises those more pragmatic studies by 
creating an “epistemological hierarchy” (2005, p. 365) with emancipatory 
perspectives above practical ones. He also contends, probably more importantly, 
that the Harbermasian underpinnings of Carr and Kemmis’ original work (1986) 
mean that there is a disconnection between theory and the practical business of 
making change happen. Elliott is not alone in critiquing the applications of 
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emancipatory participation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001), a topic that will be 
expanded upon later in this chapter.   
Another epistemological distinction can be found in recent feminist post-
structuralist perspectives on Freire’s original critical pedagogy "the term used to 
describe what emerges when critical theory encounters education" (Kinchloe and 
Steinberg, 1997, p. 24). Caitlin Cahill points out that a significant portion of what 
could be called the ‘emancipatory logic’ of participatory research has been 
explored thoroughly in the context of broad social change and consciousness 
raising, but less well understood is the role of participatory research in personal 
change (for an exception see Torre, 2005). Once again, this issue is concerned 
with the possibility of a disconnect between the theory of change and its actual 
occurrence.  
At first glance, the underpinnings of participatory research as a method that 
privileges local authenticity and seeks emancipation of the oppressed may 
appear incompatible with post-structuralism, with its emphasis on everyone’s 
subjective being in the world (Cahill, 2007a). Certainly, with recourse to Guba 
and Lincoln’s (2005) framework, critical theory and post-structuralism are in 
different boxes, though it is interesting to note Fals-Borda’s (2001) observation 
that with the perspective of hindsight, he and his contemporaries working to 
develop participatory methodologies in the 1970s anticipated postmodernism. 
Cameron and Gibson (2005) identify three areas in which the “sea change” 
(Barrett, 1992, p. 205) of post-structuralist thought has implications for 
participatory research. These are identity and subjectivity; language and 
representation; and politics. The call for reciprocation comes from both sides of 
the divide though, with scholars like Patricia Ann Lather (1991) for example, 
asking what all this textual deconstruction is actually for, what it achieves, where 
the action is (Reason and Bradbury, 2001). And thus, ontologically at least, we 
are led back to Reason’s participatory ontology with an epistemology located in 
“critical subjectivity…experiential, propositional, and practical knowing; cocreated 
findings” (Guba and Lincoln, 2005, p. 195). 
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Clearly, this is a debate that is ongoing but in order to provide some sort of 
foundation for the work in this thesis, I will draw upon the collective of 
researchers who draw upon feminist post-structuralist approaches in their 
participatory endeavours. This collective includes some relatively new 
researchers like Caitlin Cahill (2007a; Cahill, Sultana and Pain, 2007) and Maria 
Elena Torre (2005), as well as more established scholars like Rachel Pain, 
Michelle Fine and Mike Kesby. I choose to draw upon their interpretations partly 
because they resonate strongly with my own experiences and perspective and 
partly because I can see strong links with the feminist post-structuralism of Laurel 
Richardson’s work on academic writing, which underpins my methodological 
approach (this will be explained in the next chapter). From this perspective, I will 
return to this crucial question of how practical change is to be achieved, if, as 
Elliott worries, “becoming critical is not enough to become empowered as a 
change agent” (2005, p. 362). This question of being a change agent, an activist, 
as well as a researcher is explored section 3.10, within which I adopt the 
perspective of the feminist post-structuralist participatory researchers outlined 
here. The next section continues the feminist theme by summarising explicitly 
feminist critiques of the participatory research literature.  
3.7. All	  the	  reasonings	  of	  men	  
If participatory research is founded on the understanding that people who have 
experienced oppression are best placed to ask research questions and interpret 
the results (Torre and Fine, 2006), then feminist - and indeed critical race - 
perspectives should be integral to participatory research (Collins, 2000). And yet, 
gender as a source of oppression has received relatively little attention in the 
mainstream participatory and action research literatures (as opposed to social 
class, for example), with feminist perspectives largely “ignored, minimised or 
marginalised” (Maguire, 1987, p. 52); an omission Maguire finds “inadequate for 
its supposed liberatory project” (2001, p. 60). In this short section, I review the 
intersection between feminist and participatory research. 
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While women’s (and children’s) empowerment has received what Tandon (2008) 
characterises as paternalistic attention from developers, and there have been 
calls for greater attention to the social causes of women’s health problems (Israel 
et al., 1994; Israel et al, 1998; Shiell and Hawe, 1996), the exclusion of feminist 
or womanist perspectives has resulted in inadequate attention to the notion of 
seeking truly emancipatory knowledge (Harding, 1986) promised by participatory 
research. Of course, as Cahill (2007c) points out, the voices of women and other 
excluded groups do not represent “new perspectives, rather they represent 
voices that have been marginalised, silenced, or ignored” (p. 330). A sentiment 
echoed in Greenwood’s observation (in an email to Patricia Maguire, 2001), that 
his female students find action research easier to learn than men, a phenomenon 
he attributes to them having learned “how to manage without domineering, linking 
rather than coercing, respecting diversity and otherness rather than imposing 
sameness are lessons women often learn as a result of being coerced 
themselves” (p. 61). In other words, women are skilled at understanding 
oppression because it is woven through our lived experience. 
There is of course a considerable literature on feminism and feminist research, 
which, while fascinating to me personally, has limited relevance to the overall 
trajectory of this thesis. However, what does seem relevant here is the discovery 
that, regretfully, Maguire’s chapter in the Handbook of Action Research was 
replaced in later editions by Reid et al.’s (2006) exposition of a ‘Feminist 
Participatory Action Research’ (FPAR), which they define as “a conceptual and 
methodological framework that enables a critical understanding of women’s 
multiple perspectives and works towards inclusion, participation and action, while 
confronting the underlying assumptions researchers bring into the research 
process” (2006, p. 316). They claim that feminist participatory researchers work 
towards a dual aim of changing the conditions of women’s lives and challenging 
conventional notions of power such that it can be used more responsibly.   
But while this assertion that an explicitly feminist participatory research would 
draw upon feminist understandings of power and would seek social change 
specifically for the liberation of women seems sensible on the surface, what 
seems to be missing from Reid et al.’s analysis is an exploration of how this 
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advances our thinking. Is it being suggested that feminist research would benefit 
from the addition of some sort of concrete focus on ‘action’ or that the male 
dominated traditions of action and participatory research would benefit from 
some feminism? This question seems pertinent because feminist research itself 
has always been characterised by “unwavering commitment to knowledge 
production as the scene of political struggle” (Wiegman, 2012, p. 71). In fact it 
could be argued that rather like Tandon’s subaltern community organisers 
(2008), feminist researchers have been around as long as participatory 
researchers, conducting socially engaged research in pursuit of liberation and 
change (Maguire, 2001; Harris, 2001; Cahill, 2007a). In this context, suggesting 
that, as a body of work, participatory research would benefit from a sprinkle of 
feminism could be rather insulting, as could the hint that feminism has been 
conflated with a rather more straightforward notion of issues that affect women 
primarily (Fields, 2013). Consequently, I do not associate the work I did in the 
project with this particular flavour of participatory action research; rather I prefer 
the messier, more complex version of Maguire and Cahill that acknowledges 
feminism and participatory research as two venerable traditions with much in 
common. Having located myself thus, in the next section I move on to another 
critique hinted at with the reference to critical race and post-colonial scholarship, 
engaging directly with the legacy of post-colonial development for participatory 
research.   
3.8. Transformative	  or	  tyrannical?	  
A different flavour of criticism, a legacy of post-colonial development explained in 
the Southern story and one that has proved particularly influential for me, is that 
participatory research has become too mainstream. It has been co-opted by the 
establishment and, as their tool, reinforces oppression rather than resisting it: 
that participation has itself become just another tyranny (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001). This critique appears to chime with post-structuralist conceptualisations of 
power as effect resulting from the interplay of various resources (Foucault, 2000). 
The resources associated with participatory methods include discourses and 
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practices around democracy, equality, raised consciousness and critical self-
reflection; ultimately, the legitimacy of participatory approaches as a tool to 
achieve freedom from oppression. In this section I outline a second critique of 
participatory methods, founded in these theories of power.  
In essence, this critique is located in the application of participatory methods, 
rather than their underlying theory. It recognises firstly that anyone can use 
participatory techniques and in so doing has the opportunity to co-opt the power 
of their heritage; and secondly, that even if well intentioned and critically sensitive 
academics adopt a participatory approach, who is to say that their work is not 
inadvertently oppressive in itself, perhaps due to a privileged perspective that 
they are unaware is influencing their relations with their co-researchers? 
Participatory methods therefore, argue critics (Kapoor, 2005; Kothari, 2001), are 
not really so different from other, more conventional exercises of power and 
should be resisted. Bill Cooke (2004) uses the example of the World Bank to 
show how influential organisations can adopt participatory methods and rhetoric 
and thus benefit from the power of that discourse, without actually changing 
anything about their neoliberal philosophy:  
“Greater	  impact	  on	  people’s	  empowerment	  –	  in	  terms	  of,	  say	  their	  right	  to	  life	  
through	  healthcare,	  water	  and	  education	  –	  is	  made	  by	  decisions	  taken	  by	  the	  Bank	  
and	  the	  IMF	  on	  debt	  repayment	  than	  can	  be	  made	  by	  an	  infinity	  of	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  
participatory	  events	  which	  have	  no	  power	  over	  debt”	  (p.	  47).	  
Cooke’s point is that participatory methods are a smoke screen being used to 
legitimise the Bank’s promotion of its ideology and further, that practitioners of 
participatory methods who go along with such agendas are complicit in the 
continued oppression, even suffering, that results. Other criticisms of participation 
emerging from development studies include the creation of a hierarchy with 
participatory methods at the top (see also Elliott, 2005); the framing by outsiders 
of people as oppressed and thus creating them as objects requiring intervention 
who must perform appropriately in the participatory process (Cornwall and Brock, 
2005); the reinforcement of researchers as experts, not in the subject matter but 
in the participatory process, thus reinforcing their control of that process (Mohan, 
2006); and reinforcement of existing power structures via an overly simplistic 
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conception of local knowledge (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Sanderson and Kindon, 
2004; Mosse, 1994). 
However, Kindon, Pain and Kesby (2007) argue for a more moderate 
perspective. Acknowledging that participation, like any other method, can be 
used in ways that are oppressive (religious proselytizing, for example, Zocher, 
2010) and ways that are not, they suggest that the effects of participation can be 
different depending upon who is deploying the resources. Further, they caution 
against conflating power and domination. Drawing upon Allen’s (2008) 
identification of power’s modalities, they explain that domination might occur 
when participatory approaches impose a particular way of representing local 
knowledge (Alexander et al., 2007). Manipulation might occur when researchers 
engage peer researchers to overcome a group’s distrust of outsiders or draw elite 
groups into a critique of their own behaviour by way of topics that appear 
innocuous at first. I perceive strong parallels between the way development 
organisations adopted participatory methods and their associated language and 
the way that social marketers seem poised to adopt a similar philosophy. For this 
reason, these critiques are important, and I will return to them in the concluding 
chapters. The next section, however, deals with more practical considerations 
that are nonetheless important in the practice of participatory methods.   
3.9. Bureaucratic	  barriers	  	  
The previous two sections have outlined some criticisms of participatory research 
based on the dominance of androcentric and neo-colonial perspectives; this 
section elaborates on a particular critique that emerges from within participatory 
research: that of institutional research ethics. Because my focus in this thesis is 
practice, I home in on the applied normative ethics that have been elucidated by 
participatory researchers, with reference to abstract theorisation as necessary. 
First, I place participatory ethics into a broad context of ethics in social research, 
following which I explain the particular challenges participatory researchers face 
in relation to issues of consent, anonymity and ending the research process. 
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It can be argued that the decision to work in a participatory way is often made 
explicitly with ethical considerations in mind, but this conviction does not exempt 
participatory researchers from wider consideration of ethical issues (Manzo and 
Brightbill, 2007). In 1979, The Belmont Report outlined three basic ethical 
principles: respect for persons, beneficence and justice. Which principles led to 
three applications: informed consent, assessment of whether the benefits of the 
research justify possible risks and that there be fair procedures and outcomes in 
selection of subjects. Christians identifies four ethical pillars of what he terms 
“value-free social science” (2005, p. 144), which tend to be enforced by an 
Institutional Review Board (IRB, see Lincoln, 2005; Bradley, 2007): once again 
that participants give fully informed consent and therefore that they are not 
deceived (though there can be some exceptions if the knowledge to be gained is 
deemed valuable to society, Soble, 1978); that participants’ identities are 
safeguarded by keeping personal data confidential and maintaining anonymity in 
publication; and finally that all data are accurate. But while participatory 
researchers strive for ethical practice and have no concerns with the principles of 
respect, beneficence and justice (Manzo and Brightbill, 2007), participatory 
research works differently from conventional forms that separate researcher from 
researched, knowledge from knower. If the participant is no longer a passive 
object from whom data is extracted, instead they are a co-researcher of equal 
standing, a person with whom the terms of the project are negotiated, then 
conventional guidelines for assessing whether research projects adhere to ethical 
guidelines may be less relevant.  
In the case of academic research, it is the IRB that must determine whether a 
participatory research project meets ethical standards or not. However concern 
has been expressed over the politics of the IRB process, issues include 
methodological conservatism (Lincoln, 2005; Christians, 2005; Bradley, 2007), 
which may mean that projects are unable to go ahead or that participatory 
principles have to be compromised (Manzo and Brightbill, 2007). A second 
problem is that conventional approval processes may reinforce existing social 
hierarchy and power structures (Bradley, 2007; Fine, Weis, Weseen and Wong, 
2000), anathema to a methodology that evolved from a conviction that such 
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structures must be challenged (Fals-Borda and Rahman, 1991; Freire, 2000).  
Finally, it is argued that foundational ethical guidelines encourage the 
formalisation of rule following as a substitute for ethically engaged scholarship 
(Cahill, Sultana and Pain, 2007; Ellis, 2007), which once again runs contrary to 
the underlying philosophy of participatory research as an ethical practice in and 
of itself. As well as issues related to institutional review and generic ethical 
guidelines, participatory researchers are troubled by the practical issues of how 
to gain genuinely informed consent to a process that is not pre-determined by the 
researcher.  
One alternative to the fixed and singular notion of consent, which in practice often 
means participants sign a form or record a verbal agreement at the beginning of 
the research process (Bhattacharya, 2007; Marzano, 2007), is the idea of 
negotiated consent, a form of “ethics-in-practice” (Guillemim and Gillam, 2004, p. 
261). An example of a project within which consent was negotiated can be found 
in the critical participatory social work study of young people in care (Renold et 
al., 2008). Sensitive to the politics of research with this group and keen to avoid 
perpetuating their stigmatisation (Cahill, 2007b; Garrett, 1999), Renold et al. 
elected to “foreground ethics-in-practise with young people throughout the 
research process” (p. 431). They chose methods like making films and music, 
keeping photo and textual diaries and scrap books, guided tours and informal 
conversations, which they hoped would demystify the research process for 
participants and serve to “disrupt the researcher gaze” (p. 432). Drawing upon 
the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s guidelines for participatory 
social science research, which frames consent in participatory research as… 
“…an	  ongoing	  and	  open-­‐ended	  process.	  Consent	  here	  is	  not	  simply	  resolved	  through	  
the	  formal	  signing	  of	  a	  consent	  document	  at	  the	  start	  of	  research.	  Instead	  it	  is	  
continually	  open	  to	  revision	  and	  questioning.	  Highly	  formalised	  or	  bureaucratic	  ways	  
of	  securing	  consent	  should	  be	  avoided	  in	  favour	  of	  fostering	  relationships	  in	  which	  
ongoing	  ethics	  regard	  for	  participants	  is	  to	  be	  sustained,	  even	  after	  the	  study	  itself	  
has	  been	  completed…”	  (ESRC,	  2012,	  p.	  30)	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…the researchers were careful to choose language for their consent forms 
(required by their IRB) that framed the young people’s participation as always 
negotiable.    
Yet another perspective on consent is that it can be “layered” (Riecken and 
Strong-Wilson, 2006, p. 42), by which they mean that traditional 
conceptualisations of informed consent construct people as individuals who 
consent to their own participation, but that in the reality of a participatory research 
project that consent may need to be extended to others in the community who 
might be affected by the research. In Riecken and Strong-Wilson’s example, it 
was the social and political implications of participatory research into Aboriginal 
young people’s substance abuse, mental health and experiences of 
discrimination and racism that were found to have wider consequences.  
An issue that is related to informed consent is deception. According to the 
American Psychological Association (2010, p. 11), deception is permitted in 
social research if it is “justified by the study’s significant prospective scientific, 
educational, or applied value and that effective nondeceptive alternative 
procedures are not feasible”. The APA stipulates also that participants aren’t 
deceived in such a way that pain or emotional distress would result and that any 
deception is explained as early as possible in the research process. In common 
with many economists (Barrera and Simpson, 2012) who think that honesty in 
research is crucial, participatory researchers are not fond of deception. Unlike the 
economists cited by Barrera and Simpson though, participatory researchers do 
not eschew deception because it leads to contamination and invalid data 
(Bonetti, 1998), they reject it on principle; even to the extent of making clear to 
participants elements of the research process that would normally be opaque, as 
with Renold et al.’s project (2008). 
In addition to concerns over the politics and bureaucracy of the IRB process 
(Haggerty, 2004) and issues of informed consent, participatory researchers face 
the dilemma of negotiating the tensions between respecting participant 
anonymity and treating them as equal stakeholders with just as much right to be 
recognised for their contribution as the researcher themselves. Matt Bradley 
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believes his struggles with an IRB’s insistence on anonymity led to participants 
who were “silenced for their own protection” (2007, p. 339).  
“the	  limitations	  on	  research	  and	  the	  insistence	  on	  confidentiality	  that	  were	  imposed	  
by	  the	  IRB	  …have	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  research	  benign	  and	  meaningless	  and	  sustain	  
the	  marginalization	  of	  people	  by	  relegating	  them	  to	  the	  status	  of	  anonymous	  objects	  
of	  study.	  This	  is	  especially	  problematic	  for	  the	  participatory	  researcher	  who	  is	  
interested	  in	  working	  with	  vulnerable	  and	  marginalized	  populations	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
acknowledges	  their	  knowledge	  and	  experiences	  and	  seeks	  to	  amplify	  their	  voice	  and	  
self-­‐determination”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  346).	  
It has also been argued that anonymity takes away a participant’s right to be 
recognised as a contributor and to realise any benefits that might accrue from the 
research (Evans, 2004) as well as denying them the right to negotiate ownership 
of their own words and how they are used (Cahill, Sultana and Pain, 2007; Blake, 
2007). Elwood (2007) for example, describes a project in which she worked with 
a community-based organisation to develop Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) maps, which were useful both as part of continuing community 
development work and as archives of how work had developed over time. On 
publication of the research, Elwood was instructed to remove identifying 
information for ethical reasons. Her participants, however, argued that anonymity 
harmed them: it meant that others would overlook their contributions and their 
case for greater recognition locally would be diminished. In this instance, it could 
be argued that falling back on anonymity as a foundational standard of protection 
for participants was in itself harmful to them. But because of the traditional 
conceptualisation of participants as passive objects who simply “empty 
themselves into research” (Blake, 2007, p. 414) rather than participants in a 
reciprocal relationship (Domosh, 2003), ethics rules were ill equipped to manage 
the process. Elwood’s example illustrates the ways in which the traditional 
‘knowledge production’ conceptualisation of research can disadvantage 
participants. 
Yet another issue that seems quite specific to participatory research, so much so 
that it seems to receive little scrutiny in mainstream literature, is the question of 
what happens when the research ends. Because participatory research is a 
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social, relational process (Kral, 2014), so much so that some even have argued it 
has similarities with social work (Atkinson, 2005), when a project ends and the 
researcher moves on, participants can feel abandoned (Atkinson, 2005; 
Northway, 2000). The very concept of a relationship “dissolves” (Hastrup, 2005, 
p. 121). Northway (2000) explains that ending participatory or emancipatory 
research has received little attention in the literature (see also Booth, 1998; 
Goodley, 1999). One reason for this lack of attention has been posited: that 
research is a process (Maguire, 1993) that may be transformatory, rather than a 
transformatory event and therefore it is inappropriate to conceptualise an ‘end’ for 
a participatory project. This seems to me to be a semantic distinction however, 
research projects initiated and organised by academics have clear start and end 
points and the issue of what happens when an academic finishes their work on a 
particular project appears to be under developed in the literature. I will return to 
this issue in subsequent chapters. As Booth explains, “participatory research will 
always be about more than just including people in the research as, by its very 
nature, the process of involvement compels the researcher to become part of 
their lives too” (1998, p. 133). 
This idea of a genuine relationship between researcher and participant implied by 
the notion that the end of the project is an emotional wrench suggests that 
researchers become more involved in their participatory work, feel somehow 
responsible for the ongoing wellbeing of their former participants in a way that is 
closer to activism than more conventional conceptions of research. The next 
section deals with this issue.  
3.10. Beyond	  action	  
The previous sections have discussed the theories of knowledge that underpin 
participatory research and where the boundary between researcher and activist 
might lie. Before I started to look for literature on the varying and potentially 
overlapping roles of research and activism in participatory projects, I knew that 
the boundary between social researcher and social changer would be blurred. 
Richardson, Ellis and other feminist qualitative researchers state explicitly that 
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they intend their work to stimulate action and change (Richardson, 2000; Ellis, 
2000), a process that they locate in their writing. But what about hands-on, 
messy, placard waving, Occupying activism and outright advocacy on behalf of 
marginalised participants? Using the legitimacy conferred on academics through 
our status as scholars to tell another version of the story? In this section, I explain 
that the boundary between activist scholarship and participatory research is 
blurred, sometimes conceptualised as a continuum. I show how once again these 
ideas meet in what appear to be emerging as the central themes of this work: 
feminism and writing. 
In the participatory research tradition in which I locate myself researchers seem 
to regard themselves as operating primarily on the research side of the 
“researcher-activist fence” (Fine, 2006, p. 85); meaning that participatory 
researchers work with, rather than as, activists (Brydon-Miller, 2001; Fine el al., 
2002). Fals-Borda describes this as becoming an “organic intellectual” (2001, p. 
30) who seeks reference groups composed of grassroots leaders rather than 
professors; while later he advises participatory researchers that it is “not enough 
to be just an activist” (p, 31), I think he is referring to his idea of vivencia, i.e. 
participatory morality as a way of life, not just a professional identity. In their 
writing, participatory researchers seem to construct their role as one of raising 
consciousness (c.f. Freire, 2000) to awaken, as well as the oppressed, those with 
material and cultural power (Apfelbaum, 2001). This appears distinct from the 
more direct action described by researchers like Paul Chatterton, for example, 
who has participated in boycotts of publishers because of their links to the arms 
trade and who has designed a Masters programme in Activism and Social 
Change, in which students and tutors are encouraged to embrace “visions for 
social change as part of what has become known as the “anti-capitalist”, “anti-
globalisation” or “global justice” movement” (2008, p. 424). For Chatterton and 
his academic-activist colleagues, participatory research and “activist research” 
(Askins, 2009, p. 5) or “activist-scholarship” (D’Souza, 2014, p. 1) are not the 
same things (Chatterton, Fuller and Routledge, 2007). Activist scholarship 
appears to be a very broad collection of works ranging from the study of social 
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movements (e.g. Goodwin and Jasper, 2003) to a sociology for changing the 
world (e.g. Frampton et al., 2006). 
How is activist scholarship distinct from participatory research? One way that 
Chatterton, Fuller and Routledge (2007) distinguish between the two is 
participatory research’s perceived focus on research to inform service delivery or 
policy, rather than research that can be used as a vehicle for radical social 
transformation, of liberation from neoliberal hegemony; not the constitutive forces 
of the discourses imposed by the latter (Davies, 2005) but the active pursuit of 
change. How is change pursued more actively by activist researchers than by 
action researchers? Chatterton et al. outline a methodology of commitment to 
social transformation via challenging existing power structures, building solidarity 
through admitting to and applying emotion like defiance, resistance, a sense of 
injustice (Newman, 2006) and building spaces for critical dialogue (Routledge, 
1996). In essence, they claim, activist rather than action researchers need to be 
the change they seek. This chimes with Maguire’s (2001) summary of a feminist 
approach to research. Taking this perspective to a conclusion, it could be argued 
that more conventional researchers are being the system they want to preserve. 
This is an issue that will be explored in concluding chapters.  
It seems that the distinction between participatory and activist researchers is 
partly a question of what the different traditions aim to achieve, and partly how 
they achieve them. My interpretation is that the root of the difference has a great 
deal to do with researcher positionality. A participatory researcher is encouraged 
to be carefully reflexive about their positionality, to avoid “perpetuating neo-
colonial representations, having Western biases, and purporting to speak ‘for’” 
participants (Sultana, 2007, p. 375), whereas an activist researcher aligns 
themselves directly with the marginalised group involved. So an activist 
researcher goes beyond collaboratively producing knowledge with participants to 
challenge oppressive power structures (Maguire, 2001), instead they work 
alongside them to achieve social transformation. Implicit in this understanding for 
me is that the activist researcher only chooses projects that suit their own beliefs 
about what social changes are necessary, which Chatterton et al. acknowledge 
may be problematic for those who hold researcher impartiality as an important 
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feature of research. However they identify a role for intervention and critique in 
the activist researcher’s repertoire as well, which may involve advising groups 
with an alternative worldview. Pain (2003) approaches the distinction somewhat 
differently, identifying three modes of research that she calls activist, participatory 
and policy; which, she argues, in practice often overlap. Indeed, she posits that 
activism “exists on a continuum and is embedded to some extent in all our 
activity as academics” (p. 652), citing as her example movements to challenge 
racism within the academy. Ruddick (2004) writes eloquently of the “undertow of 
biography that pulls us towards one issue or another” and the “sustained 
personal connections that keep us there” (p. 229). This perspective certainly 
chimes with my own experiences of the sorts of research that attracts me and the 
sort I would prefer to deflect; this seems to be a new sort of positionality, based 
on issues that a researcher cares about and can sustain a personal interest and 
energy for. A connection with feminist research once again, in the observation 
that second wave feminists sought to redefine power as energy, strength, 
motivation and successful mobilisation of resources for oneself and others 
(Maguire, 2001). 
Kye Askins is one researcher who appears to have blurred the divide between 
participatory research as consciousness raising scholarship and activism. Or 
perhaps rather than blurring, she has built a bridge between the two approaches 
and crossed it. In her 2009 paper, she explains how despite efforts to be 
participatory and “non-extractive” (p. 5), she still felt that the confines of the 
research process she had followed left her in a position of power relative to her 
participants with which she felt uncomfortable. Consequently, once she had 
completed her PhD, she engaged in research in a different way, starting as a 
volunteer with a project to provide space and support for asylum seekers and 
their families, which morphed into a long-term ethnographic “activist research” (p. 
5) project. Emotion appears to have been the key to Askins’ transformation as a 
researcher; emotion underpinned her ‘ideological commitment’ to social and 
personal change (Fuller and Kitchen, 2004). She relates her deconstruction of the 
boundary between research and activism to feminist and critical academics and 
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her desire to break disciplinary convention in her writing, inspired by the work of 
Hélène Cixous (1976; 1991). 
Feminism, again. The significance of writing, again. Given these links it is 
interesting to me to note that the perceived researcher-activist separation may go 
back to the science-literature divide that Richardson (1997; 2000) identifies as 
unhelpful in her own work (for a full elaboration, see section 4.10). D’Souza 
(2014) writes of the Asian and Middle Eastern poet-saints, scholars she regards 
also as activists as we would understand the term today. But, D’Souza explains, 
the poet-saints too fell victim to colonisation and Enlightenment rationalism, 
creating a division between poetry and scholarship, literature and science, 
practice and theory. But fascinating as this exploration may be, because of the 
breadth and depth of activist scholarship I will need to set boundaries around 
what can be included in this thesis; therefore I have confined my discussion in 
this section to activism and activist scholarship as it meets participatory research. 
As described in the previous section, participatory research academics are 
concerned with the problem that the underlying theory of social transformation, of 
freedom from oppression, does not necessarily translate to changes in practice. 
Implicit in these debates, I think, are questions of social activism, particularly 
because they frame the disconnect between theory and practice as a weakness, 
a problem that needs to be resolved. In summary then, participatory researchers 
seek counter hegemonic knowledge (Kindon, Pain and Kesby, 2007), whereas 
activist researchers adopt an end goal of social transformation itself. The next 
section tackles the issue of space in participatory research. 
3.11. Ghetto	  pride	  
Kesby (2005) argues that participation and empowerment typically are 
conceptualised temporally rather than spatially, partly as a consequence of the 
idea of working towards “enlightenment” (p. 2052) over time and partly because 
of the way that a project life cycle is conceptualised as something that 
progresses through time. Yet the idea of space is tacit within many descriptions 
of participatory working. For instance, in just one paper describing a project, 
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incarceration was described as a time when women may have access to a “safe 
space” (Fields et al., 2008, p. 79) and a workshop was referred to as “an 
alternative space” and “a co-operative space” (ibid.). Yet despite its evident 
metaphorical and linguistic significance, it is argued that recognition of physical 
space as it relates to participatory research is under-developed in the literature 
(Kesby, 2005; Cahill, 2007a). It is natural perhaps that social geographers like 
Kesby, Cahill, Kindon et al. argue for the central role of space in the research 
methodology they prefer. But they do seem to have a point about the lack of 
focus on space by researchers from other disciplines; in the entire Handbook of 
Action Research, for example, there are but four references to space, two of 
which are philosophical (Eikeland, 2001; Reason and Bradbury, 2001) and two 
metaphorical: representing the ‘space’ available for certain behaviours in a social 
hierarchy (Ludema, Cooperrider and Barrett, 2001) and a version of Derrida’s 
“becoming space… that supported open, unstructured exploration” (Treleaven, 
2001, p. 263) in the action research project. 
An overemphasis on time and metaphorical space risks overlooking physical 
space, the “politics of location” (Cahill, 2007c, p. 268), which has an important 
relationship with social disadvantage and exclusion, as I explained in the 
previous chapter. Indeed my own experience of participatory endeavour has 
been that often it exists more significantly in space than it does in time, by which I 
mean that if you took the process to a different place, even to the next town, then 
it would evolve into something very different; whereas time seems to be of less 
consequence. My experience allows me to nod along to social geographers like 
Kesby (2007), who point out that every location has a history and associations; a 
community centre might have a past that will affect how it is used in the 
participatory process, a religious site might encourage participation of older 
groups, a youth club that of younger. It seems obvious, and therefore surprising 
that it has received relatively little attention in the mainstream literature. 
Cornwall (2004) proposes a distinction between what she terms ‘invited’ and 
‘popular’ spaces. Invited spaces are, as their name would imply, spaces into 
which people are invited in order to participate; examples would include a 
Participatory Rural Appraisal event or citizen jury. These invited spaces bring 
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together actors who would not normally be in proximity and who possess varying 
social status. Conversely, popular spaces are those in which people join together 
in everyday sociality, to engage in collective action or support. There are 
examples of both invited and popular spaces in Chapter 5. But for Kesby, Kindon 
and Pain (2007), this taxonomy sets the two types of space too far apart and too 
much in opposition, thus replicating conventional understandings of power and 
how it is exercised. They argue that invited spaces can be radical and popular 
spaces conservative and that the modalities (Allen, 2008) of power and spaces 
become entangled (Kesby, 2007). This is a really interesting debate, but I am in 
danger of following it away from the main path of this thesis. So what do these 
emerging ideas of space mean for my work? I conclude for now that to the list of 
concepts that are under explored in the social marketing and wider social and 
behavioural change literature, which includes feminism and writing, I add the 
politics of space and location. 
3.12. Concluding	  comments	  
In this chapter, I have defined participatory research as an orientation to enquiry 
that turns the conventional dynamic of studied and student on its head, 
deregulating and deobjectifying researcher, researched and process from 
beginning to end. Acknowledging the long and complex heritage of participatory 
techniques, nevertheless I distinguish between southern and northern traditions, 
based upon the latter’s emphasis on reflective practice and the former’s explicitly 
radical aim for conscientization and social transformation. Epistemologically, I 
note that participatory methods are conventionally associated with Habermas’ 
writings on communicative action and the public sphere but choose to align 
myself with the emerging feminist post-structuralist perspectives on participatory 
research, embracing a concern for issues of identity and subjectivity, language 
and representation as well as the politics and power dynamics that have always 
been a cornerstone of participatory approaches.  
I identify several areas in which participatory research touches, overlaps and 
blurs into others areas of interest; in particular feminist research, writing and 
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activism, activist scholarship, and the under-developed role of physical space. 
While the sheer breadth, depth and quality of the literature in all these directions 
daunts me, I feel energised and enthused to move forward in the development of 
my ethnographic self. The next section explains this idea, as well as providing a 
more typical elucidation of the methodology that underpins this thesis.   
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Chapter	  4: In	  which	  I	  say	  how	  I	  know	  
 “’Would you tel l  me, please, which way I ought to go from here?' 
'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to, '  said the Cat.” 
(Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, p. 39).  
4.1. Introduction	  
It is important to clarify that the methodology of the project in Parkhood and 
Urbanwood and the methodology that underpins the contribution to knowledge 
presented in this thesis are not the same. The methodology that most closely 
resembles the project is participatory research, as outlined in Chapter 3, whereas 
the contribution to knowledge presented in this thesis was developed using 
autoethnographic methods. Autoethnography is an eclectic method (Chang, 
2008), which has been defined as “research (graphy) that connects the personal 
(auto) to the cultural (ethnos), placing the self within a social context” (Reed-
Danahay, 1997, p. 145). This chapter introduces and explains autoethnography, 
which rests upon a re-interpretation of data generated during the project and 
upon the reflective writing process itself; consequently, in some sections, the 
analytical processes themselves have been documented autoethnographically. I 
begin with an explanation of my ontological and epistemological assumptions 
followed by a critical review of the denunciations that have been offered of my 
chosen methodology. Next comes an explanation of my positionality with respect 
to the research and an elaboration upon what criteria exist for making an 
assessment of the quality of an autoethnographic work. I conclude with two 
narrative accounts on how the data was analysed and theory brought to bear. I 
close the chapter with a review of the ethical issues I considered in both the 
original participatory project and the subsequent autoethnographic study. 
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4.2. Research	  aim	  
As described in my introductory chapter, the aim of this research is to expose 
and contest unjust and alienating language, discourses and power structures, in 
particular the ways in which these discourses and power dynamics are typically 
unacknowledged in conventional modes of commissioning, implementing and 
evaluating social marketing initiatives in deprived neighbourhoods.  
4.3. Ontology	  
In 1994, Guba and Lincoln identified the four over-arching paradigms that frame 
research: the received wisdom of Positivism and Post-Positivism and the 
postmodern paradigms of Critical Theory and Constructivism. Subsequently, 
Heron and Reason (1997) argued for an alternative argument for “a worldview 
based on participation and participative realities” (p. 275), which has been added 
to Guba and Lincoln’s analysis in subsequent editions (2005). This section 
locates this thesis in a relativistic ontology, justified with reference to the foremost 
critiques of this position. 
Guba and Lincoln (2005) provide a helpful table to summarise the various 
implications of the main paradigms of inquiry. According to their categorisations, 
a constructionist - they term it constructivist but following Burr’s (2006) advice 
these terms are treated as synonymous in this thesis - paradigm is underpinned 
by a relativistic ontology, local and specific; rather than the ‘real’ reality, whether 
understood via naïve or critical realism, which underpins the positivist and post-
positivist paradigms. The field of public health tends to embrace realist ontology; 
emphasising static and objective knowledge about a reality separate from 
discourse. In common with other ‘scientific’ (Loughlin, Lewith and Falkenberg, 
2012) approaches, the researcher in public health strives for findings that are free 
from bias, where the context is controlled as far as possible and propositional 
knowledge (Guba and Lincoln, 2005) that separates research from practice 
(Israel et al., 1998) is prized. Conversely, the critical paradigm is founded upon 
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historical realist ontology (i.e. a conception of reality that is shaped by social, 
political, cultural and economic values). Disentangling the appropriateness of 
historical realist ontology from the relativistic assumptions of constructionism has 
been problematic for this thesis, because of the significance of the social, 
political, cultural and economic aspects of social deprivation experienced by the 
participants in the project and because of the critical heritage of participatory 
research methodologies (Ozanne and Saatcioglu, 2008). It could be argued that 
the research can draw upon both: it is recognised that a methodology can 
emerge from an amalgamation of different disciplines and perspectives, an 
“interbreeding” of paradigms (Guba and Lincoln, 2005, p. 192; Ozanne and 
Saatcioglu, 2008) and consequently, an examination of relevant paradigmatic 
differences, controversies and contradictions may be more helpful than 
attempting to categorise methodologies with rigid adherence to universally 
applicable rules. However, despite the political and social commentary emerging 
from the autoethnographic process, it is concluded that a relativistic ontology 
(Johnson and Duberley, 2000), rather than that of naïve, critical or historical 
realism, is the most suitable for this work. I contend that the reflective account, if 
applied to a context where issues of social inequality were less significant, would 
lose its apparent connection to historico-realist ontology and yet retain its 
ontological anti-realism.  
Anti-realism has many critics, who argue that the perspective is simply idealistic 
(Collin, 1997), that it fails to account adequately for the ways that discursive 
practices must be grounded in an external reality (Nightingale and Cromby, 2002) 
and thus commits the “epistemic fallacy” (Bhaskar, 1975, p. 17) resulting in a 
partial and potentially misleading picture of the world (Williams, 2003). Williams 
criticises both naïve realism and anti-realism from the perspective of critical 
realism, which has been pronounced a third way (Sayer, 1992; Vandenberghe, 
1999), i.e. an approach that retains an acknowledgement of an external reality 
that can be known without ignoring the mediating role of language and 
subjectivity. In this way, critical realists aim to solve the epistemic fallacy by 
seeking to explain phenomena and the relationships between them, rather than 
simply to describe (interpretivism) or demonstrate causation (positivism) see 
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(Danermark et al., 2002). These criticisms might be a problem if the contribution 
of this thesis rested upon the way that alcohol is used in deprived 
neighbourhoods or upon the idea of social deprivation itself as an object, a 
phenomenon that existed independently of the way that we discuss it and 
theorise about it, and sought to present new understanding. Rather it is argued 
that to adopt a realist perspective when seeking to reflect upon the participatory 
process would be to fail to recognise that “…the ground, on which [I] stand to 
frame its world, is [my] own creation.” (Reason, 1998, p.11). Nevertheless, I do 
not reject an objective external reality out of hand; rather I am “agnostic” 
(Nightingale and Cromby, 2002, p. 703) about the status of such a reality. What 
is questioned under the relativist ontology adopted here is the status of the 
interpretations of and truth claims made in the discourses (Done et al., 2011) 
about such a world. The next section explains the treatment of truth claims in this 
thesis in more depth. 
4.4. Epistemology	  or	  anti-­‐epistemology?	  
According to Anderson (2006), autoethnography has been advocated primarily by 
scholars with postmodern or post-structuralist sympathies; Richardson (1997) for 
example situates her work within a feminist post-structuralist tradition (Done et 
al., 2011). Such beliefs are founded in a rejection of epistemic absolutism, i.e. the 
conviction that there is one absolute authoritative epistemic standard against 
which the veracity of truth claims can be judged (Luper, 2004), where ‘truth’ is 
understood as an accurate representation of an independent reality (Smith and 
Hodkinson, 2005). This section clarifies the epistemological underpinnings of this 
work, with a nod once again to those who have criticised this position. 
Hammersley (2008) writes that this postmodernist - a term he adopts to 
encompass the post-structuralist movement as well - conception of truth in social 
research focused in particular on what he calls the “crisis of representation” (p. 
130) in anthropology: a rejection of the assumption that anthropologists can claim 
legitimately to produce factual representations of people, cultures and social 
interactions, representations “of what it is like to be someone else” (Van Maanen, 
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2010, p. 339). What ethnographers write, “cannot but reflect who they are, in 
socio-cultural terms” (Hammersley, 2008, p. 131); and it hasn’t escaped the 
attention of these scholars that most ethnographers have tended to be white, 
Christian, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied and male (Ellis, Adams and 
Bochner, 2011). Consequently, autoethnographers like Richardson, St. Pierre, 
Ellis, Bochner and Denzin reject the idea that they can represent others in thick 
description, rather they believe that language “…is how social organisation and 
power are defined and contested and the place where one’s sense of self is 
constructed…language is a site of exploration and struggle” (Richardson and 
Adams St. Pierre, 2005, p. 961). Power is particularly important on at least two 
counts: the first because of the dominance of the research establishment by 
socio-culturally powerful groups (male, middle-class) and linked to this, the ways 
in which the powerful discourses of rationality and scientism are thought to be 
oppressive, supporting replication of the status quo by privileged groups 
(Pascale, 2010). In essence, from this perspective knowledge is inescapably 
political; power is the fundamental concept in social science (Russell, 1938).  
The consequence of these arguments about the impossibility of knowledge free 
from political influence is a relativist epistemology, which some have suggested is 
not an epistemology at all; rather it is an inescapable human condition 
(Schwandt, 1996) with which we must learn to live. This perspective has 
implications for the criteria against which this research can be judged, which are 
explored later in this chapter; and for the theory of knowledge that underpins the 
autoethnography presented in this thesis. The latter is addressed in the 
remainder of this section. 
For Smith and Hodkinson (2005) these postmodern ideas represent an end to the 
epistemological endeavour, an evolution in metaphor from discovery of truth to 
construction of meaning. Social research becomes a practical and moral affair, 
the core of which is a healthy scepticism that any way of knowing has the right to 
claim a privileged position of authoritative knowledge (Richardson and St. Pierre, 
2005). In sympathy with this view, this thesis is approached from social 
constructionist perspective, about which Burr (2006) identifies four 
characteristics: firstly, in opposition to the assumptions made by positivists and 
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empiricists that what exists is what can be revealed by objective, unbiased 
observation, proponents adopt a critical stance towards conventional ways of 
understanding the world, including themselves. Secondly, it is assumed that all 
ways of knowing are culturally and historically relative. Thirdly, what we regard as 
“truth” is not a product of objective observation of an independent reality, but of 
the social processes, practices and interactions (such as language) that fabricate 
what is regarded as knowledge of what is real. Finally, this perspective 
recognises that socially constructed knowledge and social action are entwined. In 
an example of the latter very relevant to the context of this thesis, Burr highlights 
the way in which alcoholics have come to be seen as victims of their addiction, 
with an appropriate response being medical treatment; rather than ‘drunks’ 
assumed to be responsible for their behaviour and therefore punishment being 
regarded as a suitable solution.  
This position is not without its critics, those that have called for a neo-realist (or 
critical realist) perspective, perhaps most notably Popper (1979), see also 
(Bhaskar and Lawson, 1998; Manicas and Secord, 1983; Hammersley, 2008). 
Their objections appear to be founded upon five pillars: firstly, that it would be 
impossible to function as an epistemological sceptic in daily life, that nobody 
could live without a “commonsense theory of knowledge” (Popper, 1979, p. 3). 
Secondly, it is argued that it is possible to accept that language is not fixed and 
absolute and still use language precisely to communicate meaning in a way that 
is compatible with realism (Hammersley, 2008; 2007). Linked to this point about 
language, Hammersley argues further that it is still possible to claim knowledge 
about the world while stopping short of the claim to know its one essential nature. 
Next, Hammersley points out that while rationalism and the scientific method can 
be used in ways that are oppressive, they have also been used to such ends as 
to combat biological arguments for racism, for example. His point being that the 
method itself is not intrinsically oppressive. And finally, Hammersly argues, 
drawing upon a flamboyant piece of satirical writing, that postmodern qualitative 
research isn’t useful to policymakers, rather as if a dentist adopted such 
principles in their practice: 
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“I	  can't	  work	  to	  order	  like	  a	  common	  tradesman!	  I	  decided	  her	  bridge	  should	  be	  
enormous	  and	  billowing,	  with	  wild,	  explosive	  teeth	  flaring	  up	  in	  every	  direction	  like	  
fire!	  Now	  she	  is	  upset	  because	  it	  won't	  fit	  in	  her	  mouth!	  She	  is	  so	  bourgeois	  and	  
stupid,	  I	  want	  to	  smash	  her!	  I	  tried	  forcing	  the	  false	  plate	  in	  but	  it	  sticks	  out	  like	  a	  star	  
burst	  chandelier.	  Still,	  I	  find	  it	  beautiful.	  She	  claims	  she	  can't	  chew!	  What	  do	  I	  care	  
whether	  she	  can	  chew	  or	  not!”	  (Allen,	  1972,	  p.	  199).	  
Some anthropologists also express some concerns with the degree to which the 
ethnographer’s own interpretation may be privileged when adopting a 
postmodern epistemology. Ryang (2000) for example, wonders whether an 
autobiographical approach both alienates and privileges the ethnographer by 
failing to place personal experience in a social, cultural, and historical reality.  
While committed post-structuralist autoethnographers like Richardson and 
Denzin reject these criticisms, others have argued that it is possible to merge the 
realist and postmodern perspectives in autoethnography (Ronai, 1996; Frank, 
2000; Newmahr, 2008). Newmahr adopts a subjective perspective - which she 
distinguishes from self-reflexivity - to an ethnographic study of the 
sadomasochistic community. Deliberately, she interweaves between a treatment 
of herself and others as analytical subjects; while she maintains a subjectivist 
epistemology, she is able to layer a somewhat distanced analysis more typical of 
a realist ethnographer (Denzin, 2006) with narrative passages representing 
fieldwork experiences. This approach is the one I aimed to adopt in my own 
analysis of the participatory project, which is described in Chapter 5. The next 
section provides further elaboration on my autoethnographic method.  
4.5. Why	  autoethnography?	  
“I wonder if  I 've been changed in the night? Let me think: was I the 
same when I got up this morning? I almost think I can remember feeling 
a l i t t le different.  But if  I 'm not the same, the next question is,  who in 
the world am I? Ah, THAT'S the great puzzle!” (Alice, Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland, p. 8).  
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The story of why autoethnography was deemed the most suitable methodology 
for this research begins at the end, with the notion that writing is itself a way of 
knowing (Richardson and St. Pierre, 2005). I began the process of writing this 
thesis assuming that the methodology that would underpin my PhD research 
would be the same methodology that was employed in the participatory project in 
Parkhood and Urbanwood: participatory research. But when I began to write, as I 
described in earlier chapters, it became obvious very quickly that participatory 
research was not the methodology I was using in this PhD. I wanted to study the 
participatory methods themselves; falling back upon traditional conceptions for a 
moment, they were the ‘object’ rather than the means of knowledge creation. This 
section explains my reasons for choosing autoethnography as method over 
reflective practice, as well as explaining why other possibilities would have been 
unsuitable in light of my aims and perspective. 
In action research, the term ‘reflection’ appears to be synonymous with ‘thinking’ 
in the sense that it relates to acts of cognition that occur during learning 
(Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyers, 1995). Reflective practice on the other hand can 
be conceptualised as an “epistemology of practice” (Schön, 1983, p. 49) that 
consists of three types of reflection: reflection-in-action, reflection-on-action and 
reflection-about-action. The first encompasses the implicit thought processes that 
accompany and continually modify and reframe (Loughran, 1996) ongoing 
practice. The second type relates to a retrospective analysis of past practice so 
as to gain knowledge about those experiences; according to Russell and Munby 
(1992, p. 3), this is a “systematic and deliberate thinking back over one’s 
actions”. The third type of reflective practice has roots in critical theory (Leitch 
and Day, 2000) and is intended to stimulate reflection upon the social, economic 
and political aspects of one’s practice. In this way, reflective practice has also 
been defined as an “acquisition of a critical stance or attitude towards one’s own 
practice and that of one’s peers” (Johnston and Badley, 1996, p. 4).  
It is this critical stance, reflection directed outwards to the social system of public 
health commissioning as well as directed inwards to individual practice, that 
seemed to link this thesis to ideas of emancipatory action research (Grundy, 
1982). At first glance therefore, reflective practice seemed ideal as a way to 
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reflect critically upon the practice of participatory methods applied to changing 
behaviour in deprived neighbourhoods. Another advantage was that action 
researchers ‘freeze’ moments of their practice for later reflection, analysis and 
interpretation. (Davis, 2004). This seemed appropriate because I was 
commencing my PhD research after the project itself was completed; I was 
engaging in retrospective analysis of the process and the outputs, guided by 
project documentation, field notes and records. The type of reflective enquiry in 
which I intended to engage can be carried out in a variety of ways, including 
autobiography, dialogical conversations, fictional stories (Evans, 1994), reflective 
writing and journals (Holly, 1989). 
The notion that writing, not just to inform but writing as a creative, generative 
process can be a legitimate way of knowing in and of itself (Davis, 2004) was 
without doubt the most significant epiphany of this thesis. Until I stumbled across 
the work of Laurel Richardson and Elizabeth Adams St. Pierre, I had no 
conception that the way ideas came to me and developed through the words 
appearing on the screen, seemingly of their own volition and sometimes 
surprising me with their insights, could be a valid way of creating knowledge. It 
was this insight that led to the final choice of autoethnography. The contribution I 
wanted to make with this thesis was located in a critical exploration of the use of 
participatory methods to change behaviour in deprived neighbourhoods: to bring 
together my reading from the literatures on participatory research, community 
development and social deprivation with the literatures on behaviour change in 
general and social marketing in particular, to explore fully some of my discomfort 
with the lack of reflection upon the theoretical, practical and ethical compatibility 
of participatory methods with the managerial approach to achieving change for 
social good that dominates in social marketing (Lee and Miller, 2012). 
So far, this section has explained why autoethnography was chosen over 
reflective practice and participatory research; but this explanation seems 
incomplete without a consideration of whether other, more traditional research 
methodologies would have addressed the research aims adequately. Alternative 
methodologies can be divided into two broad categories: an approach situated in 
the positivist paradigm, probably quantitative; or qualitative methods like depth 
Page 99 of 317 
interviews or focus groups, founded in interpretivism. Positivistic, empiricist 
methods were rejected on two counts: firstly that they position the researcher as 
an objective spectator (Smith and Hodkinson, 2005), rather than as the active 
participant in knowledge creation that I have been in writing this thesis. Secondly, 
I contend that scientific approaches are philosophically ill positioned for critical 
reflection about participatory methods (themselves described as political 
methodologies of empowerment, Rahman, 1995); associated as they are with 
imperialism, colonialism (Smith, 1999) and the location of power with the 
researcher in crafting their representations of the other (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005) as objective truth. In this autoethnography, I only ascribe truth to my 
representation of myself, see later sections for elaboration. More conventional 
interpretivistic forms of enquiry could have been suitable for addressing the 
research question, if the primary interest had been in what other project 
participants had thought about the role of participatory methods in public health. 
But while I am not so arrogant as to assume that my opinions are of higher worth 
than theirs (indeed their views are an integral part of the analysis) I can only see 
them through my eyes; in analysing and writing about their perspectives I would 
still be making assumptions about their truth, filtering their words through my 
writing as a way of making sense of the whole and integrating it within the thesis. 
It seems more honest, more authentic, to acknowledge my dominant position as 
the ‘sense-maker’ of all this information, as the arbiter of what is important, what 
is included or not and what it all means. Thus, autoethnography a methodology 
that seeks to understand the role of the self in the culture of interest seems the 
most appropriate choice for this work. The next section offers a fuller exploration 
of the autoethnographic method, beginning with a review of its roots in 1970s 
anthropology of familiar cultures and a response to the prominent critiques.  
4.6. Academic	  narcissism	  and	  other	  critiques	  
The increasing popularity of studying familiar cultures, driven partly by the 
observation that western anthropologists could rely less on protection from 
“friendly colonial authorities” (Hayano, 1979, p. 99) and partly by a growing 
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number of “minority” [sic] anthropologists who wanted to study their own cultures, 
inspired David Hayano to coin the term autoethnography in 1979 (Boloz, 2008). 
Hayano in turn traces his idea to his recollection of an anecdote told by Sir 
Raymond Firth in 1966 (Hayano, 1979). More recent literature on 
autoethnography suggests that several versions of the methodology have 
emerged in the last forty years, synthesised by Doloriert and Sambrook (2011) 
into evocative, analytic and political autoethnography. Evocative 
autoethnography, also named Creative Analytical Practice (CAP) ethnography 
(Richardson and St. Pierre, 2005; Denzin, 2006), is described as a process 
where method and writing are closely entwined and the producer of knowledge 
cannot be separated from the knowledge itself or the mode of its production 
(Ellis, 2004; Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011). Holman Jones (2005, p. 763) 
writes of autoethnography as “a radical democratic politics”, sparking social 
change by creating space for dialogue and debate. It could be argued that these 
two versions, evocative and political, are so similar in aim and epistemology as to 
render distinction unnecessarily complex: Doloriert and Sambrook (2012) identify 
evocative ethnography as interpretivist, but scholars from within that tradition 
self-identify as post-structuralist, see (Richardson and Adams St. Pierre, 2005). 
Analytic ethnography, on the other hand, is offered to those who feel that an 
alternative approach, one that harks back to the realist ethnographic tradition of 
the Chicago School, is called for as an alternative to the postmodern or 
poststructuralist “moment” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 19) represented in part 
by evocative ethnography (Anderson, 2006).  
Ellis and Bochner (2006) don’t agree with these classifications. For them, 
autoethnography is its own genre of ethnographic writing, one that is ontologically 
and epistemologically distinct from modernist or realist texts. They do not think 
that what Leon Anderson (2006) calls analytic autoethnography is authentically 
autoethnography at all, with Art Bochner suggesting provocatively that analytic 
autoethnographers rename their approach “aloof autoethnography” (Ellis and 
Bochner, 2006, p. 436) to capture more effectively its mood and tone. Ellis and 
Bochner’s point is that their own work, creative, literary and often playful in style 
as it may be, is analytical as well as evocative. The task of analysis and 
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theorising, they assert, is accomplished by stories, which they regard as 
meaningful phenomena that help people to make sense of themselves and of 
others (Adams, 2008; Bochner, 2001). Autoethnographers use stories to capture 
significant moments that have led them to rethink or re-evaluate a situation 
leading perhaps to a change of direction (Bochner and Ellis, 1992; Denzin, 1989) 
a new perspective or the ability to close a gap in existing stories (Goodall, 2001). 
While this type of autoethnography is heavily associated with autobiography 
(Pace, 2012), autoethnographers, like ethnographers, purport to set themselves 
the extra challenge of using the tools of research methodology and research 
literature to retrospectively analyse their stories, their epiphanies, so that others 
may learn from their personal experiences (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011). Not 
everyone is happy to accept Ellis and Bochner’s claim to the analytical legitimacy 
of such personal narratives, however. 
Atkinson’s critique of what he terms “contemporary fashions for subjective and 
evocative ethnographic work” (2006, p. 400) appears to be founded less in an 
objection to the postmodern foundations of this work and more in what he 
regards as the tradition’s exaggerated claims to novelty, both epistemologically 
and as method. Other critiques of autoethnography include an anonymous 
colleague of Andrew Sparkes, who characterised it as “academic wank” (2002, p. 
212); and Delamont’s (2007) depiction of the method as “almost entirely 
pernicious…literally lazy and also intellectually lazy” (p. 2) and a “narcissistic 
substitution” for research (2009, p. 51). Delamont defines autoethnography with 
reference to Anderson (2006) as “texts which claim to be research but in which 
the only topic or focus is the author” (2009, p. 57) and thus separates it from 
critical autobiographical reflection upon fieldwork. Using this distinction, I could 
perhaps wheedle my way out of the need to respond to her critique, as this thesis 
is not a text that is only about me. But I feel compelled to offer a response 
nevertheless; I want to home in on her criticisms, perhaps partly for emotional 
reasons (narcissistic, moi?) but more importantly because I feel I can offer a 
worthwhile response to them. Not least because when I did what I could claim as 
‘fieldwork’ (i.e. the project in Parkhood and Urbanwood) I wasn’t approaching it 
as such in methodological terms.  
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In 2004 and 2009, Delamont outlines a manifesto of six criticisms of 
autoethnography: that ethnographers should fight familiarity, however difficult it 
may be to do so, and that autoethnography embraces it; that autoethnography 
cannot be published ethically because of the dual problems of obtaining informed 
consent and preserving confidentiality (this I will tackle in section 4.12); that 
research is supposed to be analytical not experiential, and she is not convinced 
by Ellis, Bochner et al., that autoethnography is analytical enough (Atkinson, 
2006; Atkinson and Delamont, 2006); that autoethnography focuses on the 
experiences of the powerful, not the powerless and unvoiced, as ethnographers 
ought; that ethnographers should be studying social worlds that are worth 
researching, i.e. those that are unknown and interesting, and the minutiae of the 
bodies and social lives of social scientists are neither unknown nor interesting; 
and finally that academics paid via public funds have a responsibility to do more 
than sit in comfortable offices introspecting about their lives, they should be out 
collecting data. In her 2004 conference paper, Delamont warns that she is 
deliberately controversial; I have been similarly robust in my consideration of her 
views. 
What is interesting to me about Delamont’s perspective is that she doesn’t 
appear to acknowledge her own subjectivity. She seems to be claiming to know 
what is interesting, important, unknown (to which I will return in a moment) and 
worthy of public funding; she is claiming the authority to decide who is powerful 
and who isn’t without examining her own privilege and the assumptions that I 
argue must follow. She appears to stand primarily upon a relatively 
unacknowledged world of her “own creation” (Heron and Reason, 1997, p. 275) 
while criticising others for laying theirs bare. As well as an interest in and affinity 
with writing, what attracted me to Laurel Richardson’s version of autoethnography 
was its potential to deal with power, subjectivity and privilege in the research 
process. I concluded that Richardson’s articulation of autoethnography was the 
most honest and transparent way to tackle the power dynamics inherent in the 
process. I wanted to avoid committing the crime of privileging the experiences of 
the powerful, and I think this can be achieved by acknowledging that the only 
perspective to which I can realistically claim any real knowledge is my own.  
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No amount of data can elevate me to the authority to tell other privileged 
academics what it is really like to live in Parkhood or Urbanwood (though I can 
get quite passionate about it if they ask me, as my supervisory team can attest). I 
am not a survivor of domestic abuse; I have never felt compelled to hide any 
bruises because that’s just what women do. While I have felt the loneliness, 
exhaustion, tedium and guilt of new motherhood, I have not felt it alone day after 
day in a one bedroom flat with mould growing on the walls and noisy, aggressive 
neighbours. I can tell these stories in what I hope is an evocative and interesting 
way, but I cannot and should not claim them as my stories to tell; all that is mine 
to offer is my interpretation, my account from my perspective. And to regard them 
as ‘unknown’ and ‘interesting’ is to offer an insult to the people who would be very 
happy for these experiences to be unknown to them, to have the privilege of 
enough distance to be able to summon an academic curiosity about them. If I 
may offer an introspective observation here, the notion that these lives are 
unknown and interesting and therefore worthy of study by scholars, who will 
produce texts to be read by other scholars, evokes in me a certain outrage on 
behalf of the people who must live them.  
In this way, the method I have used in this thesis draws upon ideas from radical 
participatory researchers and activist scholars, of the former in particular Fals-
Borda’s depiction of finding “little use for scholarly arrogance”, learning “instead 
to develop an empathetic attitude towards Others which [they] called vivencia, 
meaning life experience” (2001, p. 31). Vivencia is identified with the work of 
Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset, and occurs when something is 
understood intuitively, while placing oneself in a wider context (Fals-Borda, 
1984). I have experienced this personally as continued reinforcement of a 
realisation that what I have learned about people’s lives from reading about them 
invariably leads to prejudgement, to assumptions that are almost instantly 
dispelled by actually meeting and talking to members of that social group. My 
most recent opportunity to learn (once again) about my capacity to judge and the 
importance of vivencia came in a brief piece of fieldwork observing ex-soldiers on 
a team-building exercise; these men had struggled with their adaptation to civilian 
life, becoming homeless as a consequence. I had steeled myself for implicit and 
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probably explicit sexism, as well as the slight possibility of risk from men trained 
in violence (who are more likely than their civilian counterparts to commit a 
violent offence, MacManus, et al., 2013). Once again and as ever, these men 
were people with stories to tell, just like the rest of us. This is not to say that 
privilege is wiped away by autoethnography, but it does offer a way to name it as 
such and to set boundaries around what claims to knowledge one can make.  
In conclusion then, an autoethnographic approach, for me anyway, serves as a 
reminder to respect, show compassion and not to privilege my interpretations as 
anything more significant than interpretations, epistemologically speaking. 
Autoethnography reminds me to be transparent in explaining how my 
interpretations were reached, to lay bare the reflective process in stories of 
intellectual wrestling with data and literature (more on judgement criteria later in 
this chapter). Earlier in this paragraph I made reference to the influence of activist 
scholars upon my application of autoethnography, a topic I will pick up in the next 
section, which continues this theme of positionality.   
4.7. The	  ultimate	  participant	  
For the reader, viewer or listener, reflexive accounts provide invaluable insights 
into the personal perspective from which research was undertaken and 
interpreted, enabling others to make their own assessments about the 
conclusions (Saltzman, 2002). This section continues the direction I began in the 
previous section to articulate my own position with respect to this work.  
According to qualitative researchers like Coffey (1999) and Anderson (2006), 
inward reflection has always been present to some degree in ethnographic 
research. Anderson argues that Robert Park’s interest in his students’ 
backgrounds encouraged them to draw upon personal experiences in selecting 
research topics, noting that they “walked the streets…worked for local agencies, 
and had autobiographical experience” of the communities they studied (Deegan, 
2001, p. 20). But it is argued that these early Chicago School ethnographers, 
despite their connections to the settings they studied, did not attach particular 
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analytical importance to the role of the self in their research; they remained 
“professional strangers” (Denzin, 2006, p. 421). Reflexivity as relevant to this 
thesis is best understood as emerging from critical anthropology as a reaction 
against objectivist accounts (because, it was argued, knowledge of the social 
world cannot be generated independently of the researcher, Hammersley, 2008). 
Reflexivity can be characterised as an ongoing attentiveness to and assessment 
and reassessment of the researcher’s influences upon the research process and 
findings, a cyclical process that should lead to “further reflexive understanding, 
hermeneutic mediation, and philosophical critique” (Scholte, 1972, p. 431). In this 
way the ethnographer and their history becomes integral to the study. As long as 
they are in the field, and I would add as long as they are thinking and writing, 
everything they do and experience (and write) becomes data (Ryang, 2000). 
Thus, the role of the researcher in autoethnography has been characterised by 
Robert Merton (1988, p. 18) as taking the role of “the ultimate participant in a dual 
participant-observer role”. In other words, the researcher is a member of the 
social world under study (Anderson, 2006). Evocative autoethnographers go 
further, aiming to produce texts that inspire the reader “to care, to feel, to 
empathize, and to do something, to act” (Ellis and Bochner, 2006, p. 422). There 
appear to be interesting and as yet tantalisingly unexplored links between these 
ideas and those of activist scholarship as outlined in Chapter 4, combining Ellis 
and Bochner’s exhortations to show vulnerability with Ruddick’s “undertow of 
biography that pulls us towards one issue or another” (2004, p. 229). 
Consequently, reflecting upon one’s role in the research, one’s position with 
respect to the process as I attempt to show throughout the remaining Chapters, 
is thought to help bolster the work by enabling readers to judge for themselves 
how I as an ethnographer may have influenced aspects of the work, such as the 
types of information collected and the way it has been interpreted (Saltzman, 
2002). Caution is advised though in adopting generic categories such as race, 
social class or gender to delineate positionality; while they can be useful, their 
utility must be elucidated in the narrative, not assumed to be self-explanatory, 
“ready to wear” characteristics (Robertson, 2002, p. 788). In common with a 
number of the other postmodern autoethnographers, I am female and feminist, I 
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am sensitive to issues of power and politics and I am deeply sceptical of claims 
to objective truth made about the social world; perhaps because the social world 
feels ‘made up’ to me, a series of rules of thumb that careful observation of 
skilled people will allow unskilled people to mimic in order to negotiate that world 
almost as successfully. I like to feel as though I am being as honest as my 
scholarship allows, acknowledging that there is always so much more to know. 
The next section expands upon this idea of honesty and transparency in the 
context of criteria by which to judge autoethnographic research.  
4.8. Acting	  with	  conscience	  
In addition to the ontological and epistemological considerations outlined in 
previous sections, it is helpful to clarify whether claims to knowledge are judged 
by foundational criteria (i.e. criteria that are final and absolute determinants of a 
claim to truth) or nonfoundational criteria (i.e. complex, negotiated and specific to 
certain circumstances). This section addresses this issue by exploring the issue 
of criteriaology (Smith and Hodkinson, 2005) in research. Given the diverse 
influences that underpin the scholarship offered here, this section could easily 
expand into be a PhD in its own right, consequently this section is limited largely 
to a discussion of criteria developed to judge autoethnographic work. First I 
review briefly the role of criteria in research before explaining how 
autoethnographers have translated these ideas, concluding with an articulation of 
how I judge my own work.  
For positivist or post-positivist scholars, truth can be claimed as a result of 
methodological rigour, typically quantitative, to remove bias and other forms of 
human contamination from scientific results (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). Early work 
to advance foundational criteria for qualitative research in social science included 
criteria to parallel those widely applied to quantitative research, such as credibility 
and transferability in place of internal and external validity, dependability for 
reliability and confirmability rather than objectivity (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
However, such criteria have been challenged on the basis that interpretive 
enquiry is incompatible with foundationalism, that foundational criteria would have 
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“a restrictive, limiting, regressive, thwarting, halting quality to them, and they can 
never be completely separated from the structures of power in which they are 
situated” (Bochner, 2000, p. 269; Smith, 1984; Smith and Heshusius, 1986). The 
distinction between positivist and non-positivist approaches is not straightforward; 
in critical theory, foundational truth claims are located in specific oppressive 
infrastructures (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). Therefore, the question of judgement 
criteria means that once again the intersection between critical and 
constructionist paradigms in this thesis needs to be explicit, as despite the 
appropriateness of critical theory for issues of inequality and social deprivation, 
criteria are not situated in historical structures, rather, consistent with a social 
constructionist ontology and postmodern epistemology, any claims to truth are 
based upon nonfoundational criteria: an unwillingness to accept that there are or 
can be universal standards for truth (Lincoln, 1995; 1998).  
One of the criticisms of foundational criteria for non-positivistic research outlined 
above was that such criteria cannot be separated from the power and political 
structures within which they are set. The same is likely to be true for 
nonfoundational criteria, perhaps even more so since they are negotiated via a 
complex social and political process (Smith and Hodkinson, 2005; Bochner, 
2000). Smith and Hodkinson define the political aspects of judgements about 
research quality as the process of allocating scarce resources; by resources they 
mean something that is desired but not available to all, examples include funding, 
recognition and prestige (ibid.). Politics is a theme that connects almost every 
chapter of this thesis, from the emancipatory ambitions of critical pedagogists 
(Freire, 2000; Fals-Borda and Rahman, 1991) to the structural inequalities 
underpinning poverty and deprivation (Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Mohan and 
Stokke, 2000). In the context of criteria, it is apparent at both macro and 
micropolitical levels, with influences upon the setting of research criteria for public 
health at a national level (e.g. guidelines for evaluating complex interventions 
published by the Medical Research Council, Craig et al., 2008) and institutional, 
group and individual influences upon what is regarded as ‘proper’ academic 
research (Hammersley, 2008; Delamont, 2007).  
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Another aspect to the contestability and politics of research criteria, rather an 
important one given the purpose of this document, is how institutions and 
examiners judge the quality of a doctoral thesis. Doloriert and Sambrook (2011) 
identify the issues that can arise when there is a mismatch between the 
autoethnographer’s conception of quality and that of their institution or examiners. 
Their example highlights the question of whether it is appropriate to present a 
thesis that ‘shows’ a PhD candidate’s development during the course of their 
study or whether the entire thesis should represent the polished pinnacle of their 
achievements: an airbrushed photograph rather than a documentary. Because of 
all these questions and because the form of creative autoethnography that I have 
chosen to frame this work is epistemologically and stylistically distinct, it seems 
sensible to explain how the leading scholars in that tradition have articulated the 
criteria by which they judge and seek to be judged in turn. I have been inspired in 
particular by the writings of two leading figures in this movement, professors 
Laurel Richardson and Carolyn Ellis; both of whom have given considerable 
thought to how this form of scholarship should be evaluated.  
Carolyn Ellis adopts a very evocative style and demands a high standard from 
other autoethnographers whose contributions she reviews. She has 
experimented with form and format, publishing a methodological novel in 2004. 
Not unexpectedly, she has written a short story to explain how she judges a 
piece of autoethnographic writing. First, she wants to be engaged by the story, to 
be interested in what the author has to say both emotionally and cognitively. She 
wants to “feel and think… back and forth, until thinking and feeling merge” (Ellis, 
2000, p. 273). After she has read the whole piece through and once she has 
distanced herself from this first reading, she reflects on her experience with the 
paper. Was it engaging enough that she read the whole thing through in one 
sitting? If not, if she experienced what she calls “distanced cognitive reading” 
when the piece “interrupts itself” (p. 274), then this might indicate that the writing 
hasn’t lived up to its evocative billing. But if she decides that a piece might be 
worthy of publication, then comes a stream of questions about what it might have 
taught her about social life, what might be new or innovative about the work; the 
authenticity of the story, its logic and flow, whether it rings true; the quality of the 
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writing in a literary sense, the goals of the author and whether they seem to have 
achieved them; whether the story seems likely to stimulate some form of social 
action. Finally, she considers whether the author has behaved ethically in their 
research and their writing. Ethical considerations go beyond the conventions of 
informed consent; Ellis questions whether characters have had the chance to 
contribute to the story and if not, is this omission justifiable? She asks if the 
characters (including the author) are sufficiently developed and complex and 
whether the contribution the story makes outweighs any inherent ethical 
dilemmas. 
Though she has also written in experimental ways (Richardson, 2012; 
Richardson, 1997; Richardson, 2013), Laurel Richardson’s writing on evaluative 
criteria is less evocative in style than Ellis’s short story.  Richardson’s criteria are 
based on her belief that ethnographic writing is an essentially human activity and 
that ethnography is created through research practice. Science, she writes, 
“offers some practices, literature, creative arts, introspection, and memory-work 
offer others” (Richardson, 2000, p. 254) and the ideal is to bring both creative 
and scientific lenses to bear on autoethnographic writing. Richardson’s criteria 
are near identical to those of Ellis, though more tightly corralled into five named 
categories. The first is substantive contribution. As Ellis, Richardson asks if the 
piece contributes to our understanding of social life but she goes further, asking 
that the contribution be “deeply grounded” (p. 254) in an understanding of a 
human world and that this understanding has informed the construction of the 
text.  Richardson’s second criterion is aesthetic merit, which means, to her, that 
the text is “artistically shaped, satisfying, complex, and not boring” (ibid.), that 
creative analytical practices have opened up the text to interpretive responses 
from readers. Her third is reflexivity, which deals with the ethical issues around 
representation that Ellis identified but once again goes further, asking whether 
the writer has demonstrated enough self-awareness, exposed enough of 
themselves and their thought processes to enable the reader to arrive at their 
own judgement. Richardson’s fourth criterion is impact, which seems similar to 
Ellis’s desire to be engaged emotionally and cognitively. Richardson, like Ellis, 
thinks of the work’s impact on herself as a researcher, asking herself is if the 
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piece moves her to write, to experiment with different research practices, to ask 
new questions, to act. Finally and once again in concert with Ellis, Richardson 
desires that any creative autoethnographical text will seem to speak truth, that it 
embodies “credible account of a cultural, social, individual, or communal sense” 
of something that seems real (ibid.).  
Richardson also writes that ethnographers “should not be constrained by the 
habits of somebody else’s mind” (2000, p. 254). Which is helpful to me, because 
the criteria I use to judge my own work, while similar to Ellis, Richardson et al., 
are my own as well. As highlighted in the previous section, I judge my work 
against the criteria of honesty: to what extent have I been honest with myself and 
transparent in the way that I have written my explanations, preserving the 
process by applying what Doleriert calls “logic in use” (2011, p. 587). I have great 
sympathy with Doleriert’s desire to preserve in her own thesis her development 
as a scholar, evidenced by what she calls the “rawness” (ibid.) of her early 
chapters. While I have made analogous attempts to conserve the authenticity of 
my own progressive narrative, my reliance on writing as an epistemic as well as a 
communicative activity has meant that earlier chapters needed to be rewritten to 
help prospective readers navigate the work without tossing it aside, frustrated by 
its lack of cohesion. This paragraph for instance, is one of the last to be made 
“differently contoured and nuanced” (Richardson and Adams St. Pierre, 2005, p. 
964); the only section that remains unwritten at this point in the chronological 
story of my thesis is a very final piece of entirely experimental writing.  
Other criteria I apply to myself include the question of whether I have been fair to 
the other scholars whose work I cite; whether I have given their ideas enough 
time and critical reflection so as to appreciate their complexity and context. 
Whether I have fought effectively my tendency towards the judgemental (it is 
actually easier to put this tendency aside when interpreting the lives of 
participants, much harder when critiquing the work of scholars who sometimes 
appear at first glance both privileged and complacent). To what degree have I 
been fair and ethical in my representation of others? Are they sufficiently 
anonymous in the work or do they need to be offered the opportunity to 
contribute, to set the record straight on their terms? And finally, more recently I 
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find myself questioning whether I have taken the easy path, the comfortable, low 
risk route. Consequently, due to my antagonistic relationship with foundational 
criteria and my attempts to present a document that enables the reader to judge 
its quality for themselves rather than asserting that quality is processually 
inherent, I would locate myself in the evocative interpretivism quadrant of 
Doloriert and Sambrook’s (2011) framework.  
I have found it rather helpful to write about and therefore to reflect upon the 
criteria with which I would judge my own work; as I do so I notice how they are 
beginning to move away from the autoethnographic towards the activist, that as 
the story captured within this thesis unfolds I am hankering to take risks, to be 
more confident in laying claim to my beliefs about research and scholarship, to 
think about how I might use my work to make some sort of positive contribution to 
something. As I mention earlier, this tendency is given somewhat free rein in the 
final chapter with a piece of experimental writing, a “text of illegitimacy” 
(Richardson, 1997, p. 137). For the next section however, I explain how I 
performed the autoethnographic analysis that underpins the next three chapters.  
4.9. Building	  blocks	  
Autoethnographers explain the nuts and bolts of their method as discerning 
patterns of experience evidenced by data, and then describing these patterns 
using facets of storytelling (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011). This section 
explains what data was available to me and how it came into existence.  
As explained in previous sections, the project that inspired the autoethnography 
was underpinned by an action research methodology. According to Kemmis and 
McTaggart, while there is “no clear agreement about the character of Action 
Research: what it is, what and who it is for, and how it should be done” (1988, p. 
21), the heart of Action Research is the pursuit of change via the dual media of 
action and research (Davis, 2004). As has been explained in previous chapters, 
the method is not linear (ibid.), rather the metaphor of a spiral (Kemmis, 2001) is 
employed to conceptualise an evolving process of planning, action and reflection. 
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Because the processes of the project generated the research data, it is probably 
helpful at this stage to explain briefly how the project evolved.  
The initial project plan outlined in May 2011 specified beginning with a process of 
asset mapping (Kretzmann and McKnight, 1993; Goldman and Schmalz, 2005). 
Asset mapping creates an “inventory of community strengths” (Baker et al., 2007, 
p. 438) and is thought to foster social capital upon which change can be built by 
emphasising and working with these strengths, rather than concentrating upon 
deficiencies and their solution. It was decided that the optimum way to begin the 
asset mapping for the project was to ask stakeholders to share their local 
knowledge. ‘Stakeholders’ for the purposes of this thesis can be defined as a 
person, group or organisation with an interest in the project or the 
neighbourhood. It was agreed that a workshop, to which a range of local 
stakeholders would be invited, was the likely to be the most effective way to 
introduce the project, seek input from stakeholders and enable them to contribute 
their knowledge of Parkhood and Urbanwood to the asset mapping process.  
Building upon the local knowledge and relationships begun during the asset 
mapping work, the intended next step was to undertake a planning process to 
collaborate with participants to design suitable methods to answer the research 
questions about drinking. Following this, a period of fieldwork was planned, the 
exact nature of which would depend upon the outputs of the participatory 
process. The output from these first two stages of the project was intended to be 
a written report for the funder, and an appropriate format to disseminate the 
findings and conclusions to the participants and neighbourhood (this could be a 
video, road-show or posters for example, which we would be designed 
collaboratively with the participants). The nature of participatory methods is such 
that the further into the future one attempts to plan, the more vague those plans 
must be. Thus, phase three would be to continue the collaborative working via 
the co-design and implementation of an intervention aimed at reducing drinking 
levels in the two neighbourhoods, based upon the learning and the relationships 
and networks we developed during earlier stages of the project. 
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The research data that recorded the ethnos, the moments of practice that were 
‘frozen’ for later analysis and interpretation, emerged from the action research 
and include three types of record: Firstly, documentation created during the 
course of the project, including the original proposal to the funder and 
subsequent proposals for additional funding during the course of the project; the 
information submitted to the University’s ethics committee to enable the project to 
gain approval; 20 individual planning documents recording ideas and intended 
activities; a total of 12 internal and external progress reports and one final project 
report; a spread sheet of stakeholders and assets and 2 conference papers 
written during and about the project. I wrote the majority of these documents, but 
other members of the research team were responsible for some. Secondly, 378 
emails or email strings sent and received by me during the course of the project, 
between October 2011 and October 2012, totalling over 78,000 words provide a 
record of discussions, disagreements and decisions during the course of the 
project. Finally, over 48,000 words of field notes, “gnomic, shorthand 
reconstructions” (Van Maanen, 2011, p. 123) captured during the data collection 
phase of the project, written by Anna and based on conversations with 23 males 
and 41 females in Parkhood, and 19 males and 39 females in Urbanwood. The 
research questions for this phase were: Why do people drink, why do they feel 
they can’t stop and how does this affect them and those around them? 
This section has reiterated that action research is a cyclical process of planning, 
action and reflection and explained the initial plan that was made for the project 
in Parkhood and Urbanwood. It has described the data that underpins the 
contribution of this thesis as ‘frozen moments’ of the practice that created the 
intervention and explained that this data is primarily documentation produced 
during the course of the project as part of the cycle of planning, action and 
reflection, supported by the record of written communication provided by the 
emails exchanged between project team members. The next section will explain 
how this data was analysed and how the analytical and writing processes 
themselves generated additional data. 
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4.10. Sense	  making	  writing	  
 “Do not impose your own ponderous scientif ic style for communicating 
results,  but diffuse and share what you have learned together with the 
people, in a manner that is wholly understandable and even l i terary and 
pleasant,  for science should not be necessari ly a mystery nor a 
monopoly of experts and intellectuals” (Fals-Borda, 1995, p. 1).  
 
At core, the methodology I have adopted in this study is about making sense of 
phenomena by writing about them in an analytical way. But unlike realist 
ethnographers (Anderson, 2006; Atkinson, 2006), who can apply the rigour of 
analytical procedures like grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), the 
autoethnographic literature is relatively light on practical suggestions for 
analytical writing practices, confining itself to vague references to discerning 
patterns of experience from data (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011). 
Consequently, rather than describing the ways in which I have brought to bear 
established procedures, this section describes in some detail how I made sense 
of the data that I started with; how I transformed my collection of notes, 
documents, emails and memories into the three chapters following this one. In a 
very through the looking glass way, this section could be characterised as a 
micro-autoethnographic account of the three stages by which I constructed this 
autoethnography (Wall, 2006). I begin with a brief explanation of how I subverted 
the conventional role of academic writing, followed by a description of the three 
different phases of writing that resulted in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.  
The traditional approach to social science writing is linear and static, stemming 
from the 17th century division between science and literature and designed to 
cohere “with mechanistic scientism and quantitative research” (Richardson, 1997, 
p. 87). Consequently, scientific (academic) writing is supposed to be transparent, 
a clear pane of glass that allows the reader to see straight through to the truth it 
reveals (Richardson, 1997; Richardson, 1990). The three chapters following this 
one do not contain writing that is intended to function in this way; instead, the 
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writing is my construction of truth and my truth is constructed through writing. 
These chapters represent the generation and codification of understanding, as 
such, the writing of which they are composed is not innocent or neutral and in 
some aspects has come close to Foucault’s ‘Parrhesia’ (1983), or truth telling for 
the purpose of critique (Robinson, 2014). The process was simultaneously 
analytical, generative of data and transformative, both of my understanding of 
myself as a researcher and how I could articulate a contribution to knowledge 
from this work.  
Writing Chapter 5 
Despite the lack of a blueprint, autoethnographers claim to draw upon techniques 
that autobiographers use to produce texts that are both evocative and aesthetic 
(Ellis, 2004; Ellis, 2013; Richardson, 2012). Mills writes that “story implies 
structure, and structure meaning” (2006, p. 1) and I found this very helpful as the 
first stage of my analytical writing. What I aimed to create in Chapter 5 was a 
complex and detailed full narrative of the project, upon which I could base 
subsequent analyses, corresponding to what Hatton and Smith (1995) have 
called descriptive writing. The emails, which I had placed in chronological order, 
formed the backbone of this generative writing process; these enabled me to 
construct the narrative and also to situate what we were doing in the project in 
time and space, which is recorded in italic text under each sub heading of 
Chapter 5. Context and detail were aided by reviewing the other project 
documents in line with the chronological narrative. But how can this process of 
writing an account be justified as an analytical one? If someone had been 
watching me write, it would have appeared as though I was just writing. And at 
times, I really just did write, in an almost trance-like state, similar to the ideas of 
free (Boice, 1990) or therapeutic (Richardson, 2013) writing. This, allied to the 
absence of protocol, brought its own questions about the validity of the method 
and the work: was this too comfortable to have epistemological value? A journal 
entry from March 2014 records how I felt worried “about whether the easiness of 
autoethnography and creativity means that it’s less ‘good’ than stuff I find hard”. I 
will return to this issue later in this section. 
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As I wrote the account, which has many characteristics of a thick description, 
several things happened: first, connections and ideas began to occur to me. For 
example, while I had concluded that something had changed in the PCT during 
the course of the project that transformed their attitude from a relatively 
managerial focus on milestones and specific, measureable outcomes to a more 
relaxed and collaborative desire to view the project as a foundation for long-term 
community development, I hadn’t connected this perception to a confluence of 
events in March that had both national and local significance (see section 5.13). 
Secondly, it seemed significant that my memories of some events were very 
clear, things like the atmosphere of a room, how people moved around the 
space, who spoke to whom while getting coffee. These memories evoked by the 
writing process enabled me to generate additional ‘data’ in the form of detail and 
subsequent reflection. And further it seems likely that the events I remembered 
were those that had significance for my ethnographic self, and thus those events 
seem to have shaped my analysis towards ethical and epistemological issues, as 
well as those of power and politics. The extract below provides an example of the 
extra information that these recollections created: 
We,	  the	  audience,	  gathered	  in	  a	  large	  room	  in	  the	  town	  hall,	  a	  Georgian	  building	  
with	  an	  impressive	  façade,	  I	  thought	  this	  showed	  the	  community	  researchers	  were	  
being	  taken	  seriously,	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  venue	  reflected	  the	  respect	  that	  they	  
were	  being	  afforded.	  I	  thought	  that	  this	  would	  make	  them	  feel	  as	  though	  their	  views	  
were	  significant;	  it	  didn’t	  occur	  to	  me	  at	  the	  time	  that	  it	  this	  might	  make	  them	  feel	  
nervous	  or	  out	  of	  place,	  though	  it	  may	  well	  have	  done	  (Extract	  from	  Chapter	  5).	  
The event described in this extract was a significant one in that it brought home 
to me how differently I was treated as an academic compared to ordinary people 
in Parkhood and Urbanwood. In this way, almost from the beginning of writing 
Chapter 5, I was simultaneously organising, analysing and generating new data. I 
knew that this process was as important as the words I was writing and wanted to 
capture it, to be able to explain the analytical writing as well as to write the story. 
At first, I elected to note what I regarded at that time as emerging themes in a 
draft version of Chapter 6. But very quickly it became apparent that this method 
of recording data about the writing process would expand into writing Chapters 5 
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and 6 simultaneously, which I felt would be unhelpful; primarily because I wanted 
to preserve the authenticity of the process I had elected to follow. And, because 
of the fluidity of the methodology, the lack of established protocol and the fact 
that I was my own data set (in a sense) it seemed important to impose some form 
of external structure, otherwise I felt the thesis would spiral into utter confusion. I 
also needed to rein in my tendency to dash off in pursuit of new and interesting 
ideas as the expense of important but less exciting tasks. So on 10th October 
2013 I wrote my first entry in my research journal, a document saved on my 
computer that I have maintained throughout the reflective writing process and to 
which I refer in subsequent chapters.   
Writing Chapter 6 
Once I had completed Chapter 5, I intended to engage in a different sort of 
reflective writing, characterised by Hatton and Smith as dialogic reflection. This is 
a “’stepping back’ from the events/actions leading to a different level of mulling 
over, discourse with self and exploring the experience, events, and actions using 
qualities of judgements and possible alternatives” (1995, p. 48). But rather than 
plunge headlong into Chapter 6, instead I decided to use the qualitative analysis 
software programme NVivo to engage in an intense process of open coding the 
narrative I had written for Chapter 5. I felt that this would be a useful way to take 
a mental step back, to halt the momentum of the very free writing that I had fallen 
into. I wanted to interrupt myself, to pause for reflection, make time to allow the 
ideas to settle and give new interpretations and structures a chance to emerge. 
In fact what I found myself doing was including the entire original dataset, emails 
and project documents and all, as part of a theoretically (or perhaps thematically) 
directed recoding process. I followed the processes outlined by Braun and Clarke 
(2006), a method that is often framed as realist (Aronson, 1994; Roulston, 2001), 
but characterised by Braun and Clarke themselves as equally congruent with the 
constructionist paradigm. At the start, there were four concepts that seemed 
important, all recorded in my journal: illegitimacy (how to make sense of self and 
behave ethically during such a process); social injustice (the feeling that current 
practices and discourses, through a focus on power and politics that is 
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inadequate, serve both to hide and reinforce inequality, to blame the victim); the 
boundary between activism and research (the idea that a researcher can be an 
advocate for a disadvantaged group and what that means); and the Medusa’s 
Gaze (absent referent and other linguistic devices to allow the powerful to avoid 
responsibility for the injustices they perpetrate).   
From the coding process emerged four themes, similar to those I had started 
with, but more focused and detailed: the absent referent (which became negative 
space as I started to write about it), legitimacy, performance and resistance. My 
next step was to try and represent the themes graphically, with diagrams that 
began as maps with pencil lines crisscrossing the page in ever increasing 
complexity but ended as simplified depictions of my ideas and observations, as 
illustrated below: 
 
Figure 1: First sketch of the themes 
With these four themes and their representations as a starting point, I engaged 
once more in reflective writing but this time the themes cut across the chronology 
of the story. Originally, Chapter 6 was written as four relatively long narratives 
that served to generate and depict each theme. But this seemed to embody my 
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concerns about the ease with which the therapeutic writing flowed and whether 
the output was justifiable analytically. Shouldn’t the process be more painful 
somehow, if it were to have any claim to being ‘research’? Yvette, my second 
supervisor, agreed about the lack of analytical transparency: 
“I	  found	  myself	  going	  along	  with	  your	  description,	  getting	  absorbed	  in	  the	  
autoethnographic	  account,	  but	  then	  couldn't	  help	  a	  little	  knee-­‐jerk	  response	  every	  
time	  you	  mentioned	  your	  data	  or	  your	  themes	  …	  I	  had	  to	  remind	  myself	  that	  'the	  
data'	  in	  your	  thesis	  are	  not	  just	  the	  vignettes	  that	  you	  describe	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter	  but	  also	  all	  of	  your	  (old	  and	  new)	  reflections	  on	  these.	  	  Essentially	  your	  data	  
have	  emerged	  as	  the	  writing	  has	  evolved	  -­‐	  new	  concepts	  and	  frameworks	  have	  been	  
introduced	  (e.g.	  absent	  referent	  etc.)	  which,	  in	  turn,	  have	  led	  to	  new	  reflections	  and	  
new	  ways	  of	  framing	  your	  data”	  (email	  from	  Yvette,	  23	  March	  2014)	  
Following Yvette’s feedback, I decided to restructure Chapter 6 from the four 
themes into a series of smaller reflective vignettes (Doloriert and Sambrook, 
2011), each telling the story of how the knowledge therein was produced through 
reflective writing (for a similar approach, see Ellis, 2013; Richardson, 2013). This 
process was even closer to the therapeutic writing described by Ellis, Adams and 
Bochner (2011) as writing that helps writers make sense of themselves and their 
experiences and to question dominant perspectives (Bochner, 2001). 
Writing Chapter 7 
The next type of writing, which constitutes Chapter 7, is critical reflective writing 
(Hatton and Smith, 1995). This writing seeks explicitly to reference the multiple 
discourses, historical and socio-political perspectives that influenced my practice 
and may be influenced by it in turn. This final phase of the analysis brings the 
academic literature into the writing (or perhaps the writing into the academic 
literature), both to integrate the critical reflection with the literature on social 
marketing, participatory research and other relevant topics and to include new 
directions as deemed relevant to the contribution being attempted. This chapter 
offered a challenge to my desire to preserve the authenticity of the 
autoethnographic narrative - the ‘logic in use’ - because it presented a more 
sophisticated perspective on the social marketing literature than I had originally 
written in Chapter 2. After some reflection, I elected not to rewrite Chapter 2 
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completely, as if I had always had such a refined critique on social marketing’s 
limits. But I did use the critique I developed in Chapter 7 to simplify and hone 
Chapter 2; in particular I synthesised what were disparate reviews of literature on 
the Total Market Approach, markets and systems theories, collaborative and 
community-led approaches and the S-D Logic into the three emergent 
‘revolutionary’ approaches.  
Writing Chapter 8 
I decided to write Chapter 8 in March 2014, shortly after finishing Laurel 
Richardson’s book Fields of Play: Constructing an Academic Life (1997), in which 
she applies “the sociological imagination to the act of writing” and asks how “what 
we write affect[s] who we become” (p. 1). I felt then that I had read a reasonable 
amount of literature about writing as a way of knowing and had applied it myself, 
cautiously and mostly within conventional structures; now I wanted to unleash it, 
so see where and how far I could take the idea.  
Inspired by Richardson’s conception of writing as “a site of moral responsibility” 
(p. 34) that will allow academics to use their skills and privileges to tell the stories 
of the silenced and “advance the case of the non-privileged” (p. 34) and feeling 
that the God of Convention had been placated by the humble offering of Chapter 
7, ambitiously I decided to write a story based on what I conceived as Academic 
Science Fiction. I wanted to invent a parallel universe where things were 
different, where the most powerful discourse wasn’t Enlightenment rationalism 
but subjective, lived experience founded in compassion and respect. It felt 
idealistic, but also interestingly radical.  
Quite quickly though, I abandoned this idea in favour of one less Tolkienesque in 
scale and aspiration, electing instead to write a short story that I called the Viva 
of the Oppressed. The title and basic idea for the format was inspired by Augusto 
Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed (2000): I planned to write an alternative viva 
voce, in which I would defend this thesis to a panel of people whom I would 
invent. These characters of my own creation would ask me the questions I would 
probably find hardest to answer: what had I actually achieved with this work? 
How might it benefit anyone other than myself? I made some progress along this 
Page 121 of 317 
path, fleshing out some characters and thinking of the sorts of things that they 
might say. But this idea wasn’t really working for me; the Theatre of the 
Oppressed is supposed to dramatise an oppressive situation, enabling the ‘spect-
actors’ first to recognise and then, on the second run through of the drama to 
intervene and change the story, “taking possession of the stage in the fiction of 
the theatre… By transforming fiction, [they are] transformed into [themselves]” 
(2000, p. xxi). 
Finally, I settled on an approach to which I had been introduced at a creative 
writing course on autobiography, led by author Sarah LeFanu. Sarah explained to 
us the difficulties she had faced in structuring her biography of Samora Machel 
(2012) and how, inspired by the work of her friend and fellow author Michèle 
Roberts (1993), she had decided to structure the work like a glossary or, in her 
words, a ‘lexical biography’. This format employs an alphabetic structure, with a 
single word representing something of significance to the author. I found it rather 
enlightening to write Chapter 8 using this technique for assigning structure; as 
well as satisfying my evident need to rebel against convention, it served to 
highlight and to juxtapose the many ideas emerging from the work of this PhD, 
constructing both significance and relationships between ideas that I might have 
missed, had I written a more conventional final chapter.   
In conclusion then, the writing in this thesis is not regarded as an innocent 
medium that conveys ideas formed separately to the writing process. Instead, 
writing has been used as an active and generative part of the research method 
(Done et al., 2011). The original data (the emails, documents etc.) was 
transformed into knowledge in a three-staged process: first, by imposing a 
chronological narrative structure, then cross cut into thematic vignettes written to 
capture the story of the analysis as well as its findings and finally reintegrated 
with existing literature. The next section explains the relationship between writing 
and theory.  
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4.11. The	  role	  of	  theory	  
As part of a methodological elucidation, it is conventional to clarify how theory is 
going to be used in the process. In action research for example, scholars write 
that findings should help build, inform and test social theory (Reason and 
Bradbury, 2001), leading ultimately to wider social change (Somekh, 2006; 
Ozanne and Saatcioglu, 2008). In this brief section, I explore the ways that theory 
has been written about in the autoethnography literature before explaining how I 
used theory in this thesis.  
As with the absence of defined analytical protocols described in the previous 
section, the role of theory in autoethnographic research is not made explicit; 
rather it is presented as a personal and subjective process of recognising and 
making meaning from personal epiphanies, “self-claimed phenomena in which 
one person may consider an experience transformative while another may not” 
(Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011, p. 2).  
On the surface, it might seem helpful in attempting to clarify the role of theory in 
autoethnography to compare it to ethnography. Ellis et al. locate the difference 
between these two forms of study in the mechanism by which the researcher 
makes sense of a culture (Maso, 2001): autoethnographers make sense via their 
personal experiences; ethnographers do so primarily via other means. While 
some forms of ethnography are very explicit that their aim is to develop theory 
systematically (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), most ethnographic research is more 
concerned with description and explanation of particular phenomena 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Hammersley and Atkinson go on to explain 
that rarely are ethnographic studies derived from existing theory (giving 
Festinger’s study of cognitive dissonance as one of the few examples of this 
approach); more often they are motivated by lack of or dissatisfaction with 
existing knowledge on a subject; by what they call “surprising facts” (p. 22) that 
the researcher is interested in exploring; or are opportunistic, such as studying a 
natural disaster. All of which are as likely to be politically or practically motivated 
as theoretically so.  
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The first way I used theory in this thesis was in conceiving this study, in a way 
that is probably closest to dissatisfaction with existing knowledge. I noted the 
variety of literatures in which participatory methods (or co-creation, co-production 
and other terms) appeared as theories of change. I noted also the way in which 
references to participation, collaboration and co-creation were starting to appear 
in the social marketing literature, often presented as the responsible or ethical 
choice, simply because they were participatory and collaborative. But of course, 
as Chapter 4 explains, other disciplines had considerably more experience of 
these methods and offered a much more nuanced and sophisticated perspective. 
Consequently, my intention at the start was to “sort out” these issues theoretically 
and to explore whether this sorting could help make sense of some of the 
difficulties I had identified in practice; two examples being firstly, the conflict 
between the managerial outlook of commissioners and the free flowing spiral of 
participatory approaches and secondly, the problem of whipping up enthusiasm 
among participants, only to abandon them later, once the project was over.  
Quite quickly though, my attention moved from a desire to sort out the literatures 
on participation to the problem of methodology, as explained earlier. First, I 
assumed that my methodology was participatory action research, but of course it 
was not. This led to a period of exploration to determine what methodology could 
underpin authentically what I was aiming for within the constraints that existed. 
And thus, my work - and my ethnographic self, another theoretical influence - 
began to be informed by theory in a second way, with postmodernist theories of 
qualitative research, in particular the post-structuralism of Laurel Richardson, 
Norman Denzin and Carolyn Ellis. This affected significantly how I approached 
the study, how I wrote chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 (and indeed how I am writing now, 
at this moment). This perspective sensitised me to process and narrative, 
evocation and emotion and encouraged me to experiment with voice and style in 
deliberate and experimental ways in order to create knowledge.  
The third way in which I used theory in this study was during the analysis and 
sense making stages. Hammersly and Atkinson’s depiction of the way 
ethnographers should use theory in the analysis of their data is reflective of my 
approach; they say that theorising should involve an “iterative process in which 
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ideas are used to make sense of data, and data used to change our ideas” (p. 
159). This iterative process came to the fore when writing Chapter 6, during 
which time I studied a range of theoretical perspectives from the theories of 
space in fine art to the language of eco-feminism. The backbone of my analytical 
work was formed by postmodernist theories of power and subjectivity, which 
striated every reflection, vignette and conclusion. If I were to have the luxury of 
repeating the study right from the beginning of the work in Parkhood and 
Urbanwood, I would probably choose to investigate particular aspects of my 
analysis in more depth, for example, post-structuralist ideas of performativity 
(Butler, 1999) as they might pertain to a performance of empowering behaviour 
by project leaders, or the Foucaultian notion of ethics and truth-speaking 
(Foucault, 1983) in relation to participatory projects in deprived areas. The next 
section takes a slightly different perspective on ethics, explaining how I dealt with 
the twin issues of ethics within the project itself and subsequently, the ethics of 
writing the autoethnography.  
4.12. Ethical	  implications	  
As with all research projects conducted by staff or students, the university 
required me to seek ethical approval for the participatory project (for which I 
applied using the process for staff rather than for students). I later applied for 
ethical approval as a student to conduct the autoethnography; the faculty ethics 
committee approved both applications. This section draws upon earlier writing 
about ethics in this thesis to explain the ethical issues and how they were dealt 
with in the project itself and subsequent issues related to writing this 
autoethnographic reflection. 
As outlined in section 3.9, ethical considerations in social research include the 
need for researchers to ensure that their participants have given informed 
consent, that any risks posed by the research have been considered carefully 
and it can be shown that any such risks are outweighed by the benefits the new 
knowledge will bring, that the protocols and practices outlined in the research 
design are fair, that anonymity and confidentiality will be maintained and that the 
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research will be accurate. Additionally, ethnographers are advised to be sensitive 
to power dynamics (Taylor, 2002) and to the possibility that they might change a 
person or community by dint of the reflections prompted by the questions they 
ask (Agar, 1982); though to effect change through research is rather the point, for 
participatory researchers. As well as different conceptions of the ethicality of 
seeking change, participatory researchers, as section 3.9 explains, face some 
distinct ethical challenges in their work, which relate primarily to consent and to 
anonymity. It has been argued that insisting upon anonymity as an ethical 
absolute can have the effect of “silencing participants for their own protection” 
(Bradley, 2007, p. 339); failing to credit them for their contribution and to give 
them a meaningful say in how their words are used (Blake, 2007; Cahill, Sultana 
and Pain, 2007; Elwood, 2007). The other issue relates to consent and whether it 
is ethical to expect people to consent to participate in a project when nobody 
knows how the work will unfold. In fact, there were some issues with consent in 
the project, but not of the nature explored in the literature to date, as will be 
explained in a moment. 
On 11th May 2011, I submitted an ethics approval form for the project. This form 
outlined three possible ethical issues: First, that residents might be content with 
the way things are in their lives and become distressed or angry at perceived 
criticism or judgement from outsiders. I proposed ameliorating this issue firstly by 
framing carefully the way that the project was described to people so that rather 
than studying ‘problem behaviours’ we would be looking for ‘assets’ in the 
neighbourhood; and secondly, by working closely with trusted local stakeholders 
who could help us to avoid causing offense.  
The second issue was the possibility that we may come into contact with people 
that have been harmed by alcohol in some way; perhaps alcoholism or alcohol 
related violence or abuse. In preparation for this, Anna was equipped with 
knowledge of a local organisation that supported individuals, families and 
communities with concerns about mental health, alcohol or drugs, to which we 
could refer anyone in need of support. During the course of the project, she did 
indeed encounter people who told her some very distressing stories and she did 
pass on the details of the support organisation several times. At this point, I made 
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her aware of our staff counselling service should she need to talk to someone in 
confidence about what she had heard (Adams and Moore, 2007). The third issue 
related to vulnerable adults. While the project was not about vulnerable adults, I 
was aware of the possibility that we may come into contact with them in the 
course of our work. I specified that should we encounter a vulnerable adult, we 
would work closely with their carer or the organisation that introduced them to us 
to ensure that they were not harmed by their participation and that any 
researcher that comes into contact with a vulnerable adult will be CRB checked. 
We only encountered one vulnerable adult in the project, during some data 
collection in Urbanwood. Because this man was unknown to us and not 
accompanied by another person, I elected not to proceed with an informal 
interview for ethical reasons.   
The approval paperwork also required a description of the procedures for gaining 
informed consent and assuring confidentiality. I specified that people would be 
provided with an information sheet (see appendix 1) and further informed through 
face-to-face conversations with the researchers and co-design facilitators. If any 
doubts were expressed, I stated that researchers would not attempt to do any 
more than reassure and that if individuals were not keen to take part in either the 
co-creation or the research, then no attempt would be made to persuade them to 
do so. Further, I specified that any recorded data would be identified using first 
name only, and that the analysis would make use of fake names or identifiers 
such as Male A, Female B. I specified that audio recordings would be transcribed 
using an internal transcription service, that identifier codes rather than names 
would be used and that all audio files would be erased from the recording device 
following transcription. In fact, no participants agreed to audio recording and a 
great many were even unwilling to give their names or written consent to the 
research team. Consequently, we developed two levels of consent: written and 
verbal. With the verbal consent, the participants consented only to the 
information they provided being used as background and thus no direct 
quotations of their speech were included in any published reports. Much of the 
data from these anonymous participants is captured as observational field notes 
and recollections of the main points of a conversation, not specific words or 
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information. For this reason, there was no particular issue with ownership of 
words or ideas coming into conflict with principles of anonymity.  
Finally, it is typical that research undertaken by the National Health Service 
(NHS) or on people who can be considered to have been selected on the basis 
that they are NHS patients or staff receives full NHS ethical approval. However, 
exceptions can be made if the research is deemed to be outside the scope of 
these guidelines, as was the case with this project.  
My second application to the Faculty Ethics Committee was made on 10th June 
2013 and covered the autoethnographic study described and created in this 
thesis. This was a very straightforward application covering the use of personal 
communications and collaboratively written documents as a basis for the analysis 
and the inclusion of direct quotations and extracts. I identified no risks to those 
individuals involved: Anna, Louise, Sarah and Phoebe. I explained that I would 
send each colleague a summary of the quotations I had used in context, and 
engage in discussion and negotiation with them until they were content that they 
were represented fairly. I suggested that the use of a pseudonym would help 
keep their identities confidential from all but those who knew the project well. So 
while Delamont’s (2007; 2009) concerns that my colleagues would be identifiable 
to someone who knows the project well are pertinent, I have ameliorated them by 
giving my colleagues the opportunity to review, change and remove information 
about themselves and their role. Indeed, some revision and removal of personal 
information has occurred, at their request. I have also used a pseudonym for the 
two neighbourhoods, for the same reason. All colleagues to whom I have referred 
by pseudonym in this thesis have given their full consent to be represented here, 
in this version. 
This section has summarised the procedures that were put in place to meet the 
guidelines set down by my institution’s ethics committee, which included 
minimising possible distress, safeguarding vulnerable people, making sure 
informed consent was secured and data recorded so as to ensure the terms of 
that consent were honoured and confidential data kept safe. Throughout the next 
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three chapters though, there is a focus on ethical issues that are unrelated to 
these concerns, which will be highlighted in the text as they occur.  
4.13. Concluding	  comments	  
I began this chapter with the reminder that the overall aim of my research is to 
shine a light upon the under-explored issues of language, discourses and power 
relations that may present themselves when a participatory social marketing 
intervention is commissioned in a deprived neighbourhood. In this context, I have 
explained and sought to justify the methodology I have used to study this 
question: autoethnography. I began by setting out my relativistic ontological 
position, which is easy to explain in contrast to ontological realism with its 
emphasis on an external reality independent of language but more difficult to 
disentangle from historical realism. The latter is accomplished by dissociating 
methodological concerns from the context of the research, bound up as they are 
with the issues of class-based analysis of primary concern to historical realists.  
Next, I align this work and myself with the feminist post-structuralist perspective 
articulated by Laurel Richardson et al., founded in a rejection of epistemic 
absolutism and a belief in the power of language to define and contest social 
organisation and power, as well as to function as a place for struggle and 
exploration, in which the self is constructed. I have explained that in this work, 
knowledge and self are constructed through writing as a creative and generative 
way of studying the culture of the project through the lens of the self: these three 
elements forming the auto, the ethnos and the graphy of the study. However I 
note several criticisms of autoethnography, particularly the evocative 
autoethnography that I have sought to embrace here: most significantly that the 
method is narcissistic, uninteresting, unethical to publish and a waste of time and 
money. I respond to these criticisms by pointing out the unacknowledged 
subjectivity of these opinions and the unconscious privilege displayed by 
academics setting themselves up as the arbiters of what is unfamiliar, interesting 
and thereby worthy of study.   
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Following a brief elaboration of my position with respect to the study, I expand 
upon the issues of honesty and transparency within a summation of the 
judgement criteria that leading autoethnographers have proposed, which include: 
substantive contribution, aesthetic merit, reflexivity, impact and credibility. To 
these, I add my own suggestions of fairness and willingness to take risks. The 
concluding sections of this chapter represent a bridge between the more 
conventional literature reviews in Chapters 3 and 4 and the stately progress 
through ontology, epistemology, methodology and method that I have presented 
thus far. I become more autobiographical and reflective of how my engagement 
with autoethnography intersected with my reading about participatory research to 
create the next four chapters.  
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Chapter	  5: In	  which	  I	  tell	  a	  story	  
“No, no! The adventures f irst ,  explanations take such a dreadful t ime” 
(The Gryphon, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, p. 85).  
5.1. Introduction	  
The next two chapters chronicle the findings of the autoethnographic study and 
the generation and analysis of the research data. As I explained in the previous 
few sections, my aim when I started this chapter was to create a rich and detailed 
account of the project; I aspired to bring together all the data from the emails we 
exchanged, the field notes we wrote and the numerous planning documents we 
created with my recollection of these events, some of which seem significant 
because they can be called to mind in some detail without reference to any data, 
but also those that were dredged up during the writing process. The final element 
I wanted to bring into the narrative was my reflections, those retrospective 
understandings that come with distance, with musing actively on past events and 
their significance. In the straightforward storytelling of this chapter, my 
recollections and reflections are interwoven in a single narrative, an evocative 
thick description (Goodall, 2001) drawing upon various autobiographical 
techniques like showing and telling and varied authorial voice. It is presented 
(and was written) broadly in chronological order, with one or two overlaps and 
exceptions; they are identified as such in the narrative.  
Before the story begins, I need to explain a few things. Probably the most 
important is that I do not intend to describe to the reader at the outset how this 
chapter is structured or how it ends. You will not know where you are or where 
you will end up as you read. You will not understand the entirety of the story until 
you have reached the end. This is unconventional in academic writing where 
signposting is integral to presentation, but this unconventionality is embraced 
deliberately in this chapter because it is consistent with how participatory 
methods work. I do not want to create a false certainty of logical progression 
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towards a known outcome. In an active, interactive example of the 
autobiographical technique of ‘showing’ (Adams, 2006), you will need to trust the 
process, trust that the narrative will make sense in the end, as the project team 
had to trust the participatory process of the research. This break with convention 
may be somewhat uncomfortable; this is my intention. I want you to experience 
some of the discomfort we felt, the discomfort of not knowing what the outcome 
will be. But I do not intend to cast you entirely adrift; I will conclude this 
introductory section with an explanation of the main characters in the story and 
the scenes in which it is enacted.  
The story is set in two neighbourhoods, Parkhood and Urbanwood (not their real 
names), which are suburbs (technically wards, i.e. geographical subdivisions 
within a local authority) of a medium sized regional city. Both fall within the within 
the most deprived 5% of areas nationally (South West Observatory, 2011) and 
both contain large estates of social housing built between the 1950s and the 
1970s (Lambert, 2014; McKee, 2013). According to the Office for National 
Statistics (2011) Parkhood has just over 10,000 residents, with levels of 
unemployment and people with a long-term health problem or disability both 
slightly above average for city, region and country. At 89% white ethnicity, it has 
less racial diversity than is average nationally, but is slightly more diverse than 
the regional average. Driving to Parkhood, one proceeds along a main road lined 
with large detached houses. Turning off this road, the scenery gradually gives 
way to the typical mid-century ‘council’ style of houses (Ravetz, 2013). Things 
begin to look run down, but always in the distance is greenery. Parkhood has 
several churches, a youth club, two Children’s Centres and a primary school, the 
eponymous park, a run of shops, a library (sadly in the process of closure during 
the project) and a committed amateur rugby club.  
Urbanwood, closer to the city centre, is greyer and more compact; it is the 
smallest ward in the city with only 3,000 residents. There is a central green area 
with single shop and closed down youth café below a small block of flats on one 
side and closely packed small houses on the other. Urbanwood is split into two 
areas, separated by the Urbanwood Road: the more affluent Treepark area and 
the very deprived Avenues area. There is a well-used community centre and just 
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over the Urbanwood Road boundary in Treepark is a sports club. The percentage 
of people in Urbanwood with a health problem or disability that limits their daily 
activities (including problems related to old age) is double that of the city average 
and almost double the regional and national averages. Unemployment rates are 
also higher but the percentage of people who are carers is no different to city, 
regional and national averages (Office for National Statistics, 2011). The 
inhabitants are mostly white ethnicity, as in Parkhood.  
5.2. Balancing	  act	  
Parkhood, June – July 2011 
Right from the start of the project, despite what we were proposing seeming to be 
basic common sense and knowing now that the PCT was open to more 
collaborative approaches like this, the challenges associated with what we aimed 
to do became apparent. If we wanted funding for the project, it had to come from 
within the budgeting system, and commissioning structures organised around 
topics (like alcohol, smoking or obesity) were difficult to cut across. Or perhaps 
our timing was off: the appearance later on of initiatives like a significant Asset 
Based Community Development project (see section 5.13 and Robinson, 1995) 
indicates that generic funding linked to a particular neighbourhood rather than a 
topic was theoretically possible. Nevertheless, working within rather than outside 
the existing structure, we initiated contact with a budget holder who was keen to 
fund a participatory project on the topic of alcohol. 
Developing the formal project proposal highlighted some inconsistencies 
between participatory principles and traditional social marketing management. As 
explained in Chapter 2, social marketing principles dictate that audiences are 
segmented into smaller identifiable groups and measurable goals for behaviour 
change are set. And true to the strictures of social marketing, we were tasked 
with reducing alcohol consumption among ‘increasing’ and ‘high-risk’ drinkers (as 
defined by their unit consumption), male and female, age 35-55. In reality, Louise 
and I agreed that a pragmatic approach to targeting made the most sense. Aside 
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from a cursory mention in project documents, presentations and the final report, 
the question of a target audience was not brought up again in a practical sense. 
What I took very seriously though was the stipulation that the project be 
participatory, defined in the original specification from Louise as  
“…a	  way	  of	  working	  whereby	  service	  providers	  and	  users	  work	  together	  to	  create	  a	  
decision	  or	  a	  service	  which	  works	  for	  them	  all.	  The	  approach	  is….built	  on	  the	  principle	  
that	  those	  who	  are	  affected	  by	  a	  service	  are	  best	  placed	  to	  help	  design	  it”	  (Project	  
Specification,	  15th	  March	  2011).	  
As explained in previous chapters, projects that employ a participatory 
methodology do not begin with the development of a detailed project plan; and 
here the process developed exactly as the literature said it would, as a cycle of 
planning, action and reflection (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2005) interspersed with 
problems, surprises and serendipitous moments. The first step of the first cycle 
was to organise a stakeholder workshop. The purpose of this workshop was to 
start to get to know the ‘gatekeepers’ to the two neighbourhoods: as outsiders, 
we needed people on our side, people who could warn us of potential 
transgressions, share their local knowledge and introduce us to others as part of 
the socially negotiated process of gaining access. Planning the workshop brought 
to the fore a number of issues relating to how the project should be presented 
and the extent to which we could (and should) attempt to control the degree of 
input that stakeholders, and later participants, would be allowed.  
A particular conundrum was the degree to which stakeholders and participants 
would be able to deviate from the alcohol agenda laid down by the system. Whilst 
the funders were fully supportive of the participatory ideals upon which the project 
was founded (and now that I know them better, I believe that they were as 
committed to these ideals as they could reasonably be); they were concerned 
that if stakeholders, and later participants, were to be given completely free rein 
to decide upon priorities (as they should in a Participatory Action Research 
project) they could elect to focus upon issues like healthy eating or even topics 
unrelated to health like litter and dog mess.  
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The whole team was aware that senior figures, despite their realistic perspective 
on the challenges involved, might be concerned about what could appear to be a 
failure to demonstrate a measurable performance against risky drinking 
objectives. I understood and in principle agreed with this concern: publically 
funded organisations have a responsibility to use their funding wisely and 
certainly shouldn’t waste it on initiatives that are not successful. But I was 
concerned that an overly managerial focus on short-term ‘outcomes’ would 
prevent us from giving our vision the chance it needed to demonstrate what it 
might achieve and how. 
Attempting to balance constraint with principle, we all agreed that some 
compromise would be necessary. Consequently, we all decided that some terms 
of the project would have to be set. These included the selection of Parkhood and 
Urbanwood as the target neighbourhoods, the focus on risky drinking, the final 
deadline for completion and the available budget (because of the terms of the 
funding) and the primary focus on older drinkers. The latter seems related to the 
problem of a specific ‘target audience’ identified in the previous section, but really 
it had more to do with an assumption that this group was suffering most in health 
terms (based on hospital admissions data) and also tended to be passed over in 
favour of other, hotter topics like under-age or street drinking. But regardless of 
the reasons, right from the start of the project, it can be seen that our approach 
began to deviate from a strict adherence to the principles of participatory 
research as well as from those of social marketing. 
After some discussion about the best and most sensitive way to negotiate these 
tensions between the participatory ideals and the managerial system of set 
milestones and objectives, we decided to be honest with stakeholders (and later, 
participants) that these non-negotiable terms were a condition of the funding 
being made available and this was out of the project team’s control. Thus, right 
from the very start of the project, resisting this impulse to take back control 
became a battle to be fought with each other and within us.  
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5.3. The	  keepers	  of	  the	  gate	  
Parkhood, August 2011 
As explained in the previous section, the first step of the project was to talk to 
local ‘stakeholders’ about the project. Stakeholder is a term with multiple 
meanings; stakeholder theory is used frequently in Organisation Studies for 
example (Freeman, 1984). In our project, we used the term stakeholder to mean 
a person who had a stake in the project or someone who could help us. 
Someone whose toes we might tread upon if we didn’t develop and maintain a 
good working relationship with them. In practice, this meant people working in the 
public sector with some kind of responsibility or interest in the neighbourhoods, 
for example the police community support officers and beat officers, people 
working for the housing associations, local council employees and people who 
managed community organisations like the youth club.  
During our workshop, we asked stakeholders, numbering 10 professionals from 
the police, council, community organisations and two local charities who 
delivered support to people with alcohol and drug dependency, to identify and 
prioritise what they thought the goals of the project should be. Overwhelmingly, 
they felt that improving self-esteem and feelings of competence, allied to 
increasing involvement and engagement in the community, needed to be 
prioritised over outcomes related specifically to drinking. Consensus among the 
stakeholders at the workshop was that heavy drinkers in Urbanwood and 
Parkhood used alcohol to cope with their difficult lives and that before any 
change to drinking behaviour could be achieved, overall wellbeing needed to 
improve. It is interesting to reflect that the stakeholders’ views on what the project 
should be aiming for were broadly consistent with our original vision of a holistic, 
neighbourhood specific approach.  
At the time of this first workshop, I was not aware of the degree of cynicism and 
disappointment in the neighbourhoods about the number of initiatives that had 
come and gone and while stakeholders were polite and professional, several 
appeared reserved. Perhaps this climate of resignation was the reason? I felt at 
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the time that if we were able to show that we could deliver on our promise of 
making a genuine attempt to understand fully the issues and give local people a 
voice then they would support us; but while they were willing to give us the 
benefit of the doubt, they would wait and see. One stakeholder in particular: 
Sarah, a local councillor, seemed sceptical about whether we realised the 
complexity of the problem we intended to address and the degree of empathy we 
would need to show. The following extract is taken from an early Stakeholder 
Engagement Plan, these notes relate to Sarah: 
Passionate	  about	  her	  community.	  Thinks	  we	  don't	  'get'	  what	  it's	  like	  there.	  Willing	  to	  
play	  along	  for	  now.	  Seems	  supportive.	  We'll	  need	  to	  prove	  we	  mean	  what	  we	  say.	  
Could	  be	  embarrassing	  for	  her	  if	  she	  supports	  us	  publicly	  and	  we	  fail	  (text	  from	  
internal	  document	  prepared	  in	  August	  2011).	  
Later, I became aware that Sarah had had personal experience of deprivation 
and had very little patience for people who thought that the issues were simple or 
who appeared to blame people for the circumstances in which they live without a 
full understanding of the context. Upon reflection, it seems obvious to me that 
from Sarah’s perspective, all four of the workshop organisers appeared to hail 
from privileged backgrounds with a minimum of personal experience of struggling 
to get by on a low income. Clearly, Sarah could see we were outsiders (Sixsmith, 
Boneham and Goldring, 2003).  
At the stakeholder workshop, we were told about a community fun day that was 
being organised by an important stakeholder, the manager of the Parkhood youth 
club. She hadn’t been able to attend the workshop itself because of other 
commitments, but had allowed us to hold the workshop in the youth club building 
free of charge and appeared at that time to be both supportive to the project and 
likely to be an important ally. 
This section has described the first steps in gaining access to the two 
neighbourhoods. It has explained that the scepticism stakeholders appeared to 
feel about our project was probably founded in a combination of doubt about 
whether we realised the complexity of the task we had set ourselves and the fact 
that we were obviously outsiders from relatively privileged backgrounds. Looking 
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back, it seems clear that many stakeholders felt very protective of the people 
living in Parkhood and Urbanwood, tired of the implicit blame directed at them for 
their circumstances, wary of outsiders come to judge. The next section looks at 
our first tentative steps towards meeting the ‘real’ residents of Parkhood.  
5.4. Assumptions	  and	  misconceptions	  
Parkhood, August 2011 
The first piece of engagement with potential participants was at a community fun 
day at Parkhood Rugby Club on 27th August 2011. We viewed this event as an 
opportunity to explore response to the project, in particular whether people 
experienced a negative reaction to being asked about their drinking. Primarily 
though, these exploratory interactions were an opportunity to learn about 
Parkhood and start making contacts there.  
The meeting to plan our approach to the fun day took place in a dilapidated and 
draughty building in Parkhood. Louise and a colleague, a representative from a 
local charity and I sat in chairs around a small table in the centre of a hall suitable 
for a much larger gathering. Phoebe hoped to join us from her office in London 
via Skype but there was no Internet connection in the hall, so she became a 
disembodied and slightly delayed voice from the speaker of my mobile phone.  
We dealt swiftly with practical matters such as who would attend the fun day to 
represent the project and broadly what they would aim to achieve by doing so. 
Then, we had a lengthy discussion about whether we should be direct about the 
project’s focus on risky drinking or whether we should talk to people more 
generally about their community and their health.  
The risk of opening conversations with people using the more general community 
and health approach was that people might not see drinking as an important 
topic; rather they might have other concerns. A project following participatory 
research principles more closely would accept and embrace this; encouraging 
people to set their own agenda would be an important goal. But we couldn’t allow 
this within the limits that existed and the pressure to show that the project had 
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achieved outcomes related to drinking weighed heavily on Louise’s mind. 
Because it was far too early in the process to know who might get involved, how 
they might work with us and what might happen, we all felt quite uncomfortable 
with the almost total openness of the project in these early stages. 
During this discussion, it became apparent how easy it would be to manipulate 
people in the direction that suited us. We could begin conversations with people 
using the community and health angle, knowing in advance that we would 
attempt, probably with some success, to steer the conversation to drinking. 
Phoebe in particular was very uncomfortable with this possibility. 
We settled on an approach that would explore both avenues. We would 
experiment with a conversational opener specifically about alcohol and one about 
the neighbourhood. The goal of this small and very unscientific experiment was 
to get a sense of what happened when people were approached in these 
different ways: were they offended by being asked about drinking? Did they 
refuse to discuss it with strangers seeking to impose themselves? With a more 
general opener, did the conversation include issues related to alcohol or did it go 
in a totally different direction? 
While we didn’t follow a script, we referred to the following conversational 
openers: 
Opener	  1:	  Hi,	  we’re	  working	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  NHS	  as	  part	  of	  a	  project	  looking	  at	  the	  
impact	  of	  alcohol.	  
	  
Opener	  2:	  Hello,	  we’re	  working	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  NHS	  as	  part	  of	  a	  project	  to	  involve	  
local	  people	  in	  improving	  the	  health	  and	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  community.	  	  
	  
(Text	  from	  internal	  document	  prepared	  on	  26th	  August	  2011)	  
Speaking generally about the community didn’t lead naturally to alcohol. People 
wanted to talk about issues like opportunities for young people and healthy eating 
on a budget, and once they’d had an idea they weren’t keen to divert.  
Conversely, people didn’t seem to mind being asked about drinking, provided that 
specific details about consumption were not requested (open questions and 
vague categories like ‘medium, heavy’ were preferred). Several males appeared 
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proud of their heavy drinking, and wanted to joke about it, pointing out the 
“alcoholics” in the group. One male, noticeably overweight and looking 
uncomfortable in the heat, did wish to reduce his drinking but felt that this was 
something he needed to manage in private. Apart from this man, there didn’t 
seem to be much stigma attached to drinking; though the majority of the people 
to whom we spoke thought of themselves as ‘social drinkers’ yet several people 
had stories about others’ problem drinking. Drinking at home was seen as a 
particular issue, and once again several people knew of others who they felt 
drank too much.  
There was a strong tendency to assume that we would be interested in youth and 
street drinking. We could not know whether this was because youth and street 
drinking were particularly evident locally or because of the media and policy focus 
upon these two issues had sensitised people to these concerns. However it was 
apparent that young people were a source of concern among the fun day 
attendees we spoke to: manifesting as concern for their wellbeing and their future 
prospects as well as regarding their behaviour as anti-social and threatening. The 
youth club seemed extremely well regarded.  
Why did we assume people would be embarrassed about their drinking? Upon 
reflection, this conjecture on the part of the project team could have reflected a 
subconscious judgement that people who drank far too much alcohol ought to be 
embarrassed about it, to seek to hide it from others. Potentially, we were 
projecting onto the residents of Parkhood our assumption that we ourselves 
might find questions about our drinking habits intrusive or inappropriate.  
This section described a small piece of exploratory fieldwork at a community fun 
day, with particular emphasis on our concerns about how to explain our project to 
people. Two main issues were identified: the first, once again, relating generally 
to some of the limits that precluded a fully participatory approach and specifically 
to the temptation to use a veneer of participation while knowing the destination all 
along. The second issue identified in this section is related to the ‘outsider’ status 
of the research team, exemplified in this case by our incorrect assumption that 
asking directly about alcohol would cause offense.  
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5.5. Lynchpin	  
University, September - October 2011 
If the project were a work of fiction, Anna would probably have been the main 
character. Before coming to work as Research Associate on this project, Anna 
was a community fundraiser for a hospice charity. She had an MSc (with 
distinction) in Psychology and had undertaken professional qualifications in and 
fundraising and palliative care; the latter she had studied while working as a 
fundraiser for a palliative care charity so as to gain a better understanding of the 
complexity of caring for terminally ill people. She was about to start another 
Masters degree in Health Psychology. She wanted to help people.  
To appoint a Research Associate for the project, I had to follow the university’s 
Human Resources procedures, which meant that I had a stack of CVs to score 
against the criteria set out in the role specification. Anna’s CV stood out, partly 
because she was eminently qualified for the post but mainly because of a story 
she told about how she had set up a support group following a chronic illness she 
had suffered. 
I found her honesty engaging and her obvious talent for making things happen 
inspiring. We had shortlisted four candidates for interview; Anna was the last 
person we saw. Before she walked into the room we thought we’d already found 
our ideal candidate but Anna greeted the panel with a smile and during her 
interview made us laugh several times. She answered our questions thoughtfully 
and had clearly researched both the university and the topic. Afterwards, we 
agreed that she projected a warmth and wit that would be a great asset to the 
project. She was the riskier choice: she didn’t know anyone in Parkhood and 
Urbanwood, unlike two of the other candidates. She hadn’t worked on the topic of 
risky drinking before, unlike one of the others. But there was… something… 
about Anna. The interview panel, composed of Louise, Phoebe, an Associate 
Dean and I, felt that we didn’t want the opportunity of working with her to slip 
away. With the perspective of hindsight, Anna did contribute significantly to the 
success of the project (where success is defined on my terms as remaining true 
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to our ideals of honesty, respect and authenticity in our dealings with people and 
as creating – actually, legitimising – knowledge about risky drinking in deprived 
areas).  
This section, which Anna has read and agreed may appear in its current form, 
has given brief biographical details of a key figure and explained how and why 
she was recruited to the post. Anna’s confident personality, her ability to connect 
with people and gain their trust and her commitment to this work were a 
significant factor in the project and her influence will be a reoccurring theme in 
subsequent sections.  
5.6. Turf	  wars	  
Parkhood and Urbanwood, October - December 2011 
In the early weeks of the project before Anna joined the team, I was made aware 
of another initiative happening in Parkhood and Urbanwood to recruit and train 
‘community researchers’; local people who would receive six weeks of training in 
research methods and then conduct their own research on a topic they thought 
would be important. Their project had been agreed for a while, but was struggling 
to get off the ground.  
Anna and I were given the contact details of the organisers, and resolved to try 
and collaborate closely. We hoped to become great friends, but it seemed that it 
was not to be. We heard on the grapevine that those involved with the community 
researcher project seemed worried that local people would find our project more 
exciting (because of the fun sounding ‘co-design’ compared to the arduous 
sounding ‘6 weeks of research training’). So, in an example of the issues that can 
result from several independent initiatives working in the same place at the same 
time, they proved cautious about collaboration. 
A few weeks later, Anna emailed me to let me know of another helpful person 
she had met, who had posted some information about our project on a local 
website in the hope that interested parties might get in touch. Later that day, 
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Anna mentioned in an email that promoting our project in this way would be 
perceived… 
“…like	  a	  declaration	  of	  war	  as	  [she]	  was	  originally	  interested	  in	  the	  other	  researcher	  
project...	  But	  I	  think	  we	  have	  to	  go	  for	  it…”	  	  
I replied:  
“…let’s	  just	  do	  the	  best	  job	  we	  can	  possibly	  do	  on	  our	  project,	  avoid	  passing	  any	  
judgement	  on	  them	  publically	  and	  remain	  open	  to	  future	  collaborations.”	  	  (Direct	  
quotations	  from	  email	  conversation	  on	  6th	  December	  2011).	  
This exchange seems relatively magnanimous given that it was a discussion 
between people whose offers of alliance had been brushed aside, but we were 
both sincere in our intention to treat our (in their eyes) rivals with consideration. 
Perhaps this stemmed from our genuine belief that the neighbourhoods would be 
better served by collaboration rather than competition between service providers. 
It may also have been because of the critical heritage of participatory research; 
the way it heightened our awareness of power structures and political factors in 
such a way that it enabled us to break some of the rules of the political game by 
refusing to play.  
Another explanation for their wariness might be that the community researcher 
project leaders were seeking to minimise a perceived risk to their ability to 
achieve their objectives. If their project was being measured against how many 
volunteers they trained or how many completed their peer research project 
(which seems likely), perhaps we were seen as somewhat of a threat to their 
ability to achieve their goals? But why didn’t we worry that their presence would 
threaten our ability to achieve our goals? In our project, whilst we were ostensibly 
aiming to reduce risky drinking, I don’t believe that any of the project team 
actually thought that this was a realistic or achievable goal in the time available 
and with the funding we had. I certainly didn’t and was open about it, tactfully, 
using the metaphor of an oak tree to explain how short-term measures like 
people attending events or using tools should lead to medium-term changes like 
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increased self-esteem. A reduction in risky drinking was the oak tree; not 
something that can grow in 18 months. 
 
Figure 4: Slide from working group meeting, 28th November 2011 
So perhaps, rather than perceiving ‘failure’ as not reducing risky drinking, 
collectively we perceived it as not staying true to our original vision of working 
holistically at neighbourhood level, acknowledging the full extent of the significant 
and complex problem of health inequality and seeking to do something that would 
make an actual difference to the real problem (as we saw it), even if that 
difference was very small. So collaboration did not pose a risk to us in the same 
way it may have to the community researcher project leaders.  
A few weeks later, in January 2012, relations with the community researcher 
project showed signs of thawing. Representatives spoke to Anna about the 
possibility of involving their volunteers in analysing the results of a baseline 
survey we had conducted, as a way of building up the links between the two 
initiatives. This didn’t happen, mainly due to the ethical implications of sharing 
our data. So, once again an opportunity to collaborate drifted away. 
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This section has recounted briefly our failed attempts to collaborate with a project 
to recruit and train community (peer) researchers that was operating in Parkhood 
and Urbanwood contemporaneously. I suggested several reasons why we might 
have been keen to collaborate where they were unwilling: first, that we had a 
superior understanding of the benefits of collaboration (there is no evidence to 
support this rather arrogant assumption); second, that the critical heritage of 
participatory research sensitised us to the power relations and political factors 
and thus made it easier for us to identify and dispense with them. The most likely 
explanation however is that the community researcher project leaders perceived 
our work as a threat to their ability to achieve the outcomes to which they’d 
agreed. Whereas a successful collaboration, regardless of the number of 
participants each project could claim as their own, would be counted as a 
success for us.  
5.7. If	  you	  provide	  fish	  and	  chips,	  they	  will	  come	  
Parkhood, December 2011 
On 12th December 2011, we held an Ideas Workshop at the youth club in 
Parkhood, our goal to start involving people in designing the ways in which we 
could begin to research the issue of risky drinking together. The manager was 
very enthusiastic about the workshop, offering to invite people herself and 
encourage them to attend (often this can be a significant challenge in a new 
project). She believed that women were the easiest route into the neighbourhood; 
if we could involve them, then others would follow.  
The workshop was designed to address one question: how can people with no 
training in research methods be empowered to make a substantive contribution 
to designing a research project? We knew that if we simply asked open questions 
about research methods, the answers we got would be constrained by people’s 
existing knowledge, probably a variation on the theme of focus group or survey. 
After some discussion, we concluded that in the absence of offering to educate 
people in research methods, the best way to facilitate an informed contribution 
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was to encourage our participants to experience a range of different methods, 
both as researcher and researched. So, we developed a very simple typology of 
methods: talking, answering, choosing and creating and finally, we developed 
four ‘method stations’.  
For this initial workshop, the method stations were set up using a mixture of the 
furniture available to us in the youth club and our own materials: a circle of chairs 
comprised the talking station, a table with pens, stickers, paper, glue and a range 
of printed materials the creating station. The answering station was three 
handwritten questions (why do people drink, why do they find it hard to stop and 
how does this affect those around them?) on large pieces of paper stuck to a 
wall. Finally, the choosing section was a simple game consisting of a questions 
die and some word cards for people to choose the word that best fitted their 
answer to the question. Blank word cards were provided for flexibility. 
 
Figure 5: The ‘creating’ station in action, 12th December 2011 
Unfortunately, the weather was blustery, wet and cold. The door, propped open 
welcomingly, kept breaking free of its restraints and banging loudly against the 
outside of the building, making us jump as we waited anxiously for the first 
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participant to arrive. But none of the women the manager had invited came, 
despite them all assuring her that they would be there to enjoy the ‘mocktails’ 
(alcohol free cocktails) and pampering treats that we had laid on to tempt them. 
Some had decided to stay at home because of the weather and others had gone 
to another event, the organisers of which in a flash of brilliance had offered free 
fish and chips. 
Anna was clearly mortified; her first event, and nobody had turned up. Phoebe 
and I were disappointed, but sanguine. We had several similar projects under our 
belts, we knew that not everything goes to plan and that this setback was no 
reflection on Anna’s competence, nor did it mean our endeavour was doomed to 
failure. We reassured Anna and shared similar stories from other projects. Then, 
in a miniature version of the classic cycle of reflection, planning and action, we 
regrouped and decided to run the workshop with the manager, three youth 
workers, three males who agreed to help, two of the therapists who lived locally 
and a stray 15 year old girl who had heard about the project from the manager 
and wanted to be involved because of her struggles with an alcoholic mother. Our 
ethical approval didn’t allow us to work with anyone under 18, so we did not 
consider the girl a participant and recorded no data about her, but it seemed cruel 
to send her away. All the workshop attendees were able to experience all the 
stations in the 90 minutes available, though two young men left early because of 
other commitments. 
Was this a failure? In a traditional project, the fact that we didn’t recruit our 
intended ‘sample’ of women aged roughly between 30 and 50 would represent a 
serious setback and ‘collecting data’ from anyone who happened to wander into 
the building would not have been an acceptable substitute.  
However, casting aside these conventional criteria for judgement, I concluded 
that the workshop was a roaring success. The methods stations worked, our 
participants understood what we wanted and made comments about how 
suitable the methods may or may not be. We gained understanding from 
observing and interacting with them as they engaged with the activities. Our 
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original vision for the project was genuine collaboration with a neighbourhood, 
and this is what I felt we had begun to do.  
However this workshop was the first time in the project where adherence to the 
participatory ethos had wrested control of events from me and upon reflection, it’s 
quite possible that if different people had come to the Ideas Workshop, the 
project could have developed quite differently from that point. Nevertheless, we 
learnt some worthwhile things about the methods themselves, which are 
discussed in the next section. 
5.8. Scissors	  and	  glue,	  questions	  and	  conversations	  
Parkhood, December 2011 
The previous section explained the planning process for the Ideas Workshop and 
our last minute change of direction from hosting a group of fourteen local women 
to running activities with a team of youth workers, some beauty therapists and a 
couple of passers-by. This section deals with the substance of the workshop: 
what methods could we use to investigate risky drinking in Parkhood and 
Urbanwood? 
There was debate at the talking station about whether an independent researcher 
or a peer researcher would be most effective. Some male participants felt they 
would be able to be more honest with an independent researcher with no ties to 
the neighbourhood because there would be less temptation to show off (though 
Anna’s field notes consistently suggest otherwise!). The other advantage of a 
university researcher was that participants thought people would more easily 
accept being asked questions, as there was a ‘legitimate’ (my term) reason for 
doing so whereas a peer might be perceived as ‘snooping’ (a participant’s term). 
Others felt that a peer researcher would actually be more equipped than an 
academic to challenge this ‘pub talk’ style of exaggeration that participants felt 
would be ubiquitous. While most of the discussion was centred on the best way 
of getting to the ‘truth’ (i.e. seeing beyond exaggeration), there was a brief 
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exploration of the relative power and status that might exist between researcher 
and researched: 
Needs	  to	  be	  someone	  in	  the	  community	  on	  equal	  terms.	  Not	  the	  vicar	  or	  the	  
councillor.	  Someone	  like	  you	  (reported	  speech	  summarised	  in	  facilitator	  notes).	  
We were saddened (and somewhat daunted) to hear that there had been three 
alcohol related deaths in the area recently. 
“If	  that	  wont	  stop	  ‘em	  then	  what	  will?”	  (Anonymous	  quote	  from	  participant	  recorded	  
in	  facilitator	  notes).	  
The choosing station worked quite well as a way to gain people’s interest and 
break the ice, but didn’t elicit a great deal of useful information. Participants also 
warned us that many people would be put off by the idea of having to read or 
write in public. This was yet another example of our status as outsiders: it simply 
hadn’t occurred to any of us that adults might struggle with basic literacy, though 
on reflection I should have considered it. That small insight represented a 
significant personal epiphany for me at the time: I believe it was at that point I 
was awakened to just how substantial the barriers faced by people in Parkhood 
and Urbanwood could be.  
The answers station was probably the simplest of the stations and was well 
received. However this method also faced the barrier of literacy as well as being 
rather a public way to elicit what could be extremely personal and even 
distressing information. Participants mulled over the idea of simply leaving the 
questions around the neighbourhood along with the means to answer them so 
people could do so in relative privacy. Maybe even amalgamate this with the 
creativity idea and invite graffiti in the name of research? But that idea was 
rejected swiftly for a very practical reason: our materials would quickly be 
vandalised or stolen. 
The creating station worked very well, with participants seeming to enjoy making 
their pictures once they had overcome their initial stage fright. I found that the 
most understanding came from asking participants about their visuals as they 
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worked. The youth club manager in particular seemed to think that this would be 
a good method to elicit rich data about drinking.  
 
Figure 6: Collage photographed with permission on creating station, 12th December 2011 
She thought that taking the station around existing groups would be the best way 
to engage people. In fact, drawing upon visual methods (Banks, 2001) had 
several exciting possibilities: the manager and I had an animated discussion at 
the workshop about working with local artists to create works and hold a 
community exhibition, which in itself would also be a useful way to increase our 
understanding of the issue of risky drinking as we spoke to people about the 
works, what they mean and whether their experiences are similar or different. I 
also noted in a debrief written for Louise that one of the stakeholders that had 
attended the Stakeholder Workshop (described in section 5.3) was an expert in 
visual therapy. An exhibition of creative works had another advantage as well: it 
would function as dissemination of the research within the neighbourhoods. This 
seemed like a brilliant idea at the time and upon reflection it still does. But it was 
just too brave; too risky. Not close enough to the sort of intervention that might 
reduce risky drinking. It had captured my imagination though, and I sought to 
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return to the idea several times as the project unfolded. I will explore this and 
several other good ideas that floundered in the theme of ‘negative space’ in the 
next chapter. 
One unexpected piece of feedback from the workshop harked back to our earlier 
conundrum about the best way to introduce the project’s focus. We had worried 
about people’s reaction to the topic of alcohol but hadn’t thought to be concerned 
about people’s reaction to the selection of Parkhood and Urbanwood as the 
locations. However, it is recorded in the field notes that the male participants 
objected to the rationale that Parkhood and Urbanwood were high in alcohol-
related hospital emissions. This made them feel as though we were criticising 
their neighbourhood, saying that it was:   
…crap	  and	  that	  community	  was	  part	  of	  it	  (reported	  speech	  summarised	  in	  facilitator	  
notes).	  
This was an issue that hadn’t occurred to the team at all, that locals were 
undoubtedly aware of their reputation as ‘problem’ neighbourhoods and resented 
outsiders highlighting this. This feedback from participants occurs in subsequent 
sections as well. 
This section has summarised conclusions from the Ideas Workshop, a workshop 
designed to empower attendees to participate in designing the research methods 
for the project by encouraging them to experience being a researcher and 
participant in different types of data collection. The two methods preferred by 
participants and researchers were the talking and creating stations, from which 
we had learnt that people might well boast about their drinking, but had no 
definite conclusion about the best way to mitigate this. We learnt that literacy 
could be a significant barrier, but that people enjoyed the opportunity to be 
creative. And we were alerted to the issue that people may feel sensitive about 
their neighbourhoods having a negative label applied by outsiders, so we would 
need to explore this issue carefully as the research developed. But despite being 
pleased with our progress, we agreed that more input from a wider range of 
participants was needed before it was appropriate to launch the data collection 
phase of the project. Given the challenges of persuading people to turn up to a 
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workshop style event, we decided to take the methods stations out into 
community settings. We called this phase the Methods Roadshow, which is 
reported in the next section. 
5.9. The	  show	  on	  the	  road	  
Urbanwood and Parkhood, November 2011 – January 2012 
Throughout November and December 2011, while we had been planning the 
Ideas Workshop, Anna had spent time in Parkhood and Urbanwood visiting first 
the stakeholders we had met at the workshop back in August and then making 
contact with others suggested by these original contacts. In December, Anna was 
invited to watch the first Urbanwood pantomime, ‘Snow White and the Seven 
Antisocial Dwarves’, which was co-written by the young cast. Sarah took Anna for 
a walk around the streets, to the Sensory Garden, described in Anna’s notes as 
‘a fenced-off collection of benches’, and other areas where young and adult 
drinkers gather. Sarah described to Anna how some adult drinkers choose to 
drink on the street because they are unhappy at home. Anna’s notes from these 
early explorations give a flavour of the sorts of information that would typify our 
later findings: 
…one	  man	  said	  he	  would	  be	  much	  happier	  staying	  at	  home	  and	  cut	  back	  his	  street	  
drinking	  if	  his	  living	  room	  was	  made	  habitable	  and	  redecorated	  (reported	  speech	  
summarised	  in	  field	  notes,	  December	  2011).	  
Consequently, in January Anna’s name was becoming known among local 
stakeholders and there were a number of friendly venues to which she could take 
the Methods Roadshow in Parkhood. Throughout that month, she visited a local 
church group, a toddler group, an art group, a voluntary organisation providing 
financial and employment advice and a tenants’ surgery run by one of the 
housing associations. This section examines the Methods Roadshow and 
explains how it evolved into the data collection phase of the project. 
The field notes from early Roadshow sessions reported similar findings to the 
Ideas Workshop: the talking and creating stations were preferred by participants, 
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the creating activities in particular offered an opportunity for the researcher to 
refer to the emerging visuals during the concurrent conversation. Anna also 
observed that giving participants something to focus on might have made it 
easier, less awkward, for participants to speak about difficult topics. Once again, 
anything that required participants to read or write proved unpopular and 
ineffective: 
I	  got	  the	  feeling	  that	  writing	  anything	  was	  a	  chore	  for	  some	  of	  them,	  as	  the	  only	  time	  
they	  had	  to	  write	  was	  filling	  out	  forms	  for	  benefits	  /	  housing	  etc.	  –	  one	  person	  said	  
they	  didn’t	  ‘do’	  writing	  (reported	  speech	  summarised	  in	  field	  notes,	  11th	  January	  
2012).	  
One participant at an ‘employment surgery’ visited by Anna on 11th January 
suggested we should offer a drop in ‘surgery’ about risky drinking; the following 
day, at a ‘tenants’ surgery’ (evidently a popular model for delivering services) the 
community engagement officer for the local housing association made the same 
recommendation. However, Anna records in her notes her concern that not only 
did she lack the necessary skills and experience to counsel people concerned 
about drinking, adopting such as model would place us in direct competition with 
an established alcohol treatment centre. This was the first of several other 
indications that while help was available; something was going awry in the 
delivery that meant perhaps that local people weren’t aware of its existence, 
didn’t think that the service was suitable for their needs; or perhaps they didn’t 
trust the providers.  
It was also becoming apparent that while our intention to tackle risky drinking (the 
sort of drinking that is bad for one’s physical health but wouldn’t be classed as 
‘dependent drinking’) and risky drinking only, separating this behaviour from other 
sorts of drinking was drawing a distinction that really only existed in health policy 
documents. So while the notion of segmentation was working in terms of 
targeting particular neighbourhoods, it was inappropriate both in terms of the age 
of the ‘target group’ and the sort of behaviour that we were aiming to change. 
Real life, when we attempted to study it closely, was simply too complicated to fit 
neatly into a predetermined model. The participatory mode of managing the 
project exacerbated this disconnection, because participants didn’t want their 
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experiences constrained and compartmentalised into a predetermined model. 
They just wanted things to improve and it really didn’t matter to them which 
organisation was responsible for what particular facet of the problem. I described 
earlier in this chapter that I resisted passively the constraint of the age limits, 
primarily by ignoring them because they didn’t fit with the participatory ethos of 
the project. However, ethically we couldn’t treat variances in drinking behaviour in 
the same way; ignoring limits upon participation without acknowledging the 
seriousness of some problems would have been a serious breach of trust on our 
part. Consequently, Anna sought advice from the alcohol treatment centre and 
obtained some leaflets, so as to enable people to make contact if they appeared 
in need of practical help for issues related to drinking. 
After 11th and 12th January, while we were still ‘officially’ in the Roadshow phase 
of the project, the field notes themselves make no further reference to methods. 
This was because Anna was finding exploring the methods themselves a 
distraction; rather, simply talking to people was most comfortable for everyone 
and was most effective at eliciting information. It seemed to be the informality of 
the situation that worked for participants, they were put off by any suggestion of 
formal interviews, recording, reading or writing. Participants felt concerned that 
they would lose control of their stories (a word used frequently by Anna in her 
notes of reported speech); as though a story was something tangible that could 
be kept safe only if it were kept secret. Trusting Anna with a story was a 
significant thing to do and something that would only happen if it were informal 
and personal between Anna and the storyteller. I suspect that whatever quality 
Anna possessed that made us so certain she was right for the project also 
encouraged people to trust her with their stories.   
Anna felt strongly that continuing with a formal Roadshow format was getting in 
the way of making these personal connections, connections that were too 
valuable to cast aside in favour of strict formality. But informality created an 
ethical dilemma: if people were unwilling to read, to sign anything or to be 
recorded, how could we demonstrate that informed consent was provided?  
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As explained briefly in Chapter 4, we settled upon varying levels of consent: A 
few participants were willing to sign a consent form and talk to us in the 
understanding that their stories would be kept confidential. We would know who 
they were and what they had said, but we wouldn’t allow others to identify them in 
any materials we produced. A second level of consent we named ‘background’: 
at this level, participants gave their consent to Anna verbally, but were kept totally 
anonymous. Only the gender and approximate age of these participants are 
recorded in the field notes, along with the date and location where the 
conversation took place. Most field notes therefore are in the form of reported 
speech, with few direct quotations.  
This section has explained how the Methods Roadshow, designed to gather a 
wider range of input about the most appropriate data collection method for the 
project, evolved swiftly into a method founded in informal conversations. The very 
informality of which, allied to Anna’s warm and empathetic personality, served to 
gain participants trust and encourage them to share their stories. The next 
section, while remaining true to the chronology of my autoethnography, breaks 
with the narrative thread of the project to introduce a vignette of our involvement 
in the concluding stages of the community researcher project. 
5.10. No,	  you’re	  wrong	  about	  your	  life!	  
City Centre, February 2012 
In section 5.6, I wrote about mine and Anna’s failed attempts to collaborate with a 
community researcher project that seemed to have a similar ethos to our own, 
concentrating particularly on exploring the reasons why we were unsuccessful. 
Our final experience of the community researcher initiative was to attend the 
presentation of their findings on 15th February 2012; this section presents an 
account based upon my memories of the event.  
We, the audience, gathered in a textbook ‘invited space’ (see section 3.11): a 
large room in the town hall, a Georgian building with an impressive façade. I 
thought this showed the community researchers were being taken seriously, that 
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the quality of the venue reflected the respect that they were being afforded. I 
thought that this would make them feel as though their views were significant; it 
didn’t occur to me at the time that it this might make them feel nervous or out of 
place, though it may well have done. Or, they might just have been apprehensive 
at the idea of speaking in public… We sat at small tables, 3 or 4 people at each. 
Many people in the audience seemed to know each other and many now knew 
Anna through our project. We sat at a table with an older man in a prominent 
public service role. Four community researchers stood at the front, three females 
and one male, all young, in their late teens or early twenties. They had prepared 
some large pieces of paper with handwritten bullet points to hold up while they 
spoke. They told us what they had investigated, why and how. They told us what 
they had found. The specifics aren’t really relevant here, but the reactions they 
garnered were quite shocking at the time and more so on reflection. Some vocal 
members of the audience seemed to view the findings as a personal affront to 
their work, in particular they disagreed with the overall conclusion that people in 
Urbanwood (where the presenters and their respondents lived) felt that they 
didn’t have access to many facilities or activities. This observation is of some 
significance and will be brought up again in later sections. 
One audience member stood and told the community researchers angrily that 
what they had said wasn’t true, as she personally distributed a leaflet detailing 
many activities happening in Urbanwood. Others questioned their interpretation 
of the findings: the man at our table stood to inform the researchers that 
Urbanwood didn’t need a gym as they (and many of their respondents) had 
suggested but in fact needed a boxing club to provide young men with discipline 
and an outlet for aggression.  
Why did the audience appear to feel so threatened by what the researchers told 
them, so keen to dismiss it and impose their own interpretation instead? Why 
didn’t the audience accept the findings in the way that they would probably have 
been more likely to do if I, with my university researcher stamp of authenticity, 
had presented them? Was it to do with confidence? Vocabulary? Social status? 
Once again, this observation about ‘legitimacy’, about who is entitled to present 
their truth, is a significant one that will receive more attention in later sections.  
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The community researcher project was participatory in the sense that 
researchers had autonomy to choose to investigate an issue that they felt was 
important. Consequently, should they not have been encouraged to present their 
findings in a way that gave them the power, not the audience? Instead, they were 
taken out of their world and placed into ours. Was this an attempt to show 
respect that actually showed a lack of empathy, or was it a subconscious 
reminder to the community researchers that they were just young people from a 
deprived neighbourhood who didn’t get very far in education? I think it might have 
been better to take the audience out of their comfort zone: to have taken them for 
a walk in Urbanwood, shown them the boarded up community venue, the locked 
building where the Internet café sponsored by a local service provider had once 
existed, while curious passers-by stared at them. Asked them to sit in the 
community centre, surrounded by a high security fence. This is the approach I 
would take now, should a similar opportunity arise in the future.  
After this, the community researcher project disappeared from our radar, as far 
as I know it fizzled out completely, except that two of the community researchers 
became closely involved with our work in Parkhood. The next section describes 
their and others’ involvement as participants, including a detailed summary of the 
main themes of the research phase itself.  
5.11. The	  solution	  is…	  solve	  poverty	  
Parkhood, February – March 2012 
In February, as the data collection phase was about to move into full swing, it 
was evident that Louise was still uncomfortable with how open the project still 
was. The pressure for details about what was going to happen and when was 
increasing steadily. It was at about this point when the project started to feel like 
a battle to be fought by me alone, a battle to keep everyone else calm. Or 
perhaps an illusion of calm to maintain for both sides: Anna needed space to 
explore the issues and reassurance that she was doing the right thing even 
though there were no outcomes on the horizon. For Louise, I needed to appear in 
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control with definite plans in place. While Louise knew that in a participatory 
project all dates and milestones were provisional, I felt the need to maintain a 
performance of control with provisional dates and status reports. One such event 
was the commencement of the co-design phase in March 2012, even though this 
created an artificial deadline we had to rush to meet. Fortunately, by early March, 
Anna had reached the point in Parkhood where she felt she was reaching 
saturation. She was also aware of the pressure to make progress in the project 
and was keen to start collecting data in Urbanwood, which she knew would be 
more challenging.  
Because we had only a short time to prepare for the workshop, our analysis of 
the Parkhood data in March 2012 was shallower and less reflective than I 
wanted. I have since performed a much more extensive analysis of the entire 
collection of field notes and was pleased to find that while some subtleties of 
interpretation were glossed over in our haste to prepare for the workshop, the 
broad themes we developed broadly held true. However in the interests of 
preserving this narrative’s authenticity and also in recording the interpretations 
we shared with participants at the time of the workshop, this section reports our 
interpretations as they were in March 2012, with some very basic commentary 
indicating that richer interpretations can be made.   
Because there were significant challenges associated with engaging participants 
beyond ad-hoc – and largely anonymous – informal conversation, Anna and I 
undertook the analysis of the Parkhood data ourselves. Field notes relating to 
conversations with twenty three males and forty one females were included at 
this stage. Of these only fourteen had given written consent to be quoted. First, 
we performed a thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) on the field notes, 
starting by reviewing the data independently to generate initial codes. Next, we 
compared their interpretations of the data and codes to create initial themes. 
Each theme was reviewed, discussed, edited and given a single word to describe 
it. Then, the data and original codes were reviewed against the named themes to 
check consistency with the overall story of the data. The themes were: Family, 
Trapped, Worry, Apathy (which workshop participants later changed to 
Powerless), Alone, Ashamed and Confused. Themes integrated a range of 
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factors: from significant structural barriers like housing regulations to individual 
obstacles like mental health, all of which were woven through participants’ 
stories. The following paragraphs are based upon the notes I prepared to talk 
through the themes at the workshop so as to provide an accurate report of our 
interpretations at that time, integrated with illustrative extracts from field notes 
(which were not used in the workshop itself due to the risk that the details would 
identify individuals to their friends and neighbours). 
One of the largest and most complex themes related to family. Family can be a 
trigger: for example experiences in childhood or losing a job can turn moderate 
drinking into risky. It can be part of the consequences of risky drinking: a family 
has to pick up pieces with little formal support, drinking can lead to domestic 
violence (which leads to more drinking) and more family problems.  
“…	  And	  you	  want	  to	  keep	  it	  to	  yourself,	  it’s	  shaming	  especially	  when	  you	  get	  bruises	  –	  
but	  that’s	  why	  I	  left	  in	  the	  end…	  And	  I	  think	  it’s	  the	  wives	  and	  girlfriends	  who	  need	  
the	  help	  just	  as	  much,	  otherwise	  they	  can	  start	  having	  a	  drink	  just	  to	  help	  them	  cope	  
with	  it	  all.	  It’s	  the	  women	  who	  are	  keeping	  it	  all	  together.”	  (Female,	  40s)	  	  	  
But family can also be helpful: it’s harder to hide problems from people who live 
in close proximity, family can make it easier to cope without alcohol and not 
wanting children to copy unhealthy behaviour can encourage change.  
Participants felt trapped by their responsibilities, which often included minding 
young children and to keeping things going when times are tough. They felt 
trapped because they could not move away, could not escape anti-social 
behaviour or bullying, could not offend neighbours because they’re stuck with 
them.  
…[she]	  knew	  they	  had	  spread	  stories	  about	  her	  around	  the	  area	  –	  that	  she	  was	  
selling	  drugs	  and	  everything	  else	  (she	  used	  hand	  gestures	  to	  indicate	  that	  they	  
thought	  she	  was	  a	  prostitute)…	  One	  of	  her	  neighbours	  also	  frightened	  her	  –	  he	  had	  
shot	  at	  her	  with	  an	  air	  rifle,	  put	  a	  samurai	  sword	  through	  her	  front	  door…	  (Reported	  
speech	  and	  anonymous	  quote	  from	  female	  participant,	  field	  notes).	  
Participants also reported feeling trapped by peer pressure: on men to be “manly” 
and drink and women to do what their friends are doing. They felt trapped by 
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circumstances, struggling to get by on low income and cope with debt, 
unemployment and benefit problems. Mums felt they had nowhere to go; men 
only have activities that revolve around drinking. 
People also felt powerless; if they were not working (unemployed or caring for 
children) they felt they have nothing to do. 
“You	  get	  bored	  and	  frustrated…	  I	  was	  drinking	  2	  bottles	  of	  wine	  a	  night	  by	  the	  end.	  	  
I’d	  pay	  my	  bills	  and	  my	  rent	  first,	  because	  otherwise	  you’d	  have	  a	  shitty	  house	  or	  be	  
out	  on	  the	  streets.	  	  But	  that	  meant	  I	  couldn’t	  afford	  the	  drink,	  so	  I	  started	  stealing	  it.	  	  
I’d	  go	  in	  with	  the	  pushchair	  and	  use	  that,	  I’d	  hide	  the	  bottles	  in	  that”	  (Female,	  mid-­‐
20s).	  
People explained that they felt that there was nothing to look forward to; they felt 
low, de-motivated and depressed. They got up late and started drinking at 
lunchtime, there was no reason to bother trying to change; they think there are 
bigger problems than health. A few described serious mental health issues. 
She	  is	  hearing	  voices,	  and	  this	  is	  frightening	  her.	  	  She	  also	  has	  suicidal	  thoughts…the	  
father	  of	  the	  youngest	  [redacted]	  is	  getting	  out	  of	  jail	  in	  May	  and	  she	  is	  terrified	  
because	  she	  says	  he	  won’t	  leave	  her	  alone...	  She	  is	  suffering	  from	  anxiety	  and	  panic	  
attacks	  about	  this…This	  all	  affects	  her	  drinking	  and	  drug	  use	  (marijuana).	  I	  gave	  this	  
woman	  information	  about	  the	  mental	  health	  and	  drug/alcohol	  support	  service.	  
(Reported	  speech	  from	  female	  participant	  in	  her	  20s,	  field	  notes).	  
Others simply can’t get out of their rut; they have a routine where they use 
alcohol to relax or as a treat at the end of a busy day. This is OK until something 
else happens (job loss, unexpected pregnancy) that tips them into drinking more 
at home alone. 
Participants also described feelings of physical isolation: their friends are at work; 
the traditional pub with games and caring landlord has gone.  
“I’ve	  worked	  on	  the	  door	  and	  I’ve	  also	  been	  out	  getting	  drunk	  so	  I’ve	  seen	  both	  sides.	  	  
The	  real	  problem	  now	  is	  the	  big	  companies	  owning	  all	  the	  local	  pubs.	  The	  managers	  
just	  take	  your	  money	  –	  they	  don’t	  care	  about	  you”	  	  (Male,	  early-­‐40s).	  
Participants worried about the practical consequences of seeking help; losing 
their children, benefits or home. They also worried about the social 
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consequences of seeking help: that their friends would be hostile or they would 
face humiliation when others heard about their problem. Emotional and social 
isolation were also common themes, as were feelings of shame, which once 
again seemed to be experienced differently by male and female participants: Men 
felt ashamed about admitting weakness, letting down their mates and family, 
losing face and not being able to hold their drink. Women felt ashamed about 
others judging them as bad mothers.  
“You	  can’t	  be	  a	  good	  mum	  and	  get	  drunk	  every	  week,	  but	  you	  can	  still	  be	  a	  good	  dad,	  
what	  does	  that	  say?”	  	  They	  thought	  this	  attitude	  not	  only	  made	  it	  more	  likely	  for	  
mums	  to	  drink	  at	  home	  but	  also	  less	  likely	  to	  seek	  help	  if	  they	  thought	  they	  needed	  it.	  
(Reported	  conversation	  with	  two	  female	  participants	  in	  their	  30s,	  field	  notes).	  
A relatively insignificant theme in the overall context of a complex and distressing 
set of stories was the insight that several participants felt confused about 
government guidelines on alcohol units and about where they were supposed to 
go for help. A theme that appeared during the March 2012 analysis to be a facet 
of confusion was differing interpretations of what constituted ‘normality’ in relation 
to drinking and behaviour related to alcohol. However upon re-analysing the field 
notes, it became apparent that I had grievously underestimated both the size and 
the complexity of this issue.   
For each theme, a graphic illustration and brief description was created, which 
were used to reflect our interpretations back to people in the neighbourhood in a 
co-design workshop, which is described in the next section. 
5.12. Getting	  to	  the	  “Hub”	  of	  the	  issue	  
Parkhood, March 2012 
Cook (2011), a practicing social designer in the UK, recommends Bradwell and 
Marr’s operational definition of co-design (2008). They characterise the technique 
as a collaborative, developmental process that involves a great deal of 
transparency. Co-design locates power in the process rather than with the 
funder, client or designer, which is thought to generate a sense of collective 
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ownership between all parties involved. On 21st March 2012, we ran a co-design 
workshop following these principles, held in the local Baptist Church hall. Five 
residents attended for the whole workshop, two from local churches along with 
stakeholders from the local provider of alcohol treatment, children’s centre and 
the housing association.  
After we had welcomed everyone and thanked them for coming, we pointed to 
several visuals on display around the room, including a handwritten agenda and 
co-design rules, deliberately simple and informal, and the images that an 
illustrator had created for us to represent the themes.  
 
Figure 7: Visuals (‘Apathy’ to ‘Powerless’), 21st March 2012 
A map of Parkhood also adorned the room, upon which we had stuck bright 
orange star shaped post-it notes to represent various Assets we had found. The 
asset map was there partly to demonstrate that we had made the effort to find out 
about Parkhood (to help mitigate our outsider status) and also to encourage 
people to think of using and improving existing assets, not just about creating 
new ones.  
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Anna and I talked the workshop attendees through our findings using the themes 
and four case study ‘stories’ that Anna had written based upon an amalgamation 
of the most typical experiences (see appendix 2). We had had some discussion 
about these stories while planning the workshop, attempting to strike the right 
balance between anonymising the stories enough so as to keep our promises of 
confidentiality while avoiding appearing to have ‘made them up’ (Anna’s term); 
the latter she felt would reduce our credibility with participants, who had quite firm 
ideas about what research was supposed to be. I have to assume we succeeded, 
as there were no issues with the case study stories at that workshop, or indeed 
anywhere we used them subsequently.  
Following our feedback to the group and the concurrent reflection upon our 
interpretations, we asked the participants to form four groups, each was provided 
with copies of the case study stories. This time we had paid attention to the 
possibility of barriers due to literacy: to avoid causing embarrassment to anyone, 
we organised each group so that it contained a mixture of stakeholders and local 
people. Facilitators (Anna, Phoebe and I) offered to read the case study out loud 
to each group as we distributed them, ostensibly so that each member had an 
equal chance to listen and make notes. This worked well, ameliorating any 
awkwardness that might have been created if we had expected everyone to read 
the story individually.  
We asked each group to work with one of the case studies to consider what 
might have led to that person starting to struggle with drink and what might 
contribute to them continuing to drink in a harmful way. 
Next, we asked the group to generate at least 10 ideas that could have stopped 
the person in the story on their path towards struggling with drink and at least 10 
ideas that could support that person to recover now. Ideas could be written or 
drawn on “idea sheets” we had provided. We emphasised that the ideas didn’t 
have to be brand new, they could be ways to make existing services or support 
more effective.  
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Figure 8: Some Idea Sheet examples, 21st March 2012 
More than 40 ideas emerged; some quite specific to a particular age and life-
stage (e.g. extreme sports could help divert groups of young men from organising 
all their social activity around alcohol) but with general principles that apply to all 
(e.g. provide activities that don’t revolve around drinking).  
To end the workshop, two groups were asked to visualise the idea that they felt 
was the most likely to make a difference. Independently, both groups created a 
‘Community Hub’, located in the centre of Parkhood (to remove the territorial 
issues of people from one end of the neighbourhood feeling unwelcome at the 
other end).  
Page 164 of 317 
 
Figure 9: One group’s Parkhood Hub visualisation, 21st March 2012 
The Hub would host a range of services for all ages as well as being a venue for 
‘positive’ (i.e. not stigmatising) reasons to visit such as a café, evening social club 
and venue for short courses. Having somewhere ‘positive’ to go with activities for 
all ages as well as somewhere to socialise would reduce isolation (locals felt 
there were no social spaces for adults, not even a café) and help mitigate the 
stigma associated with accessing help.  
Participants thought that this would reduce drinking and the harm associated with 
it in several ways: by making services easier and less embarrassing to access 
and also by giving people reasons to leave their homes (where they drink 
because they are isolated, lonely and bored) by offering things to do that do not 
revolve around drinking. 
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5.13. Beware	  the	  ides	  of	  March	  
Everywhere, March 2012 
As well as starting to make some progress understanding the neighbourhoods 
and making the first tentative steps towards co-design as described in the 
previous two sections, a confluence of events in March constituted a defining 
moment in the project’s narrative. It was around this time that things started to 
gain momentum: Anna was about to switch the bulk of her attention from 
Parkhood to Urbanwood for data collection, whereas Parkhood was moving into 
the co-design and implementation phase. Concurrently, Sarah heard that she had 
been successful in her application for a significant grant to be used for 
community development in Urbanwood, and she was keen to involve us. March 
also saw the initiation of a multi-agency collaboration, which intended to take an 
Asset Based approach in partnership with a local third sector organisation to 
tackle deprivation in the city, primarily in Parkhood and Urbanwood. Sarah was 
part of this nascent initiative and keen for our endeavours to compliment rather 
than compete. She was a leading figure in all these initiatives, and I was glad of 
the relationship of mutual respect that was growing between her and Anna.  
Throughout all these developments, it appeared as though we were moving away 
from a definite status as outsiders, not really becoming part of the family, but 
perhaps closer to consigliere, trusted friend and confidant to influential 
stakeholders in Parkhood and Urbanwood. This change in our status was largely 
due to Anna’s evident commitment to and regular presence in the 
neighbourhoods, her friendship with Sarah and her warm and empathetic 
personality. I was a more formal and distant figure, the one who spoke at 
meetings with other formal and distant figures, controlled the process and the 
purse strings. This arrangement wasn’t engineered; rather it evolved due to our 
different personalities and roles. Instinctively, it seems, we played to our 
strengths. 
March, then, represents several shifts: in our status in Parkhood and Urbanwood 
and more widely towards significant investment in more holistic, neighbourhood 
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based approaches, sympathetic in fact to our original vision for this project but 
significantly better funded. Nationally, things were transforming as well: on 27 
March 2012, the Health and Social Care Bill gained Royal Assent, becoming the 
Health and Social Care Act (Department of Health, 2012). This dissolved the 
PCT, the entity that had commissioned the project. Public health professionals 
would work instead for a national body, Public Health England, or for local 
authorities (county councils).  
The consequence of the Health and Social Care Bill passing in the middle of our 
project meant in practice that suddenly we had more freedom: not only had the 
intense pressure to deliver very specific outcomes related to health been relaxed, 
we were now serving as somewhat of a trailblazer for a new approach, working 
as we were with other local authority functions like community policing, youth 
services, housing and employment organisations. The ides of March were not the 
time of betrayal by our friends; they were the time we were liberated to work more 
closely with them. The ways in which this changing context affected the project 
will be highlighted throughout subsequent sections. 
5.14. A	  missed	  opportunity	  for	  Parkhood?	  
Parkhood, March – July 2012 
This section resumes the chronological narrative of the chapter, picking up the 
story from the day of the Parkhood co-design workshop on 21st March 2012. 
After the workshop, we went to see Louise and a colleague, who were delighted 
with the themes, the visuals and the Parkhood Hub idea. This may have been the 
first real evidence they saw that Anna and I had been doing any work at all. 
However, I was keen to convey that our experience and research to date in 
Parkhood suggested that if the Hub was simply created, without work to engage 
residents in the process of designing it, it risked becoming an expensive 
provision of facilities and services that the community simply didn’t use. In order 
to fulfil the vision the Hub would have to be developed collaboratively, with 
Parkhood residents; it would have to be their hub, not ours. After our meeting 
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with Louise I rang Phoebe, who explained about the concept of prototyping, a 
technique designers use to develop ideas. Prototyping, according to the Design 
Council (2014), involves building models of an idea, which can be used to test 
form and function as well as communicate design ideas to different groups. 
Phoebe sent me a document she had prepared for another client detailing a ‘pop-
up children’s centre’ that explained how such a concept could be ‘quick-and-dirty’ 
(so people aren’t afraid to criticise it) prototyped, evaluated and prototyped again 
in a cycle of development where each prototype is more sophisticated and closer 
to a final product. Prototyping was the way Phoebe would recommend developing 
the Hub idea, making use of models, sketches and later, temporary structures 
and equipment. 
But the funding and time allocated to our project would not stretch to a full 
collaborative development; if we could not secure additional funds, a compromise 
would be necessary. First, I attempted to interest the a newly constituted working 
group to tackle deprivation, preparing a short paper that was presented to the 
group prior to their March meeting. While they carried a motion to adopt what 
they termed a “total place approach” (email from a contact at the PCT, 23rd 
March 2012) they elected not to pursue the Hub idea directly, instead endorsing 
formally the Asset Based Community Development (ABCD) approach. 
The closing of this door left us in somewhat of a conundrum with our project. We 
did not want to develop anything “in silo” (email, 23rd March 2012); in other 
words, something that would either replicate or compete with the ABCD work 
happening in the neighbourhood. But we had to do…something.  
So, we deconstructed the Hub idea. What was at its core, the underlying 
principles behind it? We went back to the outputs from the co-design workshop, 
and concluded that at the essence of the Hub idea was positive, non-
stigmatising, informed social support. We visualised the Hub as an idea that 
could develop over time, starting as a loosely connected network of people 
offering friendship and advice on what services were available (we had already 
found some volunteers who were keen to get involved; they had been our original 
co-designers). In time, this network would develop its own identity, a ‘brand’ of 
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sorts, with a logo and literature, which would become recognised in the 
neighbourhood. The ultimate vision for the Hub would be to bring together the 
network and identity into a physical location, the concept visualised at the 
workshop. 
So, a decision was made to develop the Hub as a network of befrienders and 
mentors, along with providing clear information and busting some of the myths 
that scare people away from accessing help. Anna spoke to the co-designers 
about this idea; they were very keen. We started referring to these potential 
volunteers in communications between the project team as “Champions” (Anna’s 
term, 22nd March 2012).  
And so began our investigations into the practicalities of setting up. We were 
particularly concerned with making sure our scheme and the volunteers were 
looked after properly in the long-term. Otherwise we knew that not only would the 
scheme fizzle out quickly, but having their expectations raised and then dashed 
could damage volunteers themselves: we would have done exactly as described 
in section 5.3, setting up a short-term initiative destined to close down, leaving 
participants let-down and disappointed, yet again. We were determined to avoid 
such an outcome. 
…	  any	  volunteers	  we	  recruit	  will	  need	  to	  be	  really	  made	  a	  fuss	  of,	  trained	  (if	  need	  be)	  
and	  supported	  for	  as	  long	  as	  possible...	  most	  of	  the	  people	  I've	  spoken	  to	  have	  really	  
low	  self-­‐esteem	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  not	  do	  anything	  that	  will	  draw	  attention	  to	  them,	  and	  
I	  don't	  want	  to	  leave	  them	  high	  and	  dry	  	  (Email	  from	  Anna	  to	  me,	  18th	  April	  2012)	  
Our investigations centred on three areas: firstly, how to set up such a scheme 
sustainably. Primarily we were concerned with who would look after the 
volunteers in the long-term. Secondly, we needed to decide how to train our 
volunteers, to equip them with the skills and knowledge to be a Champion. And 
finally, we needed to provide them with a list of local services and facilities, to 
which they could ‘signpost’ anyone in need of support or advice.   
Local stakeholders were keen to help. We found that there were several 
individuals and organisations with relevant and very valuable knowledge and 
skills, including an expert on setting up schemes according to the principles of 
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the Mentoring and Befriending Foundation. The same organisation offered free 
training in techniques called ‘Identification and Brief Advice’ and ‘Motivational 
Interviewing’ (for a review, see Vasilaki, Hosier and Cox, 2006) and the Royal 
Society of Public Health’s Level 2 award in understanding health improvement. 
Finally, we began to compile a list of what services were available locally and 
how they could be accessed, with the intention of working with volunteers to co-
create suitable materials to help them communicate with those in need of help. 
Volunteers had suggested leaflets, but were also keen to explore more innovative 
ways of breaking down barriers to services and dispelling myths, such as a video 
created by the volunteers showing people where they would go, who they would 
meet and what to expect from the service. This, they felt, could be shared on 
smart phones and Facebook. 
Were we behaving ethically, in attempting to set up such a scheme so quickly 
and on a shoestring budget? Our intentions were good, but upon reflection it is 
clear that we knew at the time that our scheme stood no chance of sustaining 
itself as an independent initiative. It needed a home, and we had two candidates 
in the running: one was the Community Health Trainers, who had been with us 
right from the start of the project and participated fully in the co-design process. 
They could provide the necessary training, knew about all the services and 
facilities locally and, even better, actually had plans to set up their own “health 
champion” scheme. Another possibility was the local Timebank, who had social 
networks and the infrastructure to manage volunteers already in place. 
Timebanking is a means of exchange founded upon the principles of co-
production (Boyle and Harris, 2009) and community capacity building (see for 
example Craig, 2007) where time is the principle currency. People ‘deposit’ their 
time and are able to ‘withdraw’ equivalent support as needed. Each participant 
decides what he or she can offer and everyone’s time is equal (Timebanking UK, 
2012). Anna, Louise and I had an inspiring meeting with the Timebank staff, 
following which Louise intended to formally commission the Timebank to run the 
volunteering scheme. On reflection, I think Louise was delighted to have found a 
viable conclusion to the work that didn’t rely on the complicated manoeuvring of 
the various organisations involved in the various ABCD initiatives.  
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But the seeds of change sown in March with the establishment of the deprivation 
group, the ABCD project and the changes to commissioning structures dashed 
our hopes of a simple conclusion. I thought at the time that developing our own 
scheme, while simpler because it would be under our control and easier because 
we would be able to make all the important decisions ourselves rather than reach 
consensus with other stakeholders, would be the wrong decision:   
It	  seems	  unthinkable	  that	  we	  should	  disregard	  the	  opportunities	  that	  these	  
collaborations	  present	  for	  us,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  for	  the	  communities.	  I	  think	  
that,	  at	  best	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  duplicate	  these	  initiatives	  to	  some	  degree,	  and	  at	  worst	  
create	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  competition	  among	  provides	  and	  confusion	  in	  the	  
communities.	  (Email	  from	  me	  to	  Louise,	  16th	  May	  2012).	  
Anna and I were so sure that full collaboration with the Health Trainers and the 
Timebank was the right course of action that we both offered to work as 
volunteers beyond the scope of our official funding. But, in an irony that was 
almost cruel, we needn’t have worried. While we were researching the 
practicalities of our network and discussing the possibility of local collaboration, 
the ABCD project had gained momentum and had chosen Parkhood as one of 
their ‘Learning Sites’. This meant that we couldn’t commission formally our 
scheme, as the whole thing was about to be subsumed in the wider ABCD 
initiative.  
We were cordially invited to meet the representatives of the ABCD project to 
hand over the reins to them. But despite assurances that the ABCD team saw 
our work as a “foundation for the future” (email to me on 9th June 2012), my 
instinct at the time was that our ABCD contact wanted to find her own path. This 
rather unsatisfying handover marked the end of our involvement in Parkhood. 
ABCD were the new sheriffs in town. In subsequent informal conversations with 
Louise, despite her professionalism and tact, I got the impression that she shared 
my conclusions and also my disappointment at the way our work in Parkhood 
had ended.  
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5.15. A	  tough	  neighbourhood	  
Urbanwood, January – June 2012 
In section 5.9 I explained how Anna had begun to get to know Urbanwood, 
primarily with Sarah’s help: Sarah had walked Anna around the streets chatting to 
residents and continued to invite her to various events and meetings. This 
section provides a complete narrative the Urbanwood part of the project, and 
because I go back to January 2012, there are some overlaps with previous 
sections, which will be explained throughout. In fact, the section starts with one 
such link… 
Previously, I have explained that there was a feeling of disappointment, of 
disillusionment, related to the number of projects like ours that had come and 
gone (see section 5.3 on the stakeholder workshop). From the start of our work in 
Urbanwood therefore, we were sensitive to this and resolute that we would not 
echo past mistakes. Early on, Anna and I began to think of possible sources of 
funding for something permanent in Urbanwood, the challenge being of course 
that due to the participatory nature of the project we had no specifics. We met 
with our university’s development team to pick their brains about long-term 
funding for community-based initiatives. We also researched the issue of street 
drinking, having been forewarned by Sarah that Urbanwood residents would be 
quite likely to raise this as an issue. We discovered that one of our original 
stakeholders was responsible for a street drinking initiative in the centre of the 
city.  
We filed away what we had found out about community funding and street 
drinking for future reference. But in fact, we needn’t have worried about either 
issue: funding, because of the ‘My Neighbourhood’ award in March (see section 
5.13) and while some residents did talk about street drinking, other issues, which 
I will describe later in this section, were thought to be more significant. Mainly I 
think, trying to anticipate and prepare for such outcomes provided Anna and I 
with the reassurance that we were approaching the work in an ethical manner, 
we were not going to be just another project that stirred up enthusiasm and then 
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let people down. Perhaps this gave us the confidence to keep going in the face of 
a very tough set of issues.  
Venturing out from under Sarah’s wing in January 2012, at the same time as 
much of Anna’s energy was being directed towards the methods roadshow in 
Parkhood (see section 5.9), she began what would be two enduring and 
productive relationships: one with the local housing officers and the other with the 
Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs). She knew from her early efforts to 
find out about Urbanwood that there would be fewer opportunities to tag along 
with existing activities at local venues, because as the community researchers 
had found, these were limited. Anna concluded that she would need to rely 
primarily on word-of-mouth. Briefly, we considered the possibility of incentivising 
people in Urbanwood to talk to us; this, the PCSO told Anna, was really the only 
way to motivate people to participate. We had a modest budget allocated to the 
data collection phase of the study which would have covered incentives in 
Urbanwood, but we held back, partly because we were concerned that Parkhood 
residents might feel short changed because so far (we had been talking to people 
in Parkhood for around 3 weeks at this point) we had not incentivised their 
participation. Primarily though, I felt that incentives would change the dynamics of 
the work, create a transactional relationship based on bribing people to engage. 
Better if people can believe that participation is something worthwhile for its own 
sake. Indeed in observing activities unrelated to our project at a community event 
later in the year, we did conclude that incentives created a sort of “going through 
the motions” style of participation (email to me from Anna, August 2012). As it 
turned out, the use of incentives was unnecessary; Anna’s social skills were 
sufficient to engage people in productive conversation.  
Right from the start, we knew that Urbanwood was likely to be a tougher 
proposition. Unlike Parkhood, with its range of activities, there were few venues 
or services Anna could attend. She visited an art group, a toddler group and 
some debt advice sessions, but most of the data in Urbanwood was collected 
through a combination of brief conversations in the local shop “half of the stock is 
alcohol, the other half cheap frozen food and ready meals” (personal 
conversation with Anna, 5th December 2011), on the street and on people’s 
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doorsteps and longer interviews in participants’ homes organised through the 
housing officers and anti-social behaviour team. Anna was also invited to an 
event aimed at breaking down barriers between young and elderly people.  
Many of the stories from Urbanwood, especially those from the in-depth 
interviews, were harrowing. The trauma participants describe juxtaposes 
uncomfortably in the field notes with the matter-of-fact way that they described 
their lives. Anna’s notes suggest she thinks them enormously courageous 
despite living with personal tragedy. The extracts I present in this section are 
longer than the more conventional two or three line quote because I think it is 
important to see how much each person has to deal with, how so many issues 
related to alcohol are interwoven in one short conversation (each conversation 
generated at most a page and a half of typed notes):  
Her	  bungalow	  flooded	  last	  year	  and	  she	  went	  through	  a	  really	  rough	  time.	  	  She	  even	  
thought	  about	  suicide.	  	  Her	  drinking	  went	  right	  up	  because	  she	  wanted	  to	  blot	  out	  
the	  total	  mess	  she	  was	  living	  in…	  	  She	  spoke	  about	  how	  hard	  it	  was	  to	  lose	  the	  photos	  
of	  her	  children	  as	  she	  had	  to	  give	  them	  up	  to	  care	  when	  she	  had	  a	  bad	  spell	  of	  
drinking	  and	  drugs	  a	  few	  years	  ago,	  and	  that	  was	  all	  she	  had	  to	  remember	  them	  by.	  
She	  told	  me	  she	  was	  beaten	  by	  her	  first	  son’s	  father	  for	  15	  years…He	  drank	  heavily	  
and	  she	  would	  dread	  him	  coming	  home	  from	  the	  pub	  –	  she	  tried	  to	  keep	  her	  son	  out	  
of	  the	  way	  but	  when	  he	  was	  about	  5	  or	  6	  his	  father	  started	  hitting	  him	  as	  well.	  	  He	  
used	  to	  wake	  him	  up	  and	  bring	  him	  downstairs	  to	  beat	  him	  so	  he	  wouldn’t	  wake	  up	  
the	  other	  children	  	  (Female,	  50s.	  Extract	  from	  field	  notes	  May	  2012).	  
Anna told me that the themes that appeared most prominent in Urbanwood were 
feelings of being trapped and isolated; some of this was emotional but there 
seemed to be more people who were physically trapped due to caring 
responsibilities, physical disabilities and mental health problems. She recalled 
one man who had been given a flat when he moved back to Urbanwood, but he 
chose to go and live rough on the streets in the town centre with a bunch of street 
drinkers because he didn't want to be on his own. Another had 
…	  acted	  as	  a	  carer	  for	  his	  wife	  for	  the	  last	  14	  years…He	  spends	  most	  of	  every	  day	  
washing,	  dressing,	  feeding	  and	  entertaining	  her.	  	  He	  spoke	  of	  feeling	  exhausted	  and	  
hopeless…	  	  He	  told	  me	  that	  they	  still	  love	  each	  other…	  But	  he	  did	  tell	  me	  that	  he	  feels	  
like	  he	  sometimes	  fails	  her	  as	  a	  husband	  because	  he	  should	  be	  able	  to	  look	  after	  her	  
yet	  he	  sometimes	  loses	  his	  temper	  and	  doesn’t	  give	  her	  the	  care	  he	  thinks	  she	  should	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have…	  On	  a	  bad	  day	  he	  sometimes	  thinks	  it	  would	  be	  better	  for	  both	  of	  them	  if	  he	  
left	  the	  gas	  on	  and	  neither	  of	  them	  had	  to	  wake	  up	  in	  the	  morning.	  (Male,	  40s.	  
Extract	  from	  field	  notes	  May	  2012).	  
Physical barriers increased isolation: 
Over	  the	  years	  she	  has	  tried	  lots	  of	  external	  support	  services…	  She	  spoke	  about	  the	  
self-­‐consciousness	  of	  other	  people	  knowing	  she	  had	  a	  problem,	  and	  the	  effort	  to	  get	  
out	  of	  the	  house	  when	  she	  had	  depression.	  (Female	  A,	  early	  40s.	  Extract	  from	  field	  
notes	  May	  2012).	  
Anna didn’t think that people felt as worried or as ashamed about drinking in 
Urbanwood as they seemed to in Parkhood; instead she perceived a “stronger 
and heavier drinking culture” in which heavy drinking, violence and crime are 
simply “part of their lot” (Email from Anna to me, 30th May 2012); a deep seated 
resignation that permeates people’s lives from childhood. 
She	  has	  had	  a	  drug	  and	  alcohol	  problem	  since	  she	  was	  9	  years	  old.	  	  She	  has	  been	  in	  
and	  out	  of	  prison	  for	  shoplifting	  and	  spoke	  about	  how	  she	  would	  feel	  good	  in	  there	  
because	  she	  ate	  better	  …they	  used	  to	  call	  the	  discharge	  grant	  a	  ‘relapse	  grant’	  
because	  they	  would	  go	  straight	  out	  and	  buy	  booze	  or	  drugs	  with	  it.	  (Female	  A	  again).	  
	  
Combined with loneliness, anxiety and fear these factors have a powerful effect 
on mental health and people’s drinking. Antisocial behaviour featured often as an 
explanation for people feeling trapped; they “can't move away” from violent, 
disruptive or even criminal neighbours.  “One man who lived in a pre-fab told me 
about a local gang who just kicked a hole through his living room wall to steal 
from his house” (Email from Anna to me, 30th May 2012). Another man…  
…boasted	  about	  some	  of	  the	  pranks	  they’d	  played	  in	  different	  blocks	  and	  streets	  over	  
the	  years	  and	  the	  fights	  they’d	  had	  with	  each	  other,	  local	  neighbours	  or	  passers-­‐by.	  	  
…He	  lives	  in	  one	  of	  the	  blocks	  of	  flats,	  and	  regularly	  gets	  together	  with	  friends	  to	  
drink.	  	  He	  has	  received	  a	  number	  of	  ASB	  [Anti-­‐Social	  Behaviour]	  orders	  in	  the	  past	  
due	  to	  issues	  caused	  by	  some	  of	  these	  sessions	  because	  his	  neighbours	  complain	  
about	  the	  noise	  and	  sometimes	  they	  [the	  participant	  and	  his	  friends]	  cause	  trouble,	  
get	  into	  fights	  or	  break	  something.	  	  (Male,	  30s.	  Extract	  from	  field	  notes	  May	  2012).	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Thus illustrating the perspective of the people on the other side of the antisocial 
neighbour trap, though it seems to me that this man is just as trapped by patterns 
of behaviour and sociality as he makes his neighbours feel. 
5.16. What	  if	  you	  had	  a	  cheque	  for	  £1	  million	  and	  a	  superpower?	  
Urbanwood, May – June 2012 
Because we knew that people would be very unlikely to attend the more formal 
workshop format, Anna attended two community events in popular spaces (see 
section 3.11): one by herself and one with a Codesigns Associate to try and 
engage people in ‘pop-up’ co-design activities. 
The first of these was at Urbanwood Pride in May 2012. Anna chose to 
concentrate on four themes: Alone (being isolated); Confused (about health 
messages); Worry and Family. She had printed some pretend cheques for 
£1,000, £100,000 and £1 million, which she used to engage people in 
conversation about how to tackle each theme. Because it was so difficult to 
persuade people in Urbanwood to involve themselves in anything unfamiliar, we 
were unsure about how successful any co-design would be and Anna was quite 
nervous that the event would be a failure. So, rather than the primary objective of 
the co-design being viable ideas, we decided to treat this event as a 
methodological experiment: if the pop-up format was successful, then we would 
throw more resources (including Codesigns’ time and budget for more 
sophisticated stimulus materials) at the forthcoming Jubilee Fun Day on 5th June 
2012. If not, then we would have learned something and could rethink. This sort 
of thinking typifies participatory approaches in the sense that the researcher does 
not know whether an idea will be successful. There are two ways to deal with this 
uncertainty: to accept it as a necessary part of the participatory process, as an 
opportunity to learn, even if one is learning from failure. Or to be afraid of it, to 
regard failure as simply failure. By this point in my own experience with 
participatory approaches, I had learned to see co-design as the former and so 
could approach the possibility of failure with equanimity. But I had also learned to 
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minimise risk, hence treading softly and carefully before committing too many 
resources to a particular course of action that, if not successful, would mean 
those resources had been expended to little gain. Like much else in the project, 
there was a balance to be struck. In fact, the pop-up co-design format was 
reasonably successful despite people being unwilling to spend more than a few 
moments in brief conversation.  
Suggestions in response to the Confused theme ranged from reopening valued 
local venues, building new facilities (a health club and GP surgery, harking back 
once again to the community researchers’ findings and reinforcing our impression 
that people in Urbanwood felt as though they lacked basic facilities) to using 
Facebook and designing an ‘Urbanwood app’ to communicate with people about 
their health and what help is available. 
In response to the Worried theme (which most people interpreted as mental 
health problems like depression or anxiety), participants suggested a free 
counselling service that would visit people at home; this particular idea will be 
revisited in later sections. Education in general and about mental health issues in 
particular was a related suggestion, particularly for children because participants 
felt prejudice was difficult to challenge among adults. With £100,000, one 
participant would provide support and respite for carers, days out for families, 
and with £1 million; another would remove what they saw as the cause of much 
of people’s worry: “give them a job and a way to get out of debt”. 
The Alone theme generated the most ideas. These ranged from simple 
suggestions for local, free clubs people could join to more family fun days. 
Participants spoke about the barriers between people: between older and 
younger people; the latter are perceived to have little to do other than hang 
around on the streets, which intimidates older people and discourages them from 
going out. If people do go outside, there are very few things for them to do in 
Urbanwood “there’s nothing here, GP, dentist, drop-in centre”.  
Somewhere	  to	  go	  to	  just	  talk	  to	  people	  –	  all	  there	  is	  in	  [Urbanwood]	  is	  waiting	  in	  the	  
shop	  queue,	  then	  you	  go	  back	  to	  your	  flat	  alone.	  	  Need	  somewhere	  to	  go	  where	  you	  
don’t	  have	  to	  join	  in	  activities	  or	  events	  but	  can	  just	  be	  with	  other	  people,	  like	  a	  
Page 177 of 317 
coffee	  shop	  or	  drop-­‐in	  centre.	  (Reported	  conversation	  with	  Pride	  Day	  co-­‐designer,	  
field	  notes).	  
Allied to the lack of facilities locally, many people are unable to access things 
outside the neighbourhood because they have mobility issues or they can’t afford 
the bus fare. A participant suggested a minibus for Urbanwood, free or very low-
cost local transport that could take people shopping. 
Emboldened by the relative success at the Pride Day, Anna, Phoebe and I made 
plans for the pop-up event at the Jubilee Fun Day. This time, we decided to 
explore a different approach to see whether very different ideas were generated. 
Rather than using the individual themes and the cheques, a Codesigns Associate 
created simple comic strip visualisations of the four case study stories: Lauren, 
Jane, Alex and Michael (see appendix 2). We planned to engage participants’ 
imagination by asking them what superpower they would use to help these 
characters. Anna and a Codesigns Associate hired superhero costumes to help 
participants get into the spirit of the activity (and make them laugh!). 
The presence at the event of a Codesigns Associate who was a talented 
illustrator opened up the possibility that ideas could be visualised, even mocked 
up, as participants were talking opened up even more creative possibilities. We 
made plans to borrow and table and Phoebe arranged to courier the necessary 
equipment to Urbanwood.  
This approach generated some very creative suggestions: telekinesis could bring 
Lauren’s support network closer and zap the unhealthy social influences around 
her to the moon. A “Love Laser” could make Michael feel loved and able to deal 
with all he’d lost through zapping him with a love beam. 
But once again, people were difficult to engage for more than a few casual 
moments. Anna and the Codesigns Associate found that they had to go free 
range, leaving their table and visualising equipment behind. The weather was 
wet, most of the people attending the event were congregated in the bar area, 
relaxing on comfortable chairs. So, most of the creative ideas (except for the 
superhero costumes) were abandoned in favour of, once again, simply engaging 
people in conversation.  
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The ideas generated were very similar to those at the Pride day (and similar to 
many of the ideas from the Parkhood workshop as well): breaking down barriers 
between people and befriending schemes; combatting isolation, reassuring 
people; promoting opportunities to make friends, giving people something to get 
out of bed for; local transport, a “community bus” or services that would come into 
Urbanwood.  
Phoebe’s conclusion was that we had partially fulfilled our aims: we had 
generated some good ideas, but there hadn’t been time to work them up with 
participants. Consequently, because any further development would have to be 
led by the research team, she didn’t feel that we had “empowered” participants to 
“own the ideas”. The problem was, time was running out. Anna’s contract had 
only a few weeks to run and it didn’t look as though anyone was going to rush in, 
thank us for our work and ask for a straightforward handover, as they had in 
Parkhood.  
The insight that led us to our pilot was that people had said that they couldn’t 
access fresh fruit and vegetables in Urbanwood even if they wanted to, because 
the shop only sold alcohol and cheap frozen food. Yet, there was a man with a 
small vegetable delivery business who was keen to gain new customers in 
Urbanwood. What was the problem? Why were this need and this solution not 
connecting? This micro-problem began a conversation between Phoebe, Anna 
and myself that linked the issue of isolation and consequent low emotional 
wellbeing of many people in Urbanwood with the strong feeling that the 
neighbourhood lacked access to important facilities. Thus, the mobile hub 
concept was born. The mobile hub was based on the idea of the 1950s mobile 
library cum shop but with a doctor on board ready to offer consultations to 
anyone who needed help. With a café. The next section describes the 
development of the pilot. 
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5.17. It’s	  the	  Sex	  Bus!	  
Urbanwood, June - August 2012 
Throughout the remainder of June, Anna, who was by now very involved in the 
Urbanwood community, took the mobile hub idea to various events. Armed with a 
printed out cartoon of a bus and a biro, she captured a range of ideas from local 
stakeholders.  
They suggested that the mobile hub be given a permanent name; and while 
Urbmobile was felt to be a bit ‘cheesy’ most people liked it. They also liked the 
idea of images and branding that could be used for future engagement and ‘My 
Neighbourhood’ events. To achieve this, the branding would have to be 
something identifiable as belonging to Urbanwood and related to improving the 
community in general. They suggested that each day of the pilot be themed so 
that people would know what to expect, and information about what was 
happening could be updated easily using a menu type blackboard, which would 
also fit nicely with the suggested daily street café; something positive, non-
stigmatising, somewhere to just go and chat. 
The final design of the Urbmobile was inspired by two ideas from stakeholders: 
the first was to use a map of Urbanwood landmarks, a way of making it feel like it 
belonged to the neighbourhood and was not shared with anywhere else. The 
other was to continue to co-design the vehicle as part of the pilot. We were 
slightly concerned (based on stakeholder advice) about the possibility of 
destructive graffiti, so a blackboard format with some space for volunteers and 
stakeholders to decorate together was felt to be the most effective compromise. 
The Council’s Youth Services vehicle (known locally as the Sex Bus because of 
its usual role in youth outreach, presumably because youth workers offered 
advice on sexual health) became the Urbmobile for four days. We procured picnic 
tables, as well as a café style blackboard and a supply of chalk markers. Our ill-
fated gazebo, originally signed for by the enterprising ‘Darren in Flat 4’ and only 
replaced by the supplier when the University’s finance team got involved, was 
accidentally reversed over by the Urbmobile on the second day of the pilot, 
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requiring regular repair with strong adhesive tape. But these challenges, while a 
source of frustration at the time, served to unite the team of local volunteers. 
Appropriate permissions were gained from the council to provide a street café, 
and supplies of beverages and snacks were arranged. Our friends from the 
housing association and in the youth work team offered to drive and insurance 
was organised via the Youth Services team. Each of the four days of the pilot 
was themed around a particular topic: community engagement (primarily aimed 
at engaging people in the ‘My Neighbourhood’ project), youth and family, housing 
and money and health.  
The first few days of the pilot were deemed a success; summarised as “lots of 
people and amazing weather” (email from Anna on Friday 10th August). On the 
first day, which coincided with yet another Urbanwood Community Fun Day, 
Anna estimated that around 200 people engaged with the Urbmobile in some 
form; as had become the norm, most of these interactions were brief and 
anonymous conversations. Anna thought that so many people attended because 
they had been offered incentives (free tickets for the fairground rides, for 
example), but  
…the	  quality	  and	  in-­‐depth	  nature	  of	  the	  info	  suffered	  in	  my	  opinion	  because	  the	  
majority	  were	  just	  going	  through	  the	  motions	  to	  get	  their	  freebee.	  (Email	  from	  Anna	  
to	  me,	  12th	  August	  2012).	  
Much like our co-design stimulus at the Pride day, people were asked what they 
might do to make things better in Urbanwood if they had £1 million. Except this 
time, the £1 million was really there.  
The range of suggestions was familiar: a communal space like a cafe, where 
people could meet for informal social support and also have other services on 
offer (ranging from fresh healthy food to more statutory advice, chemists and 
even hairdressing upstairs). Very similar in fact to the Parkhood Hub concept. All 
the suggestions were collected in one big box, which we gave to the ‘My 
Neighbourhood’ team.    
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The second day things were closer to normal in Urbanwood. Without the 
incentive of the fun day, Anna and the Codesigns Associate found it an uphill 
struggle to get people to engage and they spend a great deal of time knocking on 
doors. She also noted a very different reaction from residents in the relatively 
affluent Treepark estate compared to the more deprived Avenues residents. The 
people in Treepark estate were reluctant to talk to the Urbmobile volunteers; they 
lived in a nice area and didn’t need any improvements made, they said. 
They	  also	  didn't	  want	  to	  investigate	  our	  mobile	  cafe,	  and	  looked	  on	  it	  with	  suspicion	  
([someone]	  told	  me	  that	  travellers	  have	  previously	  been	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  area).	  
(Email	  from	  Anna	  to	  me,	  12th	  August	  2012).	  
Yet Sarah had told Anna that Treepark estate residents often say they want more 
activities to happen in their part of the neighbourhood. Perhaps it was the ‘rough 
and ready’ nature of our pilot, with our cheap, slightly bent gazebo and plastic 
chairs that put them off? Perhaps they sensed that it was activity designed for 
people in a ‘deprived neighbourhood’ and didn’t want to associate themselves 
with such a label? 
Anna was keen to communicate that if we found that engagement was poor over 
the final days of the pilot, we shouldn’t write off the concept of mobile services 
completely. She reported conversations with the youth workers and with Phoebe, 
all of whom said that it often takes a few days before a mobile engagement unit is 
a familiar enough presence for people to be comfortable. Anna wanted to be sure 
that I understood that poor engagement during the pilot was quite likely to be 
because the disengaged and cautious residents are suspicious of anything new 
and especially anything that is related to authority, rather than flaws in the 
concept of mobile services itself.   
On 10th August, Anna made me aware of some sad news: a close relative of 
hers had passed away. I had already planned to attend at least one day of the 
pilot, so I offered to lead the day in Anna’s stead so she could attend the funeral, 
despite knowing that the social aspects of engaging strangers in conversation is 
not a strength of mine (to put it mildly). 
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The prospect of taking responsibility for the day was even more terrifying 
because Anna herself wouldn’t be there with her strong relationships with 
stakeholders and deep local knowledge. I would be alone; people would be 
looking to me for direction and decisions about what we should do.  
Deep breath. 
I arrived in Urbanwood early on Tuesday morning. I can’t remember what the 
weather was like, other than it wasn’t raining; I was too focused on the nerve-
wracking task that lay ahead. First I concentrated on sorting out some logistics: I 
needed to get the key for the community centre and then collect the volunteer 
who had offered to make healthy soup (this was the health day of the pilot) and 
deliver her and her equipment to the community centre kitchens, the only place 
with appropriate hygiene certification. Then I helped set up the café: put chairs 
and tables out and repair the gazebo once again. It was clear that the volunteers 
knew what they were doing; they didn’t need my direction, so I decided to act 
mainly as an observer. I chatted to a couple of stakeholders about their work, 
there was a lady there who was hoping to interest people in a community garden 
that she was setting up. She was an experienced community organiser and had 
set up several similar projects elsewhere. She told me that she was finding it 
quite difficult to engage with people in Urbanwood. Looking back now, it seems 
as though there was an invisible wall between stakeholders and Urbanwood 
residents: stakeholders desperate to engage people in something, anything that 
would make their lives better. Residents desperate for some sort of recognition 
that they deserved facilities and services. So why weren’t they connecting? I can 
only speculate, but I think that the problem is less that the barriers to 
engagement are too high or that the stakeholders are doing the wrong thing. In 
my experience it was closer to a parallel universe occupying the same space. 
Residents and stakeholders used the same language, saw the same sights, but 
the meanings they took from these were very different. One example Anna gave 
me was this issue of access to a GP in Urbanwood: when residents told us that 
they didn’t have access, we were told that the PCT would look at this; and it was 
found that the distance between Urbanwood residents and a GP was within the 
guidelines. But what residents meant when they said they didn’t have access to a 
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GP was that to get to their designated practice, they needed to take public 
transport (especially if disabled, and as explained previously, many more people 
than the city average had life limiting disability). And the cost of public transport 
meant that they would have to miss a meal that day. That is what Urbanwood 
residents mean when they say they have no GP: 
“I	  regularly	  come	  across	  residents	  who	  chose	  to	  eat	  before	  paying	  for	  transport	  to	  
attend	  doctors	  surgeries	  a	  couple	  of	  miles	  away	  or	  to	  visit	  the	  City.”	  Sarah,	  23	  
October	  2012	  
Another example of this parallel universe is found in a conversation I had with a 
well-respected lady who was involved heavily in youth work in Urbanwood. As we 
sat on the Urbmobile benches together, watching the local children, some as 
young as 5 years old, wander past us towards the shop where they would buy 
sweets and energy drinks, she spoke of how she hadn’t allowed her own 
daughter to roam free in this way. Her neighbours, she told me, had disapproved, 
felt that she wasn’t equipping her daughter with the skills to be streetwise, to look 
out for herself. Later I reflected upon the disapproval I would have been 
subjected to from my own peers in my neighbourhood if I had allowed my 
daughter (then 5) to wander our neighbourhood unsupervised. I have no doubt 
that my neighbours would have felt this warranted a call to social services, yet in 
Urbanwood, within a group of people born in the same region and ostensibly of 
the same culture as I, not encouraging a young child to develop the skills to be 
streetwise was viewed with equal disapproval.  
Later, Sarah told us that the ‘My Neighbourhood’ team had received 140 
completed questionnaires, and found overwhelmingly that people identified a 
need for better health facilities and activities for young people. Further work is 
planned to develop these ideas over the next 10 years. A small survey of 68 
residents aged between 35 and 55 conducted before and after the project 
showed that recollection of the Urbmobile pilot was high and the idea was very 
popular (86% thought it should go ahead), though some people felt that 
affordable, local public transport would be more empowering. 
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5.18. Concluding	  comments	  
In this section I have constructed a complex narrative of an 18-month project 
informed by participatory methods. This chapter hasn’t described every detail of 
the project. It couldn’t possibly. The narrative includes only those stories and 
recollections that seemed most important to me at the time of writing and those I 
remember as having significance at the time (which aren’t always the same 
things). When I showed this section to Anna as part of the process of getting her 
consent to feature in the story, she told me that reading it had brought the project 
back to life for her, in particular it had reminded her of what she called the 
“emotional work” (personal conversation, 15th April 2014) that was involved. 
For me, the project involved a different sort of emotional work to that described 
by Anna.  I was responsible for everything, driving it forward, making sure we 
didn’t over spend the budget, making sure Anna was safe while doing fieldwork. 
And of course trying to hold to participatory and ethical principles within a system 
of public health commissioning and knowledge creation that had very different 
ideas about research. Something that strikes me in particular having written this 
story and now reading it back to myself is how hard we tried to find people who 
wanted to work with us, to be like Cahill’s (2007b) Fed Up Honeys and take the 
reins of the project, creating knowledge of themselves, for themselves. But 
nobody really wanted to engage and I am frustrated by my lack of insight as to 
why that might be. I could explore the idea that it was a class issue, education, 
lack of motivation, ambition, belief in their capacity to effect change, but I feel that 
to go down this path is to excuse my failings by elevating myself, educationally, 
intellectually, above people in Parkhood and Urbanwood. And I don’t think that’s 
right. It’s not right ethically and it isn’t correct, either.  
No, my guess is that they had bigger things to worry about, stressful lives filled 
with tasks and worries and a project about drinking offered nothing in particular to 
make them want to add to their daily burden. And we were not offering the sort of 
liberation Freire describes in the people he worked with in Brazil, one of whom 
told him "I now realize I am a person, an educated person" (2000, p. 33). The 
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next Chapter, in which I make some sense of it all, homes in on some of these 
reflective moments and is presented as a more conventional account organised 
by theme. As I described in Chapter 4, the themes were identified in two ways: I 
kept a diary during the writing of this first chapter, noting ideas and their possible 
significance and I used the narrative from this chapter as the basis for thematic 
analysis.   
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Chapter	  6: In	  which	  I	  make	  some	  sense	  of	  it	  all	  
 “I could tel l  you my adventures beginning from this morning,” said 
Alice a l i t t le t imidly: “but i t 's  no use going back to yesterday, because I 
was a different person then” (Alice, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 
p. 71). 
6.1. Introduction	  
Denzin and Lincoln hope “that social sciences and humanities become sites for 
critical conversations about democracy, race, gender, class, nation states, 
globalization, freedom and community” (2005, p. 3). This second results chapter, 
in which I make some sense of it all, is presented as a somewhat more 
conventional account organised by theme and attempts to engage with some of 
these issues. In particular I explore issues of class and gender, freedom and 
community, as well as exploring the ways in which language, discourses and 
power relations manifested themselves. As explained in Chapter 4, I developed 
the themes described in this chapter by combining different analytical techniques: 
First, I kept a diary during the organisation of the data and throughout the 
generative process of writing the previous chapter, in which I noted down nascent 
ideas as they started to emerge. Then, once I had finished writing the story of the 
project that forms the previous chapter, I analysed it, employing the principles of 
thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). I undertook an intense and 
extensive period of open coding, in which I coded the original dataset, the 
previous chapter and a small selection of relevant theoretical literature in order to 
generate the building blocks for the analysis. Then, as Braun and Clark suggest, I 
used mind maps (see also Wheeldon, 2010), which I found invaluable in 
exploring and making sense of the complex array of codes and ideas I had 
created. I generated a total of four mind maps on large sheets of plain paper, 
referencing the codes I had developed and the ideas noted in my research diary; 
each map became less complex as the process of representing visually the core 
ideas helped clarify and solidify the themes.  
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As I write this introductory paragraph, I have yet to undergo the transformational 
process (to me) of converting the various disparate strands of thought, scribble, 
mind map, sub-title and the occasional paragraph captured in a fit of creative 
inspiration into a chapter of coherent prose that explains my conclusions and 
justifies my reasoning. I call this process transformational in the sense that 
Richardson seems to mean when she calls writing itself a way of knowing. So, 
like the previous chapter, the very process of attempting to make myself 
understood will contribute to the richness of the themes, enhance their rigour and 
depth; will clarify to myself what I mean and what I can claim to know. I anticipate 
continuing to work with the data as I write this chapter and I will continue to keep 
the research diary. In the conclusion to this chapter and in the final conclusions 
and discussion chapters, I will reflect not only upon the ‘findings’ (if it is 
appropriate to call them this) of this autoethnographic study, but also upon the 
process of what seems to have turned out to be a multi-layered study of a 
method within a method within a method.  
I have continued to write the themes in a narrative style, this is to preserve the 
authenticity of the process by which the knowledge was created and, by meeting 
the criteria of honesty and transparency, help readers to judge the interpretations 
offered here. 
6.2. To	  infinity	  and	  beyond	  
“In common usage, posit ive space is the part of a painting that carries 
the creative action, the aesthetic or art ist ic manifestat ion of the work. 
As the primary part of a painting, the posit ive space concentrates in 
i tself  the dynamic strength of the painting. It  is the f ield charged with 
the painter 's message…. The negative space is subordinate to the 
posit ive space. It  is  inferior in importance, since i ts content is minimal 
to non-existent.  Nevertheless,  i ts presence in the painting is both 
desirable and functional” (Kočíb,  1986, p. 141).  
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When I think of the hundreds of reports and articles I’ve read and the handful that 
I’ve written that document a project or a process, I cannot recall a great deal of 
attention being paid to what didn’t happen. Yet reading through the raw data in 
preparation for writing the previous chapter, one of the first reflective thoughts 
that I recorded in my notes was the number of promising ideas that came up 
during the course of the project that went nowhere. I was struck by the apparent 
arbitrariness of which ideas ‘stuck’ with a participatory project like this one. Why 
did some ideas get implemented and others not? Was it because they were 
better ideas or were there other reasons?  
Following the analytical act of writing the narrative and subsequently coding and 
mapping the themes, this emerging idea of things that didn’t happen, of things 
that were abandoned, was still significant. Particularly so given the strength of 
feeling in Urbanwood that the people there had been abandoned: let down and 
forgotten by the authorities and the way that we were required to abandon our 
vision for the Parkhood Hub to make way for the Asset Based Community 
Development project (which is linked to themes around politics, which will be 
discussed in later sections). In essence, then, this theme is about whether there 
is significance in the things that did not happen, and what that significance might 
be.  
One way to conceptualise this did / didn’t happen dichotomy is the idea of 
negative space. In art, students are taught to study the negative space as well as 
the positive 
“…if	  you	  are	  drawing	  a	  model	  with	  a	  hand	  on	  her	  hip,	  the	  triangle	  of	  space	  inside	  her	  
bent	  her	  arm	  is	  as	  much	  a	  part	  of	  the	  drawing	  as	  the	  arm	  itself…	  Betty	  Edwards	  
(1997)	  talks	  about	  how	  when	  we	  start	  drawing,	  we	  tend	  to	  get	  stuck	  on	  visual	  
representations	  of	  things	  rather	  than	  seeing	  what	  is	  there.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  might	  
draw	  a	  child’s	  version	  of	  a	  flower	  (a	  round	  circle	  surrounded	  by	  petals)	  rather	  than	  
the	  actual	  flower	  that	  is	  in	  front	  of	  us.	  By	  looking	  at	  negative	  spaces,	  we	  take	  our	  
focus	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  flower	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  an	  object	  in	  space.	  And	  that	  is	  when	  
we	  start	  being	  able	  to	  draw	  what	  is	  there”	  (Dembling,	  2012).	  
This notion leads me to wonder whether the things that didn’t happen should be 
considered as important a part of the overall picture of a participatory project as 
the things that did. To focus only on the positive space is to offer only a partial, 
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unsophisticated understanding: a child’s simplistic drawing of a flower. Or 
perhaps, worse, ignoring the negative space presents a story that is not neutral 
but instead conspires to hide, even silence (Ward and Winstanley, 2003), the 
difficulties and the failures and (probably most importantly) the reasons for them.  
There is an obvious conundrum associated with this concept though: how does 
one identify and delineate this negative space? In theory, it could be infinite, 
which would make the concept rather useless. So I reviewed the project narrative 
to try and give the idea of negative space some form and boundaries. The first 
two examples of negative space appear early in the project; that stormy day in 
December 2011 when the invited workshop participants didn’t attend and during 
the workshop when we abandoned the idea of creative ‘research graffiti’ because 
of fears that it would simply be vandalised. These two examples seem different 
because one was partially out of our control; we didn’t know that the women 
invited to the workshop wouldn’t come, though we could have regained control by 
choosing to reschedule or engage with those women in a different way at a later 
date. Conversely, the other represented a conscious decision not to pursue a 
particular option. But in both these examples, it seems to me that what became 
negative space were the options that were more risky, less familiar. We ran the 
workshop with the youth workers because they were there and were enthusiastic. 
It was a safer (and less costly) option than cancelling it and trying a different 
approach to work with less available, less engaged people. And the research 
graffiti idea was abandoned precisely because it was considered too risky.  
The research graffiti was merely the first of several other ideas linked to art and 
creativity, of giving participants the opportunity to express themselves, that 
became part of the project’s negative space. In the narrative, I describe an 
animated conversation with the youth club manager about expanding the 
‘creating’ method station into an activity whereby local people collaborate with 
local artists to create an exhibition of work that expresses the role of alcohol in 
local life. This seemed like a good idea on several counts: the positive reaction 
people had to the creating station, once they’d overcome their stage fright, the 
way it gave Anna the opportunity to talk about what the participant was doing as 
a way of exploring the issue, the way making something gave participants 
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something to focus on, removing some of the awkwardness of talking about such 
difficult topics with a stranger. It could have functioned as a consciousness 
raising (Freire, 2000), even transformational activity both within the 
neighbourhood and outside. 
But this fragile shoot of an idea got trampled as the project ground forwards; 
primarily, I think, because it wasn’t linked clearly enough to the project’s 
‘outcomes’ but also, again, it seemed risky, difficult to control and predict. I tried 
to resurrect the idea a couple of times, including making several separate 
applications for funding, but without success. My continuing failure to make 
participant creativity and expression central to the project appears central to the 
negative space. Other examples of were the collaborations and relationships that 
appeared promising at first, but that fell by the wayside. An early case was the 
community researcher project, another was a local charitable organisation, which 
was closely involved in early meetings and which we assumed would be a 
significant partner in the work but who, for reasons I do not know, kept their 
distance. Yet another example from much later in the project was the emerging 
relationship between our work and the Timebanking organisation; this was almost 
certainly stymied by political factors: the new and powerful ABCD project wanted 
to call the shots. Compare these people and relationships in the negative space 
with our relationship with Sarah and the way in which she supported (and 
consequently helped shape the direction of) our project. It seems reasonable to 
assume that if we had met someone different, if the community researcher 
project had embraced collaboration, for example, then we could have gone in a 
very different direction. 
6.3. Making	  room	  for	  absence	  	  
But while it is both easy and interesting to sit back and speculate on what might 
have been had things been different, to make the observation that projects can 
take many different paths without an examination of the reasons why some 
things fall into the negative space and what the consequences of failing to 
acknowledge the negative space might be is to make rather a humdrum point. 
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Negative space, if it is not to be defined as the infinity of possibilities that are 
created and closed off whenever any action is taken, needs elaboration. Figure 
10 attempts to define the project’s Negative Space as emerging from the data: 
 
 
 
Figure 10: The project's Negative Space emerging from the data 
I have shown in the discussion above that the negative space of this project was 
composed of rejected or forgotten ideas and people and relationships that could 
have been significant but that drifted away. To this list, I would add the voices 
that went unheard (or perhaps were even silenced, like those of the community 
researchers when they presented their findings at the town hall) and the 
alternative interpretations that could have been made of our research data had 
we a) had more time to dedicate to analysis and b) had realised our original 
ambition to involve participants in a process of co-analysis.  There are a number 
of ways that the data could have been interpreted differently: first, the original 
Family theme for example, contained within it data about acceptable and 
unacceptable parenting and about how participants who had been affected 
negatively by alcohol often seemed to begin their stories in childhood. Another 
observation that cut across several of the original themes was that people often 
seemed to have constructed ‘normality’ differently to the way that public health 
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professionals would have liked them to. An example being how ‘normal’ or 
acceptable violence might be in different situations, or what might constitute 
‘problem’ drinking. But the specifics of how the analysis could have been 
different, while interesting, are less relevant in the context of negative space than 
the observation that there these alternative interpretations existed; and therefore 
that a full understanding of the whole picture of the project should acknowledge 
the implication of their absence as well as the implication of the presence of the 
themes we took forward into the co-design phase.    
The emails between the project team provide some enlightenment about why 
negative space might occur as well: highlighting that negotiations about what can 
and can’t be done, about who will and won’t be involved link both to the 
resistance and legitimacy themes (the subject of later sections in this chapter). 
Ideas and interpretations are judged, often openly but probably subconsciously 
as well, against the criteria set for the project and against the degree of risk and 
impracticality they might pose. And in the writing up, the process is made logical, 
sequential, erasing the negative space in sympathy with “the positivist view of 
research process, which attempts to eradicate all uncertainty and mess and 
ambivalence… Thus we abandon our intuition, vision, creativity, and the hopes of 
our participants, in the face of epistemic antipathy towards uncertainty.” (Y 
Morey, personal communication, 28th February 2014). 
6.4. Shadow	  boxing	  
Probably the most significant aspect of the construct of negative space in a 
participatory project is the consequences of what doesn’t happen. There are 
three implications of negative space in my autoethnographic reflections: the first 
is rather obvious: if an idea becomes part of the negative rather than the positive 
space of a project, then it won’t be counted as part of a project’s effects or be 
evaluated; it will also be absent from the project’s reported ‘outcomes’ and also 
from any contributions to knowledge in the form of publication unless explicitly 
recognised, as is happening here in this thesis. However, the two implications of 
negative space that are the most interesting and consequential relate to 
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epistemic and to ethical issues. In other words, what might be different about the 
knowledge available to us in the negative space compared to the positive? And 
have the right things, the ethical things, gone into each? 
As outlined in Chapter 4, this autoethnography is founded in a rejection of 
epistemic absolutism; consequently I do not adhere to the belief that there is an 
authoritative epistemic standard against which an accurate representation of an 
independent reality (Smith and Hodkinson, 2005) is deemed ‘Truth’ (Luper, 
2004). So epistemologically, the negative space here may represent an 
alternative truth, a more nuanced and complex truth or a less powerful truth, 
rather than untruth.  
Keeping in mind the recognition that certain groups are thought to dominate 
conventional social science research (i.e. middle-class, heterosexual, white, able-
bodied and male, Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011), we sought to prioritise the 
voices of people normally marginalised by virtue of their status as ‘working-class’ 
or residents of a deprived area. These voices and those of our stakeholders (the 
people who have first-hand experience working in deprived areas) form the 
positive space of the project, as much as is possible given that they are filtered 
through my interpretation. An example of this from the data was our change of 
direction early in the project when we realised that participants were not, as we 
had assumed they would be, embarrassed to talk about drinking. In fact, what 
seemed to happen was that our status as researchers served to legitimise these 
voices that would not normally be listened to. I regard this observation about the 
legitimisation of participant voices by researchers as a separate theme, which will 
be discussed in a later section. 
However, while an explicit recognition of the power dynamics of social class was 
part of the project’s positive space, issues of gender, race, disability and sexual 
orientation were firmly in the negative space. There is nothing in the data about 
race and sexual orientation that gives any shape even to the negative space, and 
very little related to disability other than a recognition of different conceptions of 
‘nearness’ of facilities like a GP practice, which may be dependent upon one’s 
physical abilities.  
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6.5. What	  about	  teh	  menz?	  
“What about teh menz?” is feminist shorthand for the phenomenon sometimes 
observed in online discussions about women’s issues where someone will 
interrupt the discussion to argue that whatever issue is being discussed affects 
men too. This is usually interpreted as derailing the discussion (i.e. “the act of 
throwing a thread in a discussion forum off topic, oftentimes [sic] so much so that 
the original discussion is unable to continue”, Urban Dictionary, 2009). Thus 
having the effect, whether intentional or not, of silencing the women involved in 
the original discussion. But in this project I think there is a good argument to be 
made that despite our lack of deliberate recognition of gender issues in the 
research, the positive space of the project represents a feminised interpretation 
and the negative space a masculinised one. So, what about the men? 
I reach this conclusion partly because of the imbalance in participants; 
quantitatively, there are more female stories in the data than there are male. It is 
also relevant to consider why, in Parkhood, the co-designed idea that was 
selected to take forward was one that resonated with engaged female 
participants; and conversely why the ideas that weren’t pursued (primarily 
activities to divert men from organising their social activity around drinking) were 
those that would have had more impact upon male drinkers and which would 
have needed the committed involvement of male participants, of which there 
were very few.  
While I would identify as feminist and have sympathy with the aims of a feminist 
epistemology, neither the participatory project nor the autoethnography was 
undertaken from an explicitly feminist epistemic standpoint (Harding, 1991). 
Partly because I recognised from the start of the work that women were in control 
of the project: women conceived it, organised its funding, agreed its objectives 
and terms of reference, managed it, collected and interpreted all the data, forged 
the relationships and wrote all the documents. In this project we held the 
positions of power; we were the dominant group. Men and male perspectives, 
conventionally those that are dominant, largely fell into the negative space. A 
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good example of our feminised interpretation from the data is the way we 
constructed stories from men as “boasting” about drunken exploits, exploits that 
frequently involved some sort of violence. Our tone is one of disapproval; our 
choice of language betrays our lack of sympathy for the viewpoint of someone 
who could be proud of getting into a drunken fight; of finding violence amusing, a 
source of pride. This stands in contrast to our sympathetic portrayal of the lonely, 
powerless young mother who turns to drink in desperation. She inhabits the 
positive space in this project; the drunken violent male dwells in the negative. 
The observation that, upon reflection, we seemed to have judged male behaviour 
and perspectives more harshly has an obvious ethical dimension as well as 
epistemological consequences; particularly given that our subsequent actions 
(advocating the Parkhood Hub vision and its semi-adaptation into the Urbmobile) 
are more strongly associated with female stories of loneliness and isolation rather 
than male stories of a social life organised around drinking and finding 
entertainment in violence. It may be obvious to the reader by now that I still hold 
this perspective. I do disapprove of the notion that drunken violence is amusing 
(not to say this is an exclusively male phenomenon, though it was so among our 
data). I do sympathise with a lonely young mother. But arguments about 
epistemic standpoint aside, is it ethical to allow personal judgements like these, 
no doubt informed by more general feminist reading on the phenomenon of male 
violence, to influence which ideas form the positive space and which the negative 
in a participatory project? The question of ethics was addressed in the 
methodology chapter, but was primarily concerned with positionality and 
representation in the research process. This question of the ethics of positive and 
negative space needs wider input from the ethics literature, which will be dealt 
with in the concluding chapter.   
6.6. The	  silence	  of	  the	  insider	  
“I do not know if  you realise the importance of this piece of work.  
Your conclusions are not new as we have al l  been saying i t  for ever but 
by producing the report as clear and decisive as this then commissioners 
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have to l isten”. (Email from senior project stakeholder, 5th October 
2012, emphasis added). 
The idea of ‘legitimacy’ as a name for this theme originated from the work of 
Laurel Richardson (2005); she writes of “illegitimacy”, conceptualising it as her 
struggle with the academy “being in it and against it at the same time” (p. 966) 
and wondering if others faced a similar struggle to make sense of themselves 
and act ethically. As a subjectivist researcher working primarily in an objectivist 
domain (i.e. public health) I identified strongly with this dilemma. Thus legitimacy 
/ illegitimacy, like the idea of abandonment, was present in my earliest 
reflections. In fact, I first wrote about the idea in June 2013 as part of an early 
draft of the methodology chapter, where I conceptualised it as being inside the 
system of public health research and against it at the same time. Indeed this 
notion of being against the system has evolved into to the resistance theme, 
which is articulated later. 
Like the construct of positive and negative space, the theme of legitimacy also 
invites dichotomy. In this project, at first there appeared to be two types of 
legitimacy: legitimacy of voice (i.e. whose interpretations were listened to, as 
illustrated by the stakeholder quotation that opened this section). And secondly, 
legitimacy of outcome: which outcomes were regarded as legitimate for the type 
of work that had been commissioned; an example being the arts-based work, the 
potential of which I struggled to realise despite stakeholder support. I came to 
suspect that this might be because it was not regarded as a legitimate outcome 
for a social marketing project. However, later and more critical reflections have 
revealed a more nuanced interpretation, which will be outlined in this section. 
Unlike the concept of negative space though, the construct of legitimacy carries 
with it an enormous weight of academic literature and of particular relevance 
seems to be the conception of legitimacy from political science (as opposed to 
the meaning of the term in law, i.e. a child born of parents lawfully married to 
each other, Oxford Dictionaries, 2014). Political legitimacy, as I think it is relevant 
to this study, relates to the authority a decision-maker has, i.e. others’ “belief in 
the rightness of the decision or the process of decision making” (Dahl, 2013, p. 
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46). In political science, the decision maker to which scholars refer is a 
government; but in my initial reflections, legitimacy seemed to be a useful way to 
conceptualise the rightness of someone’s claim to truth or the processes of 
arriving at that truth. In other words, who has the right to speak and from where 
or what is this ‘right’ to speak derived? 
A stark example of this phenomenon from the project can be found in the vignette 
from the previous chapter about the community researchers’ presentation; 
concerning why the community researchers themselves weren’t really believed 
when they told people what they had found out about their neighbourhood, 
whereas when I drew similar conclusions later in the project, my claims were 
accepted. Another, perhaps more subtle example, is the outcomes of the very 
first workshop with stakeholders, when they told us that the reason people drink 
too much is that they have little motivation to change, because they are 
disengaged and often suffering from mental health issues. This room full of 
experienced stakeholders knew what the problems were, they had understood 
them for a long time and yet they felt that those with the power to make changes 
hadn’t listened. Why not? 
6.7. It’s	  not	  just	  voice	  
These observations led me to reflect deeply upon the different degrees of 
legitimacy afforded to different voices in different contexts. Another example of 
legitimacy working in a slightly different way can be found in my notes about our 
status as outsiders, particularly whether our lack of lived experience of 
deprivation would lead us to draw simplistic and blame-filled conclusions (in other 
words, illegitimate conclusions) about people’s lives. Two instances early in the 
project were Sarah’s concerns about whether we realised the scale of the 
problem and our mistaken assumption that participants would be embarrassed, 
even ashamed, to talk about their drinking. In those examples, we were the ones 
who lacked legitimacy. Following this reflection, I have concluded that there is 
more to legitimacy in a participatory project like this one than simply the right to a 
voice. 
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Figure 11: The theme of Legitimacy, referencing (Dahl, 2013) 
Before describing the sorts of phenomena that the data implies we scrutinised for 
legitimacy during the course of the project, it is important to make clear that 
nowhere in the data does it suggest we thought consciously about legitimacy per 
se. The closest we got to thinking about the construct as I have described it here 
were the discussions we had about different courses of action (such as the ones 
about how to introduce the project to participants), but we didn’t ask each other 
and I didn’t think until I started the reflective writing process, “is this a legitimate 
thing to do?” No, the judgements we seemed to make about legitimacy were in 
some cases totally subconscious reactions and in others very practical in nature; 
what we should do, what it might lead to, what the problems associated with a 
particular course of action might be. What is apparent in the data and in my own 
recollections though, is that the way we deliberated was often related to notions 
that speak to legitimacy in the context of participation: were we excluding anyone, 
imposing our own perspective, making assumptions, guilty of manipulating the 
outcomes? In essence, frequently we asked ourselves whether our actions were 
consummate with a legitimately participatory process. 
But I argue here that the subconscious verdicts and the practical discussions 
about what course of action we should take can be conceptualised as 
judgements about what was and what was not legitimate in a political sense; 
whether there was, as Dahl writes, a belief in the rightness of the decision or the 
Page 199 of 317 
decision making process (2013). I found four different sorts of things in the data 
that seem to have been judged as legitimate, or not. These are conclusions and 
decisions (which I consider analogous to Dahl’s notion of a decision) and actions 
and goals (decision making process).  
The first type is conclusions, which encompasses the observations that first led to 
the identification of this theme in the data: the question of who gets to claim 
knowledge of something; of who gets to be believed. The second type, a 
decision, is often followed by an action but can also be a decision to allow 
something to happen or to react in a certain way should something happen; for 
example, our decision to allow the young girl to participate in the ideas workshop 
because to do otherwise seemed cruel. Another example of a decision was our 
need to consider the ethical implications of people’s unwillingness to engage in 
formality and paperwork (see the ‘Show on the Road’ vignette in the previous 
chapter), which led us to abandon confidentiality in favour of anonymity for most 
participants so they would not be excluded.  
The third type, actions, relate strongly to the participatory process, in the sense 
that at each stage of plan, act, reflect and plan, an action is taken, something is 
done (and inevitably, other things are not done). In the context of the previous 
theme of negative space, this construct of legitimacy seems to help explain why 
some actions might be taken whereas others are not. Of course, legitimacy is not 
the only reason for actions to fall into the positive rather than the negative space, 
as identified earlier, other factors like risk and politics play their part, as well as 
mundane practical considerations like time and budget. The fourth category is a 
goal, the ultimate outcome against which something would be judged. In the 
larger sense, the whole project’s goals seemed to be arbitrated with reference to 
ideas of legitimacy: to aim only for reduction in drinking seemed illegitimate, both 
because it was unrealistic but also too simplistic. Whereas goals related to 
engagement and overall wellbeing seemed legitimate in the context of the 
project, but less so in the overall context, an issue I explore later in the section.  
I don’t mean to imply here that whether something is deemed legitimate or not is 
a systematic or predictable process. Rather, legitimacy seems to be a unifying 
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construct that can help explain why, in the inherently social process of designing 
and managing a participatory project, some things happen and some things 
don’t, some experiments work and some don’t, some ideas are well received and 
others fall flat. In other words, legitimacy helps understand what goes into the 
positive and what into the negative space of a project.  
In my data, there appear to be three intersecting sub-themes that can help 
explain the process by which a conclusion, decision, action or goal is deemed 
legitimate, or not. These are: who is making the claim to legitimacy and linked 
closely to this, the basis upon which the claim is made. The third sub-theme 
deals with the context in which they make the claim, by which I mean the 
question of insider-outsider status; this seems linked in turn to the context and 
physical location in which the claim occurs. An example of this latter point being 
the community researchers once again; would their findings have been judged 
more legitimate if they had presented them on their turf, where they were the 
insiders and the audience the outsiders, rather than the other way around? 
 
  
 
Figure 12: How claims to legitimacy are judged 
Once again, my choice to use words like “claim to legitimacy” to describe what I 
see happening suggests that this is an openly negotiated, conscious process; in 
most cases these claims and the judgements made about them do not seem to 
be made in this way, the evaluation of legitimacy seems to be tacit, even 
subconscious. Yet I argue that such judgements do occur and that they affect 
how a project proceeds, and consequently the knowledge it develops.  
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6.8. Pangs	  of	  conscience	  
Firstly then, when weighing up a claim to legitimacy, there seems to be 
considerable significance associated with who makes the claim. In our project, 
there appeared to be three broad categories of people that might make a claim to 
legitimacy: an insider (for example, a community researcher or a person living in 
Parkhood or Urbanwood, participant or not); an outsider (for example, a 
stakeholder, commissioner or researcher) and an academic. While the insider-
outsider boundaries aren’t fixed (Sarah, for example could be placed in both 
insider and outsider categories), the category of academic appears to be rather a 
special case because it seems evident that academics’ claims to legitimacy are 
treated somewhat differently to the claims of other outsiders. Anna, on the other 
hand, was also somewhat of a special case. She seemed to travel between the 
categories with ease: she didn’t live in Parkhood and Urbanwood, but became 
accepted as a sort of honorary insider quite swiftly. I suspect because of her 
personal qualities and social skills, though Sarah’s advocacy probably helped. 
Anna was also, of course, an academic. The less socially skilled and physically 
present academic (me) was always an outsider in our project. 
 
 
Figure 1: Who makes claims to legitimacy  
There isn’t anything explicit in the project documents that would explain this 
difference between academics and outsiders more generally, but reflecting back 
upon the process, it seems likely that the claim of an academic is taken more 
seriously because we benefit from the legitimacy conferred by an association 
with a research process and further, such legitimacy appears to be granted 
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because of an assumption that ‘academic research’ is synonymous with 
‘scientific’ (as in positivistic assumptions of objectivity, rigour of method and 
freedom from bias).  
Of course, such claims to objectivity are not made in participatory research, yet 
my experience of the project and subsequent reflections tell me that I benefited 
from the power inherent in that objectivist discourse in successfully making 
claims to legitimacy. In other words, I conclude that it is this association with the 
scientific tradition, even though it is misplaced, that made the academic’s claims 
to knowledge more likely to be accepted than those of local stakeholders or 
people like the community researchers. But it was an illusory power; I didn’t 
deserve it.  
The academic’s associations with the objectivist discourse of ‘research’ also 
seems to underpin the differing levels of legitimacy conferred by the basis upon 
which someone claims it, which can be divided into two categories: data or lived 
experience. The outsider (including the academic) seems most likely to base their 
claim upon data (by dint of their status as outsider, typically they have little or no 
lived experience anyway), whereas the insider tends to base theirs primarily upon 
lived experience. One interesting point about the properties of these two 
categories is that despite lived experience appearing to be a less powerful basis 
upon which to claim legitimacy, when it is combined with data as it was in the 
case of Sarah, it does not seem to detract from the claim; rather a combination of 
data and lived experience, an insider and an outsider perspective, seems to lend 
weight in a cumulative way.  
6.9. Who’s	  game	  is	  it	  anyway?	  
The final sub-theme is the context in which the claim to legitimacy is made. In the 
data, there were two aspects of this: the first was the system, the structure, in 
which the claim was being made (an example being the commissioning system, 
another being the discipline of public health) and the other aspect was the 
physical surroundings in which the claim is located. These elements speak to the 
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question of whether the claimant is on their turf, both metaphorically and 
physically; are they playing by their own or by someone else’s’ rules?  
Before elaborating this sub-theme in more detail, it is relevant (and also 
somewhat uncomfortable for me to note) that in this project, the outsiders and 
outsider-academics tended to be of a more privileged social class than the 
insiders. There are a significant number of theoretical traditions that could help 
explore the relationship between context and legitimacy that appears to be 
present in this project, but my preference would be to draw briefly (in this section, 
though I will return to the topic in the conclusions) upon the work of Bourdieu, 
because his theory of social structure seems to encompass all the elements I 
have found in my analysis on this topic. 
Bourdieu conceptualises what I have noted in my analysis as context as a ‘field’, 
which can be defined as the relationships between “the social positions which 
guarantee their occupants a quantum of social force, or of capital, such that they 
are able to enter into the struggles over the monopoly of power, of which 
struggles over the definition of the legitimate form of power are a crucial 
dimension” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 229-230). A field therefore, 
according to Dick (2008), is analogous to a game; an association that is in itself 
interesting given my choice of language and metaphor to describe it in my 
narrative: ‘on their turf’ ‘playing by the rules’ ‘home or away’. Most significantly in 
the context of this thesis, is that the theory of fields helps enrich understanding of 
why some claims to legitimacy in some contexts were more successful than in 
others. According to Bourdieu, the explanation is founded in the relative capital of 
the different actors and their ability to deploy these both as part of their claim to 
legitimacy and to influence the process by which something is deemed legitimate 
(c.f. Dahl, 2013). It is possible that Bourdieu’s work could form a unifying 
theoretical framework for my contribution; I will explore this possibility in the next 
and final chapter.  
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6.10. My	  ethnographic	  self,	  Part	  I	  
Who says or does something, and when and how they say or do it, matters in a 
participatory project. It is part of the tacit and complicated process of whether 
someone is believed, whether their recommendations are followed, whether they 
are permitted to act and how their contribution is judged. This has both ethical 
and epistemic implications. 
But before I can try to tackle these issues, it is important to reiterate Richardson’s 
(2000, p. 253) belief that “the ethnographic life is not separable from the self”. 
Increasingly, as I explore the themes that are emerging from my reflective data 
about the project, things that I have learnt outside of the project and the thesis 
writing are influencing my thinking, and reflecting on whether a researcher in 
public health or social marketing (however pure their motives and however good 
their intentions) should seek to legitimise a less powerful participant’s voice is 
one such issue. 
The online feminist community I frequent is full of intelligent and articulate women 
learning and teaching each other about feminism. Recently, there has been an 
outcry about a leaked document from well-known human rights organisation 
Amnesty International, which appears to suggest that being able to purchase sex 
is a ‘human right’. During the robust discussion that followed, a poster known as 
Beachcomber (who has agreed to be quoted) wrote that “men speaking for 
women, is not men representing women, it is men oppressing women” (1st 
February 2014). This led me to wonder whether this same dynamic is present 
when researchers go into deprived neighbourhoods and then represent people’s 
lives to policymakers. Is this an empowering thing to do, because the views of 
local people are heard, legitimised? Or is it disempowering, because yet again, it 
is only a small number of privileged interpretations that are afforded legitimacy? 
Is what we did in Parkhood and Urbanwood advocacy or oppression? As 
Richardson points out, research and writing are complex political activities; 
ideological agendas are likely to be present in our writing and “speaking for 
‘others’ is wholly suspect” (2000, p. 254; Spivak, 1988). 
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6.11. Viva	  la	  resistance	  
“…what we can study, how we can write about that which we study -  is 
t ied to how a discipline disciplines i tself  and its members, i ts methods 
for claiming authority over both the subject matter and its members”  
(Richardson, 2000, p. 253).  
As soon as I began to write the previous chapter, it became obvious to me that 
something I named in my notes as ‘resistance’ was woven through both my 
actions on the project and the way I see the project now, in hindsight. I even 
resisted disciplinary convention in the way I have written this thesis, despite the 
concerns of my supervisor (who was, thankfully, willing to afford me the benefit of 
the doubt). 
I resisted the issue led commissioning structures and resisted the overall 
knowledge system that underpins the positivistic progress towards predetermined 
‘outcomes’. I resisted the conventional approach to social marketing outlined in 
Chapter 2: I did not aim to change individual behaviour among a particular target 
audience using all four Ps. What I did could almost be classed as outright 
rebellion against social marketing; in many ways I rejected it, stamped upon 
almost everything related to its neoliberal, managerialist philosophy. 
When Richardson writes of resistance, she is referring to the constraints that she 
perceives to be imposed upon scholars by the structures and conventions of their 
home discipline. I started developing this section with the idea that I would write 
about the different ways in which the notion of resistance manifested itself in the 
data, probably organising this around sub-themes of resistance to a 
managerialist notion of control, resistance to the dogma of ‘what social marketing 
is’, resistance to positivistic notions of ‘what research is’. In fact what happened 
with this theme is I engaged in a whole new micro-study, a reinterpretation of the 
autoethnography to look for theoretical constructions of resistance, in the project 
and in myself, where resistance is understood primarily in the anthropological 
sense rather than in the Marxist interpretation of labour relations. In a context of 
differential power relationships, Seymour defines resistance as “intentional, and 
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hence conscious, acts of defiance or opposition by a subordinate individual or 
group of individuals against a superior individual or set of individuals” (2006, p. 
305). To meet her definition, acts of resistance should be counter-hegemonic and 
should not be subconscious (which she would prefer to call “subversion”, p. 312), 
but they don’t necessarily need to be successful in effecting change. For me to 
conceptualise my behaviour as resistance in this way, I need to see myself as 
subordinate to more powerful others, in this case these are the academic 
establishment, my supervisor and particularly the examiners who possess the 
power to confer my doctorate upon me. Or to withhold it, of course.  
6.12. My	  ethnographic	  self,	  Part	  II	  
I think I have always resisted. “Because I said so” has never been a compelling 
reason for me to accept anything. I have a clear memory of myself aged 16 or 17, 
sitting in my chemistry classroom on the hard, high wooden stool, arms resting 
on the venerable wooden bench, scarred by 20 years of student experimentation 
and petty vandalism. I was watching our teacher demonstrate a titration 
experiment, observing the colour change that indicates an acid turning to a base. 
I can remember thinking to myself, how do we know that this colour change 
means that all these ions are detaching and reattaching in different forms? All we 
can see is the colour changing. We just have to believe her when she says it’s 
true. But how does she know that it’s true? She can’t see either; like us, all she 
can do is believe the books, believe what her tutors at university told her.  
Even earlier than this, it was chemistry once again that sparked my personal 
consciousness of what turns out to be postmodernist epistemology. For our 
GCSE science exams, aged 16, we were taught to regard the atom like a ball 
(the nucleus) surrounded by other balls (the electrons) whizzing round on little 
wires (the shell), rather like the planets round the sun. Moving to A ‘Level, we 
were told to forget all that, that was a lie, developed so that 16 year olds could 
understand it well enough to grasp the basic principles of chemical bonding. I 
suspect that the version we were taught at A ‘Level is a construction too. And the 
version that undergraduates are taught to describe in their exams. Knowledge 
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constructed for a purpose. A useful one, probably, but not a neutral, objective 
truth. And this was chemistry. Hard Science. On reading a draft of this chapter, 
Tim, my Director of Studies, asked:  
“As	  a	  critical	  realist	  (I	  think	  that	  is	  what	  I	  am)	  I	  take	  the	  view	  that	  there	  is	  some	  kind	  
of	  reality	  out	  there,	  but	  that	  reality	  is	  complex	  and	  the	  research	  we	  do	  to	  understand	  
that	  reality	  often	  only	  offers	  a	  partial	  explanation	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  updating	  and	  new	  
interpretation	  as	  new	  knowledge	  becomes	  available.	  Often	  we	  have	  to	  use	  
metaphors	  as	  a	  way	  to	  aid	  understanding	  in	  terms	  that	  human	  beings	  can	  relate	  to.	  
Hence	  I	  would	  interpret	  your	  chemistry	  example…as	  a	  metaphor	  to	  aid	  
understanding	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  lie.”	  (T	  Hughes,	  personal	  communication,	  26th	  March	  
2014).	  
I found this an interesting question to reflect upon. Where are the boundaries 
between truth and lie, when we draw so often on model and metaphor in to make 
ourselves understood and, particularly relevant in this thesis, to be evocative in 
our writing? Tim’s question enabled me to be more specific about what exactly 
makes me uncomfortable about the way I remember being taught chemistry. It 
isn’t that I expected the teachers to be able to tell us the whole and perfect ‘truth’ 
all the time. They wouldn’t have been able to, of course. What bothers me is the 
omission; the intellectual dishonesty (whether they are being knowingly dishonest 
to their students or unknowingly dishonest to themselves) in not explaining that 
the planets round the sun metaphor was a metaphor to help us understand a 
complex thing. These pretences, though kindly meant, contribute to the lack of 
epistemological nuance that underpins the general assumption that research 
equals objective validity.  
In fact, when I look back on the process of writing this thesis, like the examples 
above from my school days, I will probably identify it as a transformational one 
not just in the conventional sense of gaining academic status, but in discovering 
the writings of critical postmodernist scholars, in particular Laurel Richardson. 
Reading the work of these accomplished and successful literary ethnographers 
has been akin to finding a group of like-minded friends, with whom I don’t have to 
conceal the way my mind grapples with a problem; I don’t have to resist anything. 
If I had begun this project knowing that this creative qualitative research is 
practiced, was valid in the sense that it exists as a tradition, I would not have 
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needed to struggle against disciplinary convention. If I had not found it, I would 
have missed the peace that comes with simply acknowledging subjectivities, of 
laying bare the frail humanity that underpins the multitude of little decisions and 
actions that shape a research project, participatory or otherwise.  
So now, safe on my autoethnographic island, I look back on the stormy waters of 
the project and the early stages of writing this thesis and see clearly a process of 
resistance. There is no diagram to accompany this theme; just three simple sub-
headings to organise instances of what I perceive as resistance in the data: to 
the hegemonic managerialist notion of control, to the dogma of ‘what social 
marketing is’ and to positivistic notions of ‘what research is’. 
6.13. Neoliberal	  managerialism	  managed	  
The whole project was rooted in resistance. Right from the start, we wanted to 
resist the conventional issue led approach of designing and managing health 
interventions on a topic-by-topic basis, “in silo” (to borrow a phrase from a project 
email, 23rd March 2012). This thought process, along with our failure to frame 
the project in the way we wanted, is documented in the previous chapter and 
there is no need to repeat these reflections here, merely to acknowledge an 
attempt at overt resistance against commissioning structures that appeared 
unsuccessful, in that we did not persuade the PCT to fund a cross-issue project. 
There were more covert forms of resistance though, and these were more fruitful. 
Another early example recorded in the project documentation is my resistance 
against the assumption that we would achieve a measurable reduction in 
drinking. For a start, this was impossible because we were unable to determine 
where people lived from hospital admissions statistics; the best the statistician at 
the PCT could offer was the admissions data for the whole of the city, which was 
no help to us. But also, I knew that one short project would be very unlikely to 
make enough of a difference to people’s lives such that they reduced their 
drinking. As explained in the previous chapter, I drew upon the metaphor of an 
oak tree, positioning our work as planting the acorn and caring for it as it 
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emerged. The oak tree wouldn’t grow for 10, 20 years. This tactic of resistance 
via gentle diversion was successful in this instance. I think at least partly because 
it chimed with what the stakeholders knew to be true about the neighbourhoods 
and the people who lived there: that drinking was related to the more serious 
issues of disengagement and deprivation and therefore a simplistic solution stood 
no chance of making a difference. In fact I think it likely that arguing the 
converse, that the project would reduce drinking at population level, would have 
been more difficult.  
Another way I exhibited resistance was through creating an illusion of control, of 
milestones planned and met, of logical progression towards a successful 
outcome. Throughout much of the project, it felt like I was fighting for the 
principles we had all agreed to follow and it took quite a toll on my personal 
resilience. At times, the temptation to stop resisting and actually take control in a 
non-participatory way, just to get to the end of the project without censure, was 
strong. But as explained in the previous chapter, I maintained an illusion of 
control rather than its reality.  
Other examples of resistance to the managerialist hegemony were also about 
adherence to participatory principles, but rather than resisting these covertly by 
diversion or illusion, in these examples I resisted overtly, by arguing my corner. 
The first instance of this happening in the data was with the Parkhood Hub and 
my insistence that the PCT should not simply take the idea away and develop it 
in a non-participatory way. Linked to this was my determination that our 
‘community champion’ scheme would be set up carefully, involving the right 
stakeholders, rather than rushed through as an isolated initiative with limited 
support. A small example of what I interpreted as resistance upon similar lines 
from Louise was her strong desire to commission the Timebanking organisation 
to run our ongoing scheme, which I assumed was at least partly related to a 
desire to have some independence from other initiatives happening concurrently, 
a desire to wrestle back some control. 
But as the project unfolded, we were able to edge closer to our original vision. 
Can this development be characterised as resistance? Not entirely, because it 
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came about largely as a consequence of other changes to the overall hegemony 
in the PCT at the time, which were described in the Beware the Ides of March 
vignette in the previous chapter. But I think that it is fair to claim that our early, 
more covert resistance (for example, not being rigid about only including as 
participants people who met the age requirements set out in the commissioning 
specification) meant that because we had resisted the constraints of the old 
approach, when the hegemony of the PCT changed to one that was more 
supportive of our original vision we had crafted a project that suited the new 
direction. And the fact that we were now going with the flow of PCT strategy 
rather than against it meant the overt resistances had more chance of success. 
6.14. Social	  marketing	  snubbed	  
As I showed in Chapter 2, models of behaviour change that assume people are 
individuals free to make decisions, which in turn are based on rational or semi-
rational weighing up of positives and negatives, underpin much theory in social 
marketing. This is why exchange is one of the fundamental principles many 
social marketers rely on to structure their thinking about their work: make people 
an offer they can’t rationally refuse, and behaviour change is sure to follow. 
Most of this participatory project was predicated upon a rejection of this notion, 
which I would characterise as overly simplistic. Or perhaps not a rejection per se, 
perhaps a belief that social marketers can’t (or won’t) acknowledge that the ‘offer’ 
they would have to make to the people I met in Urbanwood and Parkhood would 
be very expensive and impractical within the current hegemony. We would have 
to offer them a different life, one where they were not born into a family that lived 
in a deprived area, one where their parents valued education and encouraged 
them to attend a school where other children were keen to learn and behaved 
well, one where they had a fulfilling job and earned enough money to live in 
pleasant surroundings without worrying about making ends meet. I don’t think 
social marketing is able to claim legitimately to offer such an exchange. 
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And really, what I have just described is not necessarily how to empower people 
in deprived areas to live lives that they are happy with; it’s a recipe for how to be 
more like people with class privilege (c.f. Lindridge, 2012); in other words 
generally the sort of person that becomes a professional social marketer or 
academic. 
I worry also that to assume that an exchange will stimulate a change in behaviour 
among people who are drinking to cope with what are in in many cases incredibly 
difficult circumstances, is at best naive and at worst harmfully dishonest. What if 
they don’t change? Can we blame them for that, given the structural factors that 
constrain their choices? Are we, in normalising this approach, contributing to the 
stereotype of people who live in deprived areas as “feckless” (Walters, 2012) 
“scroungers” (Sloan, 2010; Jones, 2014) too lazy and ignorant to make sensible 
decisions about their own lives? I fear that social marketing is not helping dispel 
this impression. 
Autoethnography, as described by scholars like Ellis and Richardson, demands 
critical self-reflection, which can at times be an awkward and painful endeavour, 
as Davies (2005, p. 2) points out, “ critique is risky work, not just because it might 
alienate those who are deeply attached to, or personally implicated in, the 
discourses to be placed under scrutiny”. With this in mind and while it is difficult 
to acknowledge this in a formal document, I can’t help but feel, I think, 
embarrassed to be associated with a discipline that makes such apparently 
unsophisticated claims about behaviour change. It seems small and petty and too 
concerned with its disciplinary status, with what’s in and what’s out of consensus 
based definitions (see also Spotswood, 2013). And yet big questions, 
philosophical questions, remain unanswered; I have significant reservations 
about our claims to legitimacy, for example. Social marketing is at the same time 
too bold and not bold enough.   
As my work on this thesis has developed and my thinking refined, I have 
engaged in small acts of resistance, even defiance, like presenting a conference 
paper in 2012 that was knowingly and critically self-reflective about how we 
(mis)use the construct of empowerment in standard social marketing discourse 
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(Collins, Spotswood and Manning, 2012). Drawing upon theory from international 
development, my presentation used the project in Urbanwood and Parkhood to 
illustrate the mistakes we are making and their likely consequences. It went 
against the prevailing upbeat ‘social marketing can change the world’ mood of 
the conference, and some delegates who spoke to me afterwards were quite put 
out that I hadn’t offered them a story of ‘success’. Indeed, one even tried to 
reconstruct the story for me, suggesting that I should claim to have achieved an 
objective of ‘understanding’ rather than admit to failing to achieve an objective of 
‘empowerment’. She appeared to think that I would find this interpretation 
reassuring. Other small acts of resistance include not answering “I am a social 
marketer” when people ask me what I do, removing the words ‘social marketing 
centre’ from my email signature and changing the hyperlink to my personal staff 
profile rather than one associated with social marketing.  
One consequence of this particular personal resistance is that having rejected 
social marketing as a disciplinary identity; I am cast adrift. I do not know where I 
belong or where my skills and outlook on research would be welcomed and 
valued.  
6.15. Positivism	  eschewed	  
Continuing the concluding point in the last sub-section, as well as setting myself 
free in disciplinary terms I have done something similar epistemologically. Or 
perhaps what has happened is that I have finally developed sufficient erudition to 
claim an alternative perspective with confidence.  
But that observation relates only to my internal struggles to find a place that is 
comfortable intellectually, it has no bearing on how I navigate the wider research 
culture in which I find myself. As Boje (2001) points out, most business school 
academics (to which I would add public health professionals in particular and 
almost everyone who has not studied some form of social theory or theory of 
knowledge in general) are trained to follow a functionalist ontological and 
positivist epistemological stance. This means that in the minds of many people 
Page 213 of 317 
with whom a non-positivist researcher will come into contact, research is 
synonymous with the discovery of “value-neutral, empirically verifiable facts” 
(Boje, 2001, p. 357).  
It is this assumption that all research leads to empirically verifiable ‘fact’, free 
from any taint of value judgement or political motivation that seems to give the 
academic much of their perceived right to claim legitimacy, as argued in an 
earlier section. But I resisted this, both in the project itself and in the rather 
tortuous processes of, firstly, working out that if I wasn’t developing in this PhD a 
contribution to knowledge founded in what we had learnt about alcohol in 
deprived neighbourhoods (which could have been an option), what exactly was I 
doing? And secondly, in writing up this thesis in such a way that it would achieve 
the dual standards of a) avoiding unnecessary confusion to the reader by failing 
to follow accepted convention with things like the order of chapters and the 
writing style (or worse, suggesting to them that the underpinning scholarship was 
lacking); and b) remaining true to the actual process that I had followed to create 
the contribution to knowledge I present here; to tell a story that is authentic, 
rather than one that is sanitised with every trace of mess and uncertainty 
removed. I was keen to ‘own’ the methodology that I had followed, to stand by my 
work with pride rather that to ‘fake’ (as I saw it) a more conventional PhD by 
obfuscating the process through retrospective writing up.  
There are two issues to deal with in this section then, the first being instances in 
which I resisted a positivism-inspired conception of ‘what research is’ in the 
project; and the second how I navigated my instinct to resist the conventional 
way of structuring and writing about a PhD.  
In essence, I can argue that the whole project was a resistance to ‘what research 
is’ in public health, because I saw the entire project as wholly and completely 
research and have consistently written and spoken about it on those terms. 
Whereas in a more conventional understanding, the project would have been split 
into formative research (the ethnographic phase) then the development of some 
sort of intervention (not thought of as ‘research’), surrounded by more research to 
evaluate the intervention: a sort of research-intervention-research sandwich. 
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Other examples of resisting conventional understandings of research and its role 
included this issue of evaluation, which was rather more of a practical problem 
than an epistemological one in most cases. But there was the underlying feeling 
that the only way to really show that the project had achieved anything was to 
prove that drinking had reduced, and that the reduction was due to the project 
and not confounding factors. This would have been largely impossible anyway 
due to all the other things happening locally, like the ABCD project and the ‘My 
Neighbourhood’ grant. But in fact, this was one area of the project where I felt 
resistance would be futile, so I designed a short and simple pre/post survey 
asking questions about drinking behaviour, community engagement and 
wellbeing. In my mind, this survey was unlikely to show any statistically 
significant differences anyway, because the changes in drinking behaviour would 
need a long time to manifest themselves. In fact, there were small differences in 
Urbanwood, which I thought at the time were more likely to be related to a 
growing feeling in that neighbourhood that things might actually get better this 
time, largely because of the symbolic value of the £1 million grant. In a way, I 
suppose, developing this survey was similar to the illusion of control I described 
in the section on resisting managerialism, only this time it was an illusion of 
scientific evaluation that was being created. 
Another example of resisting the traditional conception of ‘what research is’ in 
public health can be found in my need to emphasise that just because the 
research had ‘found’ something, didn’t mean that just implementing it as a 
‘solution’ was going to be successful. I think this assumption comes from the 
conventional approach of doing formative research to understand the issues, and 
then designing some kind of remedy that is implemented separately from the 
people who will use it. I resisted strongly the idea that this would work in the 
neighbourhoods, largely because of emotional and political factors such as local 
people resenting the power to impose things upon them that remote others 
possess. Conventional health services research, it seems to me, prioritises fact 
over politics.  
Another small example is the use of incentives. Orthodox approaches to 
formative research do typically rely on an incentive of some kind to encourage 
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participation. But we resisted the temptation to offer these, partly because we felt 
that this would create a transactional feel, but epistemologically, the use of 
incentives suggests to me that the information gained is separable from the 
person providing it, so the extent to which participants feel that they are valued 
as individuals with something to offer, rather than people who have been paid for 
what they know and then sent away, will affect the quality and depth of their 
engagement with the issues. In essence, I think all these relatively small 
instances of resistance to ‘what research is’ can be grouped as a resistance to 
the traditional power dynamic inherent in research, where the researcher holds 
the power, not the participants. We tried to operate differently.   
The second form of resistance identified in this sub-theme was that which I 
showed towards conventional approaches to doing PhD research and writing a 
PhD thesis. Others have written of their struggles with unconventionality in this 
context as well. Laurel Richardson, as mentioned earlier, writes generally about 
illegitimacy in a disciplinary sense; and more specific to PhD research, there is 
Julie Davis, who invented for her thesis an alternative structure to try and more 
accurately represent the process of knowledge creation she followed. Rather 
than the conventional separate, sequential chapters starting with a review of 
extant literature, findings and “interpretations detached from accounts of the 
research process” (Davis, 2004, p. 13), she aimed to show the ways in which 
processes and outcomes were intertwined by intermingling accounts of action, 
reflection and literature in her thesis in the form of reflective “cycle” (ibid.) 
chapters.  
Her examiners, unfortunately, were unimpressed with her approach. She 
describes the first examiner as a researcher knowledgeable in action research; 
this academic felt that there was foundation for her desire to present her work 
unconventionally, but he felt that the intermingling of literature and action 
interrupted the flow of the story in a detrimental way. Her other examiner was 
less sympathetic overall, advocating a more conventional approach simply 
because, in Davis’s opinion, he had “missed the point” (p. 17) of what she was 
trying to achieve.  
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According to my research diary, in October 2013 I realised that my ambition for 
the thesis was:  
…to	  “sort	  out”	  all	  the	  different	  literatures	  that	  dealt	  with	  the	  topic	  of	  co-­‐creation:	  
SDL,	  participatory	  research,	  co-­‐design,	  ABCD,	  that	  sort	  of	  thing.	  They	  all	  seemed	  to	  
be	  saying	  similar	  things	  without	  reference	  to	  one	  another.	  	  
Consequently, I found it acceptable to start the thesis with literature review 
chapters that framed the thesis in line with my own starting point for the actual 
research, a process of “sorting out”. The methodology chapter that came next 
helped me to realise that I was not in fact ‘doing’ participatory research; rather I 
wanted to study it. But I couldn’t study it as Davis had done, knowing from the 
beginning that I was concurrently doing action research and studying it. It had 
already happened, I didn’t have the right sort of data and didn’t want to imply that 
I had. So I started to read about reflection, which led quickly to autoethnography, 
which provided an authentic framework from which to look back on past events 
and write about them to generate new knowledge about them. The chapter that 
tells the story of the project and this one flowed ever more smoothly from the 
autoethnographic framework. And thus there is really no need to present the 
thesis in an unconventional structure. As a result of my exploration of resistance 
against ‘what research is’ in the context of a PhD thesis, I conclude that rather 
than choosing actively to resist conventionality, I found no particular need to do 
so.  
In overall conclusion for this section, I have found broadly four strategies of my 
own resistance in the project and subsequent work on the thesis. These I had 
named confrontational, diversionary, illusionary and unconventionality. 
Confrontational strategies include directly addressing whatever it is I want to 
resist, whether by presenting arguments or making statements of belief or intent. 
Diversionary strategies include avoiding direct confrontation by gently directing 
the focus in other, more desirable directions or using metaphor to suggest 
compliance when really, resistance is occurring, such as the oak tree. 
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Illusionary (or performative?) strategies include creating the impression that 
something is happening when in reality it is not. It is important to note that this 
does not encompass outright untruth, more creating an impression of, for 
example, logical progress towards agreed milestones while knowing that those 
milestones are not as fixed as the illusion implies.  
There were hints at resistance among Parkhood and Urbanwood residents in the 
field notes as well; though as the project wasn’t framed in these terms, I suspect 
that we will not have recorded or even really noticed much of the resistance in 
which they engaged. Briefly, examples included people finding their caring 
responsibilities overwhelming and behaving (in their eyes) badly because of their 
frustration. Avoiding social services even though they needed support, avoiding 
asking for help generally so that they stayed off the authorities’ radar, reluctant to 
engage, being unwilling to trust. Not turning up to things, even though they had 
agreed to. This area of resistance to health intervention and even health related 
research is one that would benefit from some attention.  
6.16. Empowerment	  of	  the	  powerless?	  
Sadie: So are you arguing that this empowerment of the powerless is 
simply an i l lusion? A performance, maybe? But doesn't  actually do 
anything in terms of a real transfer of power… 
Katie: I l ike the idea of empowerment as a 'performance' .  I am going to 
explore that I think. Thanks! 
Sadie: You're welcome. It  comes from my experiences within the youth 
and community work sector. Empowerment is bandied around a lot but 
you get the impression they are only talking about i t  and performing i t  
in order to get funding.  The people who work at the grassroots see the 
irony of i t ,  but they have to play ball :  "Empower" the kids and we' l l  give 
you more money.  Nothing ever changes. (Extract from Facebook chat,  
28th November 2013). 
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My friend Sadie has a job doing pioneering participatory work in film production. 
Her suggestion about conceptualising what happened in the project as a 
performance of empowerment turned out to be a very helpful one, not least 
because there were other examples that could be constructed as performance or 
indeed performativity in the project.  
The notion of performance as a theme stems from this conversation with Sadie, 
but the idea that something was amiss in how we were using the term 
empowerment in fact came from the conference I describe in the previous section 
on resistance. That conference paper (Collins, Spotswood and Manning, 2012) 
was the first piece of truly reflective writing I did about the project in Urbanwood 
and Parkhood. Ostensibly, I wrote in that paper, participatory methods like those 
to which we attempted to remain true in the project offer a promising way to 
empower “surplus” (Hickey and Mohan, 2005, p. 239) or “at-risk” populations 
(Pechmann et al., 2011, p. 23), like people who live in deprived neighbourhoods.  
However I noted that this premise is not uncontested; that criticism that 
participation has failed to achieve meaningful change had been mounting (Cook 
and Kothari, 2001). The problems I identified from a review of the international 
development literature included inattention to issues of power and politics (Hickey 
and Mohan, 2005) coupled with an unsophisticated understanding of the 
mechanism and constitution of power (Mosse, 1994; Kothari, 2001); an 
overemphasis on local concerns to the detriment of structural inequality (Mohan 
and Stokke, 2000) and a conceptualisation of the relative functions of structure 
and agency that is inadequate (Cleaver, 1999). Finally, I argued that mainstream 
participatory approaches are too voluntaristic in regarding any form of 
participation as superior to non-participatory practices (Chambers, 1997) without 
considering the risk that those with disempowering agendas may adopt (or co-
opt) initiatives that serve their purposes (Rahman, 1995). I contended that that 
these considerations should be of grave concern to social marketers dipping their 
toes into the turbulent waters of participatory methodologies. 
What I had not realised at the time that what I secretly worried was a pretence of 
empowerment could actually be better described as a very convincing 
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performance. So convincing, I think, that many ‘empowerers’ have even 
convinced themselves. 
But arising out of my reflective writing about the project were other things that 
could also be constructed as performative; as well as empowerment, there was a 
performance of control and perhaps even a performance of legitimacy 
(exemplified by the need to design a conventional form of evaluation in order to 
satisfy the need to ‘prove’ that the project had achieved its ‘outcomes’). 
Performativity is a term that has come to be associated closely with feminist 
scholar Judith Butler, who characterises it essentially as “fabrications 
manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive 
means” (Butler, 1999, p. 173). She goes on to suggest that if the gendered body 
(the subject of her analysis) is performative, “it has no other ontological status 
apart from the various acts which constitute its reality” (ibid.). 
However, performativity could simply be another way of looking at the 
phenomenon in the last section that I characterised as resistance through 
illusion; for example in the project, these illusions were related to the hegemony 
of neoliberal managerialist control. As Davies explains: 
“In	  speaking	  ourselves	  into	  existence	  as	  academics,	  within	  neoliberal	  discourse,	  we	  
are	  vulnerable	  to	  it	  and	  to	  its	  indifference	  to	  us	  and	  to	  our	  thought.	  It	  can	  become	  
the	  discourse	  through	  which	  we,	  not	  quite	  out	  of	  choice	  and	  not	  quite	  out	  of	  
necessity,	  make	  judgements,	  form	  desires,	  make	  the	  world	  into	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  
(neoliberal)	  place.”	  (2005,	  p.	  1).	  
But really, this theoretical perspective suggests that more could be happening 
than simply an alternative nomenclature to the types of resistance I identified in 
myself during the course of the project and latterly, writing this thesis. It can be 
argued that Butler’s theories of performativity and subversion could in fact 
present an alternative lens to the theme of resistance I elucidated in the previous 
section. This would be the case if I were to conceptualise the system against 
which I identified my own resistance (composed of public health commissioning, 
social marketing dogma and positivistic notions of research) as neoliberal 
hegemony, as Davies evidently does. So rather than managing managerialism by 
playing along, as theorised earlier in this chapter, am I actually performing it, and 
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thus making it tangible? This question of the individual’s role in performing, or 
indeed resisting, neoliberalism or any other ideology is explored in the final two 
chapters.   
6.17. Concluding	  comments	  
When I wrote in the introduction to this chapter that my thesis seems to have 
become “a multi-layered study of a method within a method within a method” I did 
not think that I would end here, with a thesis that, at its core, is about things that 
are hidden, tacit, taken for granted; about underlying structures that govern and 
influence how we judge people and information and how these translate into the 
actions we take, that is concerned as well about my own academic identity, my 
place in the world. I have arrived at this point via the notion of negative space, 
which seems to me to stand alone as valid in and of itself, particularly in relation 
to action research projects where the process is not mapped out at the start. In 
contrast, the other themes seem to be concerned less with the role of 
participatory methods in public health and more with finding an identity for myself, 
finding my place among competing structures and ideas.  
My themes of legitimacy, resistance and performativity are concerned with the 
sort of projects I want to work on and how they can be done ethically, so that as 
academic researchers we work against exploiting people, stealing their stories or 
treating marginalised groups as ‘other’. This involves some difficulty when they 
are funded by public health because of the positivistic and managerial 
hegemony; the thesis tells the story of this difficulty, this conflict, between that 
system and me. The conclusions and contributions to knowledge about social 
marketing practice that I articulate in the next chapter represent sites of conflict 
from which seems to be emerging strong beliefs about what we can claim to 
know, which I am reasonably comfortable with; and my disciplinary identity, which 
I am not; some broader implications and nascent contributions are explored in 
the final chapter, along with the usual reflections and assessment of the study’s 
limitations.   
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Chapter	  7: In	  which	  I	  go	  back	  to	  the	  beginning	  
 “What do you mean by “If you really are a Queen”? What right have 
you to call  yourself  so? You can’t  be a Queen, you know, t i l l  you’ve 
passed the proper examination. And the sooner we begin i t ,  the better” 
(The Queen, Through the Looking-glass and what Alice Found There, 
p. 70/1). 
The sort of telescope I had in mind for my metaphor is called a Galilean 
telescope, which is of the refracting type. Refracting telescopes are optical 
telescopes that consist of two lenses connected by a tube. The objective lens is 
convex, the eyepiece is concave and the tube needs to hold the two lenses the 
right distance apart so that the eye can focus on the magnified image the system 
produces. But because the point of focus lies inside the instrument and the eye 
cannot be placed there, it has to be placed as close to the ocular lens as 
possible, thus restricting the field of view (The Penguin Dictionary of Physics, 
2009). But when you turn a refracting telescope around and look through the 
objective lens into the ocular lens, things that once seemed very familiar (like 
how far away your own feet are when you look down at them) now appear 
strange and distant. Writing this thesis, for me, has been like turning the 
telescope around. My thinking has changed from an external but narrow focus on 
critiquing social marketing as a social change technique to asking some very 
searching questions about how I want to define myself as an academic and what 
sort of research I feel I ought to conduct. Consequently these concluding 
chapters feel like the start of a new approach for me. What can I claim to have 
contributed to knowledge? What do I have to show for these last 18 months of 
writing? What will happen when I turn the telescope back and look outwards 
through the ocular lens again? What will be my focus?  
I aim to explore these questions through two different forms of writing 
(Richardson, 1997) in which I attempt consciously to show as well as tell. There 
are two characters (Richardson and Lockridge, 1991) in this piece of writing; I am 
both of them. Through the objective lens, in this chapter, I write as I have been 
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taught to write, following disciplinary convention, telling how the findings of my 
autoethnography challenge and develop existing theory in the discipline in which 
I began: social marketing. Through the ocular lens, in Chapter 8, I show in more 
experimental forms of writing how each aspect has challenged and changed me, 
as a researcher, and explore what I want to do with this new consciousness.  
In previous sections, I have said that my aim in this thesis is to critique and 
reconstruct the ways in which language, discourses and power relations are not 
typically acknowledged in conventional positivistic, ‘evidence based’ modes of 
commissioning, implementing and evaluating social marketing initiatives, 
particularly when asymmetric power relations are obviously present, as with 
interventions in deprived neighbourhoods. In this Chapter I draw upon my four 
themes of negative space, legitimacy, resistance and performativity to argue the 
following conclusions: that social marketers may use language to reinforce an 
assumed consensus of a paternalistic interpretation of social good, which draws 
its authority from the perceived legitimacy of the speaker; that politics and 
ideology are manifested in the discourses of social marketing and, related to this, 
that social marketing in turn may be deployed ideologically and finally, I discuss 
the consequences of erasing the social marketer themselves, the wielder of the 
tool, from the process through the language we use. I close by synthesising 
these points into the literature on social marketing ethics, generally and, with 
more confidence, specifically in in relation to the idea that increasing participation 
can be a solution to the ethical dilemma of how to articulate a definition of the 
social good. 
7.1. The	  authority	  of	  princes	  
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
“it  means just what I choose i t  to mean - neither more nor less” 
(Through the Looking-glass and what Alice Found There, p. 46).   
In their 2011 book, French, Merritt and Reynolds claim that “the words matter 
less than the application of the principles” (p. 13), which they consider to be the 
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use of a finite set of concepts in a systematic process defined by learning and 
evaluation, aiming towards the social good via focus on specific behavioural 
objectives (see also section 2.1). In other literature, social marketing has been 
described in similar terms, as a toolbox, technique or technology (Hastings and 
Domegan, 2014; Andreasen, 1994; Hastings, MacFadyen and Anderson, 2000) 
or a process (Lee and Kotler, 2011; French and Blair-Stevens, 2010; Kotler, 
Roberto and Lee, 2002). 
One consequence of this particular construction of social marketing as, 
essentially, a neutral instrument (Dann, 2007) is that the language and related 
assumptions are allowed to drift along largely unexamined (Wymer, 2011; 
Brennan, Voros and Brady, 2011; Brenkert, 2002). And yet as someone who 
thinks that knowledge is socially constructed, I cannot but assume that underlying 
assumptions there are. One of the biggest, in my opinion, is the belief that people 
in academic or public service roles, those people with significant claims to 
legitimacy who believe that they are working towards social good, must 
automatically be working towards the social good. But why does their opinion 
count the most? What gives them the right to decide what the legitimate version 
of social good is? The people in Parkhood and Urbanwood didn’t get a voice in 
the debate about what the social good for their neighbourhood might look like, or 
at least they didn’t get a voice on their own terms.  
There are strong parallels here with the international development practices 
discussed in Chapter 3: in that example, Western ideals of what it meant to be a 
‘developed’ nation were imposed on other cultures felt to be ‘developing’. In the 
case of social marketing, it could be argued that people from relatively privileged 
backgrounds are guilty of a similar degree of false consciousness, of assuming 
that everybody should aspire to share their own ideas of what is best; ideas 
which are, it could be argued, “culturally and geographically contingent 
phenomena that should not be uncritically subscribed to or exported throughout 
the globe” (Tadajewski and Brownlie, 2008, p. 2). But, like in the preface to this 
thesis when I described a very enlightening conversation about differing ideas of 
what it meant to be a good parent in different contexts, I argue that individual 
subjectivities mean that ‘social good’ is likely to have a different meaning for 
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different people and further, that some versions are likely to be judged more 
legitimate than others. This is an issue that has received surprisingly little 
attention among social marketers, with only one conference paper engaging 
explicitly with it (Lindridge, 2012).  
To acknowledge subjectivities is not to say that social marketers have no concern 
with ethics, an issue that is expanded upon later in this chapter, but that its 
evident functionalist underpinnings have led to an unchallenged assumption that 
there is “a unity of interest among members of social systems” (Boje, 2001, p. 
357), i.e. this assumption of a universal ‘social good’ towards which we all work. 
With some notable exceptions (e.g. Gerard Hastings’ stinging critique of 
corporate dominance, 2013; Lefebvre’s ongoing interest in the TMA) and 
acknowledgement of contextual issues like health inequality, social marketing 
doesn’t appear to hold as a foundational premise that there is something wrong 
with the status quo per se, at least not in the same way that orientations 
underpinned by critical theory do. Indeed, it has been argued that social 
marketing is a neat ideological fit with activities of organisations like the World 
Bank and the IMF, whose “literature extols the multiple virtues of the private 
sector’s ability to reach target communities more efficiently than state services to 
change the presumably harmful health behaviors of the poor” (Pfeiffer, 2004, p. 
78). But as described in section 3.8, these corporate inspired, Western 
development policies have not been without their problems, not least among 
them that they haven’t always achieved the changes they promised. 
The strength with which we cling to the idea of a unified perspective is still 
apparent. Examples include the TMA, which is predicated upon privileged groups 
knowing what is fair and just; libertarian paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), 
which embraces this idea almost gleefully; and in the debates about whether 
commercial organisations have a role in promoting social change (see Wood, 
2012, for a review; also Beall et al., 2012; Gordon, 2011). This largely 
unexamined construct of a universal ‘social good’ stands in contrast to explicitly 
critical approaches, such as Freire’s conscientização, Denzin and Lincoln’s call 
for “critical conversations about democracy, race, gender, class, nation states, 
globalization, freedom and community” (2005, p. 3), activist scholars like 
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Chatterton’s open allegiance to “global justice” movements (Chatterton, 2008, p. 
424) and, closer to home, critical marketers (see Tadajewski, 2010, for an 
extensive review). The contrast I perceive comes not from the assumption that 
these perspectives have espoused worthier versions of the social good, merely 
that the underpinnings of all three have been articulated more fully and, more 
importantly I would argue, more critically; acknowledging subjectivity.  
A counter argument made by some of my colleagues is that more explicitly 
principled approaches like those identified above may make their practitioners 
“feel good” (Spotswood et al., 2011, p. 167) but such philosophies struggle to 
achieve their goals. And as outlined in Chapter 3, participatory and critical 
scholars do struggle with the problem of disconnection between emancipatory 
knowledge and actual social change. Social marketing’s “practical realism” (ibid.), 
on the other hand, leads proponents to consider any ethical technique with 
evidence of effectiveness (Gordon, 2011). When they and other social marketers 
write of ‘effectiveness’, Spotswood et al. (see also Helmig and Thaler, 2010; 
Stead et al., 2007; Truong, 2014) appear to mean whether the chosen technique 
has achieved the specific objectives it set out to achieve, not whether it has 
succeed in bringing about large scale social change. I expand upon this utilitarian 
understanding of ethical decision making later. But I can’t help but notice that this 
pragmatic argument shares similarities with Machiavelli’s notion that 
“…in	  the	  actions	  of	  all	  men,	  and	  most	  of	  all	  of	  Princes,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  tribunal	  to	  
which	  we	  can	  appeal,	  we	  look	  to	  results.	  Wherefore	  if	  a	  Prince	  succeeds	  in	  
establishing	  and	  maintaining	  his	  authority,	  the	  means	  will	  always	  be	  judged	  
honourable	  and	  be	  approved	  by	  every	  one”	  (Machiavelli,	  The	  Harvard	  Classics	  1909,	  
p.	  34).	  
Authority albeit constrained by the need to reach “a balance between our power 
to change people and the legitimate demands of ethical transparency” 
(Spotswood et al., p. 167).  
They probably don’t mean to imply that provided the objectives are set by the 
person with the most authority, achieving them will always be judged 
‘honourable’. So what might these concerns over the legitimacy and authority of 
social marketers and their funders mean in the context of this study? It would 
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seem outlandish to suggest that an intervention that persuaded people in a 
deprived neighbourhood to drink less alcohol could be anything other than for the 
social good, both for the people concerned and for a society that would otherwise 
foot the bill for the costs of their health and social care. Could it? And yet, 
drinking was so bound up with structural inequality that individual behaviour 
change, unaccompanied by significant social and political transformation, was an 
utterly unrealistic goal (Collins, 2014), which would explain why I spent so much 
energy on resisting this narrowly behavioural focus throughout the project. Given 
this assertion, I find myself wondering whether spending relatively small amounts 
of money here and there with a positivistic focus on measurable behaviour 
change objectives, helpful as they might be to those who wish to prove social 
marketing’s effectiveness quantitatively (Truong, 2014) and consistent as they 
are with  ‘evidence based’ (Killoran et al., 2012) approaches, could be considered 
wasteful and demeaning to a ‘target audience’ subject to such significant 
structural constraint. Wasting public money and demeaning the target audience 
do not sound socially desirable to me. In fact I do not think that the money was 
wasted or the target audience demeaned in the case described here, but this 
outcome was only avoided because of the considerable efforts put into 
stakeholder relationships and the genuine desire to adhere to participatory 
principles (which is not without its own issues, as outlined in Chapter 3). And the 
good fortune that other, better funded and longer-term development initiatives 
took the reins when we ran out of time, of course. Nothing inherent in the social 
marketing process was responsible. 
In conclusion then, social marketers have argued that they are well placed to 
address the deficiencies of commercial marketing (Kotler and Zaltman, 1971; 
Hastings, 2007; 2013), but have perhaps neglected to turn this critical lens upon 
themselves (Tadajewski and Brownlie, 2008), in particular upon social 
marketing’s legitimacy and authority to claim to be working towards a 
functionalist-derived uncritical consensus of the social good. It seems that words 
may matter, after all.  
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7.2. Speaking	  into	  existence	  
Taking up the challenge offered in the previous section might be one way to 
articulate a contribution to knowledge from this thesis. Attempting to remedy 
Tadajewski and Brownlie’s concerns by turning a critical lens on social marketing; 
asking what if, instead of being defined as a neutral process or a tool, social 
marketing were to be thought of as a methodology or orientation towards social 
change, similar to the way that participatory research is conceptualised? If social 
marketing were to be retheorised as something with epistemological and political 
significance in and of itself, then a number of underlying assumptions would be 
subject to scrutiny and constructive critique. 
As explained previously at length, much of the social marketing literature is 
concerned with evidence for effectiveness; application of behavioural models 
developed with positivistic underpinnings. Consequently, according to Guba and 
Lincoln’s (2005) typology, a social marketing orientation, whether drawing upon 
participatory methods or not, seems to correlate to an understanding of a single 
reality that is real and perfectly (or imperfectly) apprehensible, findings that are 
true (or probably true), a strong preference for quantitative methods in a search 
for cause effect links, facts and verifiable laws. Knowledge is accumulated like 
“building blocks adding to the edifice” (p. 196) and judged using conventional 
criteria like validity (Brennan, Voros and Brady, 2011), reliability and objectivity. 
The social marketer is a “disinterested scientist” (Guba and Lincoln, 2005, p. 196) 
whose work informs policymakers; a tool wielded by Princes (those with the 
authority to set objectives and the funds to pay for an intervention). It is assumed 
that personal values, politics and ideology are thus removed from the knowledge 
presented to the world and the results of the intervention. 
But it has been argued, probably because of social marketing’s positioning as a 
neutral, scientific, pragmatic process, that social marketers “may be used by an 
unjust system to protect itself from challenge” (Brenkert, 2002, p. 21). For 
example, in the context of the UK Coalition Government’s public health policy, 
which promotes personal responsibility and privileges individual and corporate 
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freedom (Department of Health, 2010), commercial organisations are to be 
encouraged to use their resources and creative capabilities to tackle lifestyle 
diseases. However, as the British Medical Association (2012) points out, there is 
an obvious conflict of interest in allowing organisations that profit from unhealthy 
behaviours to assume any responsibility for public health policy. Undoubtedly, 
there will be a temptation for organisations that rely on the purchase of alcoholic 
beverages for their livelihood to protect that livelihood, thus there is a risk that a 
system that facilitates risky drinking will be perpetuated rather than challenged 
(see also Rahman, 1995 and Chapter 3 for analogous issues in the International 
Development literature).  
Thus I would argue that while an individual social marketing intervention may be 
designed according to positivistic principles of objectivity and neutrality within 
itself, politics and ideology are present in the wider context nonetheless; 
especially now that some social marketers are arguing that they should cast off 
their humble tool-like status in favour of a seat at “the top policy and strategy 
development table when social interventions are being conceived” (French, J, 
personal communication 08 May 2014). These interventions are activities that 
aim to influence “the behaviour of citizens in relation to important activities… 
which are politically defined” (Raftopoulou and Hogg, 2010, p. 1209). This is 
particularly concerning given recent examples where social marketing has been 
deployed in ways that are overtly political; for example, anti-immigration (Elkin, 
2007) and promotion of American values to Muslim people (Klein, 2002).  
Consistent with the argument presented above, politics are present in all four of 
my themes, which were developed from a project that was, ostensibly, social 
marketing: politics and power dynamics were present in negative space, 
delineated as it was by which voices were heard and which were shut out, in 
which ideas were acted upon and which rejected. They were present in 
legitimacy, again of voice and of outcome: in the observation that whether an 
individual’s views were heard depended upon whom they were and the perceived 
authority of their position. In the way that I could identify my own personal 
resistance to the positivistic hegemony of conventional approaches to social 
marketing and public health more generally and in the way that I could identify 
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and critique what all too often appears to be a performance of empowerment and 
a performance that the process was under control. Taken together, these four 
themes represent what might be called ‘internal’ and ‘external’ politics, politics 
within the project and in its wider context.  
Social marketers are also concerned with the politics of their own survival, with 
pleas to stop arguing over definition and instead concentrating on ‘proving’ 
(there’s that positivistic underpinning again) social marketing’s value to 
policymakers (Wood, 2012) and carving out a space between other disciplines 
(Andreasen, 2002). Calls to “build on the success of the field to date” and 
“aggressively market and promote the proven value of social marketing” (Beall et 
al., 2012, p. 111) appear to be mounting. An upcoming conference will aim to 
“showcas[e] examples of good practice and debat[e] how social marketing can be 
further developed in Europe” (World Social Marketing Conference, 2014). Social 
marketers worry about ‘brand competition’ from other behaviour change 
techniques, such as health promotion, enter-educate programs (Piotrow and 
Coleman, 1992) and more recently, behavioural economics (Dibb and Carrigan, 
2013), which are perceived by some social marketers as threats. There are some 
significant exceptions, social marketers who argue in favour of a multidisciplinary 
approach (Collins, 2014; Spotswood, Unpublished); but there is also jostling for 
recognition and status for social marketing, which sits uneasily, in my mind, with 
the rhetoric of ‘the social good’.  
If I am to define social marketing as an inherently political activity, one significant 
question relates to its legitimacy as such. In previous chapters, I chose to define 
the idea of legitimacy by drawing upon political science as a “belief in the 
rightness of the decision or the process of decision making” (Dahl, 2013, p. 46). I 
identified four occasions upon which something might undergo a conscious or, 
more likely, subconscious weighing up of its legitimacy: The first type was a 
conclusion; the question of who gets to claim knowledge of something; of who 
gets to be believed. The second type was a decision, to take a particular course 
of action, to allow something to happen or to react in a certain way should 
something happen. The third type was an action and the fourth a goal, an 
objective against which something would be judged. The latter is probably the 
Page 230 of 317 
most significant form of legitimacy to examine here, partly because of social 
marketing’s pragmatic and utilitarian underpinnings outlined in the previous 
section (that it is judged ‘good’ if it achieves its objectives) and partly because it 
is the objectives that are most likely to be politically significant. A directed review 
of the social marketing literature reveals no explicit recognition of the issue of 
legitimacy, though there is some general exploration of ethical issues, to which I 
will return in a moment. There are however a few references to the notion of 
legitimacy in the critical marketing literature.  
Marion (2006) links legitimacy with ideology, pointing out that two broad 
interpretations of ideology exist: the first a Marxist interpretation, which has 
ideology as “set of illusory beliefs and a ‘false consciousness’ by which the ruling 
class maintains its dominance over the working class” (p. 246). Under this 
interpretation, a marketing ideology has manipulated our culture into a 
consumerist one, largely to our detriment (see Ewen, 1988). And social marketing 
doesn’t look squeaky clean from this perspective either, largely because of the 
lack of acknowledgment of the political issues and subjectivities. However, social 
marketing’s underpinnings and vocabulary provide a significant clue as to its 
underlying ideology. “Social marketers are in the business of behaviour change” 
(Wood, 2012, p. 96, emphasis added). “Consumer behaviour is the bottom line” 
(Andreasen, 1995, p. 14, emphasis added). Such language indicates in the most 
basic sense that social marketers have taken, largely uncritically, the modernist, 
neoliberal ideology of market capitalism and translated it directly to the idea of 
social change. This interpretation appears to resonate strongly with the concerns 
I have identified throughout this thesis regarding the lack of awareness of the 
power dynamics inherent in the social marketing process (to name a few 
examples, issues of unacknowledged subjectivities linked to privilege, the 
legitimacy afforded to outsiders assumed to be objective and the protection 
afforded by an assumed consensus of the social good). I could conclude that 
social marketers subscribe to illusory beliefs about the goodness they are doing 
and false consciousness about their neutrality. More bravely, I could claim that 
social marketers prop up the power of an elite political class by helping to 
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legitimise, as cost effectively as possible, the blame attributed to less fortunate 
people for the social and economic structures that disadvantage them.  
Marion’s second interpretation of ideology is based upon the work of Louis 
Dumont, who conceptualises it as collective representation composed of an array 
of social phenomena, including social norms, values, beliefs, symbols and 
customs: a shared intellectual heritage and common understanding of the rules of 
the game. For marketing, the significance of this interpretation is that collective 
representations and shared beliefs about marketing forms one of three layers; 
the other two being marketing practice and marketing as a branch of knowledge. 
For social marketing, most thought has gone into the practice layer, very little into 
the epistemological or ideological layers. Which brings the discussion back to the 
same problem: the consequences of a lack of critical reflection upon the 
epistemological and ideological dimensions of social marketing. Drawing once 
again on the work of Bronwen Davies, it seems that social marketers are 
speaking and writing ourselves (themselves) into existence within neoliberal 
discourse (2005), without being aware that this is what is happening. False 
consciousness again: thinking that we are doing good when in fact we are 
unthinkingly helping to perpetuate an unfair system.  
This observation about social marketing’s political and ideological dimensions 
leaves me (and others who share my concerns) broadly with two options: either 
reject the discipline or seek to develop it somehow. I will address this question in 
the concluding chapters. 
7.3. Speaking	  louder	  than	  words	  
My observations about negative space in the previous chapter call to mind a brief 
conversation I had with an experienced and well-respected professor, after I had 
given an informal presentation of the project described in this thesis. Our 
discussion centred upon the degree of input researchers (or public health 
professionals) should seek to have in a participatory process. His view seemed to 
be that all the ideas should come from the participants. Mine was that the 
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process should be collaborative, with both ‘sides’ making contributions where 
they could, but with the researcher working to eschew their status as privileged 
knowledge producers. Previous sections have examined the context in which 
social marketing strategies are commissioned and judged; this section looks 
inwards, to the role of the social marketers themselves.  
Reflecting once again on the idea of negative space, it seems obvious to me that 
even if a researcher (or social marketer) intends to work in a fully participatory 
way, they still maintain considerable influence. Even if they try not to, they are 
still present; for one thing they have initiated the process, it would not have 
started without the catalyst of researcher or funder. The researcher is the one 
who knows what is supposed to happen, who understands the ‘spiral science’ of 
action research, who is aware of the arguments for participatory approaches. At a 
more prosaic level, the researcher tends to be the person who organises the 
events, books the venue. In the specific example of this project, it was the 
research team’s energy that drove the project forward and it was perhaps our 
interests and goals that decided where that energy was expended, what battles 
were worth fighting. In this project, the researcher’s voice seemed to carry a 
great deal of legitimacy and the researcher was the one who fronted the 
‘performance’ of participation and empowerment. The researcher was the person 
who resisted. 
On another level, a researcher working on a social change project might become 
more than involved; they might become active, even activist, in their contribution. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that during the course of the project Anna and I 
become advocates for the neighbourhoods; we saw and heard for ourselves how 
people felt trapped, abandoned. We were on their side; we wanted change. If we 
accept this argument that the researcher is always present and therefore always 
exerting some influence, then the discussions over what that influence might be 
and how it manifests itself becomes very important.  
As explained in the previous sections, social marketing is written about as a tool 
to be wielded, a game to play (Bloom and Novelli, 1981; Goldberg, 1995; 
Andreasen, 2012). All the emphasis is placed upon the puppets, the scenery and 
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the audience, with very little on the puppeteer and this reinforces once more the 
argument that at core, social marketing has taken much of its inspiration from 
positivistic paradigms. The absence of an embodied researcher (or social 
marketer) in that literature implies that it doesn’t matter who the researcher is, 
what they want, what they believe, because they are neutral, objective observers 
following a process. That because objectively observed behaviour change is the 
goal it doesn’t matter what goes on in the researcher’s mind, provided they follow 
the protocol. I think that this lack of acknowledgement of the role of the 
researcher (or social marketer) means that important questions about social 
marketing’s legitimacy and ideology are not being posed. Such scrutiny of the 
role of a researcher is known in the methodological literature as positionality (see 
Chapter 4), an idea that acknowledges the researcher’s position as a member of 
the social world under study (Anderson, 2006). But social marketers do more 
than simply study the world, they are active change agents and so also relevant 
here is the notion of the activist scholar. 
From the post-structuralist perspective I have adopted latterly, the researcher is 
never neutral, never detached from the research. And within this perspective, I 
would argue that the social marketer, like the activist scholars I discuss in 
Chapter 3, is never detached from their intervention. This question relates to 
epistemology, but it occurs to me that the role of the researcher, social marketer 
or activist will depend on what underlying theory of change is being relied upon. 
In social marketing, that theory of change is predominantly psychosocial theories 
of behavioural change, as I have explained in earlier chapters. These theories 
remove individual subjectivity from consideration and assume that provided the 
process is followed correctly, the researcher or social marketer will always be 
neutral and thus the outcome will be unaffected. Conversely, activism can be 
understood as a much broader spectrum of change, from rethinking social 
relations through to street demonstrations, including choosing to work on projects 
that align with the activist’s goals and beliefs about the sort of society they want 
to create. “Activism thus defined carries its own contradictions, as the committed 
activist makes choices about how much time, energy and emotion to commit to 
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social change; and as she attempts to manoeuvre the complex political currents 
through which social power is channelled” (Kobayashi, 2003, p. 346).  
7.4. A	  contribution	  in	  conscience	  
In much of this chapter so far, I have been critical of current social marketing 
thought and practice, albeit with the recognition that social marketers believe that 
they are doing good and seek to behave ethically in their work. In this section, I 
aim to show how the findings of my autoethnographic study contribute to the 
body of literature that seeks to help social marketers make more ethical 
decisions; generally and, with more confidence, specifically in in relation to the 
idea that increasing participation can be a solution to the ethical dilemma of how 
to articulate a definition of the social good (Andreasen, 1995; Brenkert, 2002).  
According to Smith (2001), in his introduction to one of the few books about 
ethics in social marketing, ethics is about making decisions. To elaborate, these 
considerations are the domain of normative applied ethics, which can be 
understood as the attempt to arrive at standards that will regulate right and wrong 
conduct and apply them to a particular situation or question (see Fieser, 2014). I 
argue that there is a broader perspective to be taken on how social marketers 
currently conceptualise and prioritise their normative ethics; one that links with 
the other findings described in this thesis. I synthesise the problems into two 
distinct yet linked categories: Firstly, the functionalist assumption outlined earlier 
in this chapter that everyone is working towards a known consensus of the social 
good, and that this mutually agreed upon and simply defined articulation of the 
social good is sufficient as a benchmark against which to decide whether the 
intervention is ethical. And secondly, Brenkert’s (2002) concern that social 
marketing bypasses the usual democratic processes of grassroots action and 
political discourse, and thus the people social marketers believe they are helping 
are in fact being stripped of their voice and rights to self-determination and 
participation.  
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Few critiques have engaged explicitly with the issue of who defines the social 
good for social marketers. Exceptions include Webster, who suggested, “the 
marketer who wishes to serve the public welfare must now bring his [sic] own 
personal values to bear on his [sic] professional decision making” (1975, p. 77); 
or Fox and Kotler (1980), who rely on legislative mandate to ensure social 
marketing programmes are working towards an uncontroversial, legitimate social 
good. I have argued that the social good is defined according to an assumed and 
normative consensus, a social contract (Friend, 2014), that citizens should obey 
the law, take care of their health and the environment and generally behave in 
ways that are socially responsible, consummate with current cultural mores. A 
consensus Brenkert (2002) has described as individual and social welfare. And I 
don’t think that many would argue against these abstract ideas of the social good 
per se; the problem arises, as has been discussed in previous sections, when 
this abstract idea of the social good is subject to insufficient critical analysis. One 
issue, for example, is the observation that this version of the social good is 
viewed from the perspective of those whose voices are conventionally regarded 
as legitimate, those with social power. As a consequence, Brenkert asserts, there 
is an asymmetric power relationship between social marketers and those they 
target; an assertion that this study supports and reinforces. 
There are different perspectives on the problem of how social marketers can 
evaluate whether they are comfortable that they are working towards an ethical 
interpretation of the social good in an ethical way; but most appear to ignore the 
asymmetry noted above. One way is to rely on the judgements of commissioners, 
as advised by (Fox and Kotler, 1980) or upon one’s own values, as 
recommended by (Webster, 1975). Another is to develop codes of ethical 
practice, which are intended to increase “awareness of ‘ethical moments’ and the 
chances that…decisions will be based on a social conscience that leads us to 
‘higher ground’” (Kotler, Roberto and Lee, 2002, p. 395). In 2009, a detailed 
report was prepared for the National Social Marketing Centre (NSMC), an 
organisation established in 2006 by the UK government (NSMC, 2010). This 
report reviewed the typical ethical dilemmas inherent in social marketing practice 
and proposed a draft code of ethics for social marketers. This code, like others 
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before it (Rothschild, 2001; Fishbein and Cappella, 2006; Laczniak and Murphy, 
1991) advises avoidance of harm, education and professional development of 
practitioners, equal and fair treatment for all involved, an assessment of suitable 
goals based on the greatest good for the greatest number, recognition of 
individual autonomy and choice and formalised ethics procedures; principles that 
appear to be based primarily in a utilitarian ethical framework. Like the 
frameworks developed to guide the decisions made by social researchers (see 
Chapter 4), these frameworks seem to concentrate primarily on avoiding causing 
harm, also described as unintended consequences, as a result of social 
marketing interventions and on making sure the benefits of those interventions 
are sufficient to outweigh any risk, rather than any wider social effects.  
Cho and Salmon (2007) identify several such unintended consequences of health 
communications campaigns. These include the potential for creating confusion or 
distress, desensitising people to health messages or creating a desire to rebel 
against them (as with the scorn with which ‘5-a-day’ messages were regarded in 
Parkhood and Urbanwood). For example, a recent study found that fear appeals 
in communications to counter domestic violence can have the unfortunate effect 
of encouraging men to think of domestic violence as less of a problem after the 
campaign than they did beforehand (Keller, Wilkinson and Otjen, 2010). In 
addition to these consequences for individual wellbeing or attitudes, Cho and 
Salmon identify broader societal consequences: culpability, or appearing to 
blame individual for structural problems (similar to the idea of victim blaming 
discussed at length in this thesis); and social reproduction, forming and enabling, 
in which existing knowledge and power structures are reinforced, to the detriment 
of marginalised groups. I suggest that the latter type of unintended consequence 
has received too little attention from social marketers, when compared to the 
utilitarian concerns of whether a particular intervention has achieved something 
deemed positive by the social marketer and those initiating the intervention 
(typically senior policymakers or individuals in the public sector).  
But while focusing exclusively on the symptoms of a social problem without 
considering structural factors could be argued to be unethical in itself, as I have 
discussed at length, doing the opposite presents ethical challenges as well. All 
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the themes described in the previous chapter are relevant: questions of 
legitimacy, how decisions are made, what voices are heard and which are 
silenced, who resists and against what, who is empowered and is this 
empowerment really empowering or just offering the trappings while the real 
power remains elsewhere. In so doing, social marketers lose claim to their mantle 
of objective, apolitical neutrality; their right to claim simply to be technicians 
(Brenkert, 2002, p. 21). And still, even when social marketers focus on the 
causes of social problems as well as their symptoms, follow ethical codes of 
behaviour and seek to sensitise themselves to and respond appropriately in what 
Kotler et al. term ethical moments (2002), this issue of asymmetry of power and 
privilege is likely to remain. Of course, this is a problem widely recognised in 
postmodern qualitative research and in participatory research, as outlined in 
some detail in Chapters 3 and 4. It could be argued that the sort of participation I 
sought to enable in Parkhood and Urbanwood represents progress for social 
marketing. To present a solution to these ethical questions represents another 
turn around the spiral, it is too significant an issue to be explored in depth here. 
Consequently, I will conclude this section and Chapter by noting areas of the 
literature that I think offer the potential for future scholarship in this area: these 
include McCormack’s notion of ethics as a “processual enactment of non-
representational processes” (2003, p. 489) rather than a function of 
predetermined code and Renold et al.’s (2008) ideas of reflexive praxis, which 
holds ethics as locally negotiated, dialogic and political. 
In this chapter, first I have explored the dominant construction of social marketing 
as an apolitical instrument that helps policymakers in their quest to achieve 
socially beneficial outcomes, under which construction there is an assumed 
consensus that there is a single social good that benefits all. I have highlighted 
the parallels between this perspective and that of Westernised ideas of 
international development, which has been subject to significant critique, 
primarily due to concerns over exploitation. I locate my own critique of social 
marketing in similar terms: that, unlike participatory research, the literature is 
limited in its acknowledgement of political and ideological factors, including social 
marketing’s legitimacy as an activity that I argue has political significance. 
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Further, I contend that that social marketers may be speaking and writing 
themselves into existence as a neoliberal discourse, assuming pragmatically that 
the ‘social good’ is the standard against which our activities are judged when 
really the only authority may be that of a Machiavellian Prince: an argument that 
circles around to equate good with the power to define objectives. And as well as 
speaking social marketing into existence in this way, social marketers may be 
speaking themselves out of the process, allowing once again important questions 
about power, politics and ideology to remain comfortably unasked.  
There is a danger though that in attempting to respond to these issues, social 
marketing draws upon the radical discourses of participation without challenging 
the underlying assumptions about neutral positionality and paternalistic 
assumptions of a consensus-based, unproblematic idea of a single social good. I 
argue that the solution to these issues is not to co-opt the language of 
participation, rather a reconceptualisation of the role of ethical frameworks in 
social marketing, drawing upon ideas from participatory and feminist research, 
could lead to decisions that are more critically informed. 
7.5. Concluding	  comments	  
 “…writ ing is precisely the very possibil i ty of change, the space that can 
serve as a springboard for subversive thought,  the precursory movement 
of a transformation of social  and cultural structures.” (Cixous, 1976, p. 
879). 
 
We sat on the spine jarringly unyielding leather sofas outside the meeting room, 
both of us noting the student sitting in our line of sight. He sported a vivid lime 
green knitted hat perched on the top of his head, incongruous with his formal 
business suit. As he became absorbed in the serious discussion that engaged 
him, he appeared to forget the hat’s jaunty, irreverent presence; his intense pose 
and expression better suited to his suit. It is a memory that makes me smile as I 
write. There wasn’t much to say while we waited; Yvette thought my viva voce 
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had gone well. She suspected that the examiners’ only real concern was that I 
had been too constrained in how I had articulated my contribution, that I had 
placed too much emphasis on content over praxis. She was right, as it turned out. 
We were called back into the room after twenty five phone fiddling, mindfully 
slow-breathing minutes to learn that I had been awarded a doctorate, subject to 
minor amends. The amends the examiners wanted included this postscript 
documenting the contribution that they had pushed for, teased out, during my 
defence.  
A number of times during the viva I had tried to argue that there were two 
separate things going on. Often brought to life with decisive hand gestures of 
division; or invisible circles drawn in the air simultaneously with the fingers of 
both hands; or space encased in two half closed fists: self and findings, method 
and writing, negative and positive space. But instead of two separate entities, the 
examiners saw in my responses to their questions an integrated whole comprised 
of three: a triangle, with inequality, identity and evocative writing at each corner. 
An integration that contributes to our understanding of social science and how 
social policy is enacted. Identity and the struggle to negotiate it are overt in the 
text from the beginning. My identity as an academic, that is. But tacit are other 
identities as well: oppressive and oppressed. Who listens, who speaks, who isn’t 
heard and who is, what’s in and what’s out? Increasingly for me these are 
questions of identity, and the struggles of the other characters in my story 
partially mimic my own: to work out who you are, who you want to be; to resist 
unwanted identities imposed by others. I wrestled with questions of identity 
through evocative, performative (Denzin, 2014) writing.  
Feminist philosopher Jean Harvey uses the term civilised oppression to refer to 
the “vast and deep” (1999, p. 3) injustices suffered by some groups, which she 
regards as a consequence of the unconscious assumptions of well intentioned 
people, supported by stereotype, bureaucracy and market mechanisms. I have 
shown in this work how behaviour change interventions, however participatory 
they purport to be, are founded on an edifice built at least partially around 
external imposition of identity and therefore may well entrench, rather than 
challenge, inequality. This entrenchment could be happening through 
Page 240 of 317 
reinforcement of stereotype; construction of excluded or problematic identities 
(from the interventionist’s perspective); or because interventions might operate in 
ways that could be interpreted by its targets as coercive control, punishment or 
removal of choice. We might imagine risky drinking as a problem to be solved; 
but for some, alcohol is a solace that they cannot imagine living without 
(Cameron and Jones, 1985). So like the jaunty green hat, the promise of 
empowerment is incongruous with the actuality.  
That’s two sides of the triangle reconciled, how does evocative or performative 
writing fit? To explain this I want to return to the metaphor described on page 
114: that scientific writing should be a clear pane of glass that does not obscure 
the categorised, organised truth beyond. Except, in common with post-
structuralist theories of knowledge, I do not think that writing does (or can) work 
like this. Instead, I argue that writing is more like a Hall of Mirrors than a 
flawlessly transparent window to the world beyond. When you stand in a Hall of 
Mirrors, you see a reflection of the world, which changes dramatically depending 
on how you are positioned. Similarly, when I write, I want readers to see a 
different reflection of the identities I am writing about, I want them to feel first and 
then to think what it might be like to stand by that person in the Hall and see how 
things look from there. This is a positionality that draws from feminist post-
structuralist ethnographers like Richardson and Ellis, as well as Fals-Borda’s 
conception of the “organic intellectual” (2001, p. 30); crafting written 
representations that may be liberatory rather than oppressive: advocacy through 
the amplification of the dangerous (Freire, 1970), challenging words of the 
oppressed. I take these ideas forward in the next and final chapter, an illegitimate 
text that attempts to combine theories of ethical writing with the contribution I 
present in this thesis.  
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Chapter	  8: In	  which	  I	  consider,	  what	  next?	  
 “I know who I WAS when I got up this morning, but I think I must 
have been changed several t imes since then.” (Alice, Alice’s Adventures 
in Wonderland, p 26).  
This chapter represents what Laurel Richardson might call a “text of illegitimacy” 
(1997, p. 137). I wanted to write it as the culmination of the PhD process, to push 
the boundaries of my own understanding of the way of knowing that writing can 
be. Originally, I wanted to write science fiction. To conceive of a parallel universe 
in which it wasn’t a source of power in discourse to be objective, a distanced and 
aloof observer and documenter of interesting facets of social life; rather it was 
unethical to be so. I located this difference in my feminist ideas: wondering what 
if women hadn’t been written out of social theory? What if instead they had 
dominated intellectual endeavour? How would things be, what would we believe 
about knowledge and truth, in that world? When might the turning points have 
occurred (they would have to be relatively recent because otherwise the 
structures of oppression that prompted feminist theorising wouldn’t have been 
there to stimulate it)? What if…  
But quite quickly I realised that constructing an entire fictional universe to tackle 
major epistemological debates like these would take a great deal more time than 
I had available to me, and as with anything that attempts to break with 
convention, it has to break it while at the same time being very, very good. So 
while I haven’t abandoned entirely the idea of academic science fiction, the idea 
was consigned to the future. Instead, inspired by an exercise I undertook with 
author Sarah LeFanu and my nascent creative writing group, I have adopted a 
lexicographical format for my illegitimate text. 
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A 
Action. I am left with the vaguely uncomfortable feeling that nobody really knows 
exactly how all this action, this social change, this transformation that is all 
over the literature is actually enacted. In order of appearance, orthodox 
social marketers imagine a rational assessment of advantages and 
disadvantages followed by willingness (or not) to participate in an 
exchange. Communitarians envisage strong, supportive communities and 
systems perspective advocates imagine fairer markets. Participatory 
researchers write of knowledge for social transformation, but acknowledge 
the problem with the underlying mechanics; feminist post-structuralist 
participatory researchers hope that subjectivity and personal 
transformation might hold the answer. Autoethnographers write of 
stimulating emotion in their readers that will provoke them to curiosity, 
reflection and change. Activists write of being the change they want to 
see, and I think that this is the closest that any of the groups come to 
identifying how their philosophy of change actually works. Overall, theories 
of change and actual real life change appear to be disconnected.  
Activism. One consequence of these 300-odd pages of writing has been that I 
am inclined now to redefine myself as an activist scholar. This, I think, 
brings together the disparate elements of this thesis and hints at an 
underdeveloped yet potentially more significant contribution: linking the 
epistemological work of Richardson, Ellis at al., with the ideas of Freire 
and Fals-Borda and Ruddick’s “undertow of biography that pulls us 
towards one issue or another” (2004, p. 229). I find myself asking the 
question, can we (should we) use the legitimacy conferred on academics 
through our status as scholars to tell “advocacy tales” (Van Maanen, 2010, 
p. 19)? Is there a niche among all this scholarship for explicitly 
participatory and evocative writing as activism? 
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Backwards. Throughout the writing, I have wrestled with the problem of how to 
preserve the authenticity of the research process. I think that one 
significant way that this sort of research can be judged (the validation 
procedures, to borrow the language used in my institution’s guidelines for 
doctoral students) is to lay bare the process by which the final, honed 
contribution was constructed. If I had followed this conviction fully, rather 
than compromising somewhat for the convention of a PhD thesis, this 
document might well be different. Chapter 4, with its story of my journey 
from the spirals of action research to post-structuralist autoethnography, 
via reflective practice and emancipatory action research, would have been 
the first I would have presented. Followed by Chapters 5 and 6. In this 
order, my thesis would have been a story of searching for a methodology 
that could make sense of a practice already completed, a reinterpretation 
of that practice and a theorising about it. Only then would I have wanted to 
write about participatory research and activism. My writing about social 
marketing would have been very different then, I think. I would have 
wanted to take a broader perspective on UK public policy about 
deprivation and health, situating the increasing interest in communities 
and their capacity in an overtly political context. And so the dizzying spiral 
continues. 
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C 
Contribution. Mindful of the requirement to conduct enquiry that leads to 
creation and interpretation of new knowledge and to communicate and 
justify an independent judgement of issues in the field (Institutional 
Doctoral Guidelines, 2014), articulating and situating a contribution to 
knowledge has been on my mind throughout the writing of this thesis. As I 
said in the methodology chapter, my thesis holds that methods of 
intervention design that use the language of participation and 
empowerment are associated theoretically, linguistically and ethically with 
participatory research methodologies and that this heritage brings both 
opportunity and responsibility to the practitioner, particularly when working 
with disempowered groups. So what can I offer the responsible practitioner 
who wants to use participatory methods and call them social marketing (or 
vice versa)? I would suggest that if you know what the outcome is likely to 
be before you begin, you should not call what you are doing participatory. 
And if you do not already know the outcome, you should be ready to trust 
the process and prepare yourself and your collaborators for a reasonable 
amount of discomfort along the way. I would say be honest with 
participants and do not make promises you are not certain you can keep. 
Continually reflect upon yourself, your assumptions and whether what you 
are doing is ethical, because it will probably not turn out the way you think 
it will. Embrace failures. Realise that, like any sort of genuine social 
process, participation takes time and requires you to give as well as to 
receive. Recognise that you are not doing people a favour by turning up in 
their neighbourhood and expecting them to fall in with your plans. 
Appreciate that if you are successful in stimulating participation, you 
cannot expect people simply to forget about the work and move on when 
you do. It is your project; it is their life.   
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D 
Development. One of the things I liked about the notions of reflective practice 
discussed earlier was the idea that researchers could seek explicitly to 
develop in their practices, as well as their knowledge. I have certainly 
developed in my knowledge, but now feel motivated to ask myself what I 
would do differently in the future; how I have developed in my practice. My 
first thought is a relatively personal one: I would not agree to take on a 
significant project like the one described in this thesis and call it 
participatory. I have come to the conviction that participatory research is 
founded upon the notion of consciousness raising and thus transformative 
upon the individuals that are involved, not upon an entire neighbourhood. 
That’s not to say that individuals cannot or should not play a leading role in 
co-designing public health interventions, but these interventions shouldn’t 
be constructed as participatory because they are unlikely to be 
underpinned by the discovery of self-knowledge or raised consciousness 
of oppression. So if they are not participatory, what are they? Calling them 
co-designed is probably helpful, as this allows for other theories of social 
change to be brought to bear. Another way in which I have developed in 
my practice as a researcher is via a changed perspective upon my 
professional life: everything appears as ethnography now. I keep a daily 
journal, which is part field note and part autobiographic reflection. I 
envisage that any future research projects will attract this dual focus.  
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E 
Empowerment is a word much misused, I think. The World Bank, much 
criticised by participatory researchers like Bill Cooke, define empowerment 
as “the process of increasing the capacity of individuals or groups to make 
choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and 
outcomes” (2011, p. 1). It seems to me that this word, as my friend Sadie 
described in Chapter 6, has become a buzzword, something that people 
claim to be doing because they want to imagine people empowered as a 
result of their work, rather than because people actually are. I experienced 
this in a meeting recently with the representative of a corporate social 
responsibility scheme, who spoke of ‘empowering’ a marginalised group 
through an activity. I challenged this, asking what power this group were 
actually being given, what capacity? What decisions could they now make, 
with this new power that they had? Everyone around the table reflected for 
a moment and then the representative agreed that they often used the 
term without thinking through what and how the actual empowerment 
would be.  
 
G 
Geography. Who knew? So much interesting work is happening under the rubric 
of a discipline closely associated (in my mind anyway) with eccentric 
teachers in corduroy trousers and checked shirts waxing enthusiastically 
about the evolution of farming and the Duke of Edinburgh award scheme.  
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Journal. I found keeping a personal research journal valuable both as a record 
for how ideas develop and a source of new ideas. This observation 
prompts me to wonder whether academic journals serve the same 
purpose in a collaborative way or whether they have come to represent the 
ultimate driver of what has been conceived as academic exploitation, i.e. 
taking the contributions and stories of participants and benefiting from 
them personally. I was going to write about this in my fictional viva, 
through the medium of Ada. Ada was a character I developed; a teenager 
with a quiet calm expression, she would have spoken in very precise way, 
suggesting that English may be a second language. She would have 
wanted to explore the link between consciousness raising and actually 
making some sort of real difference. She would have wanted to know how 
I justify what I have contributed via this study. I envisaged her saying: “you 
know that what is important is what difference you have made to people’s 
lives, not what you might be able to publish in one of your journals. That is 
for you and your academic friends, if you think it will be empowering for 
your community to share your findings according to their cultural norms. Of 
course, that is a very worthwhile aim for you. But it is not relevant for us.” 
In this way I wanted to highlight the way that culturally appropriate 
dissemination is spoken about as a necessary yet ultimately less valuable 
form of dissemination than that which is affected by publishing in high-
ranking journals.  
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L 
Limitations. If I had known when I began the participatory project that I was also 
going to be studying the process as well as implementing it, I may well 
have been able to go further than what amounts to a number of critically 
informed questions about social marketing. Drawing more deeply on 
feminist post-structuralist thinking, I could have framed more specific 
questions about language and inequality and health policy in the UK. With 
this hindsight, the research presented here would have been closer to 
ethnographic, perhaps one of Richardson’s (1997) collective stories; rather 
than the autoethnographic retrospective that I present here. Another 
alternative could have been fully textual; using discourse analysis to 
understand how power relations were negotiated throughout the project 
would have been very interesting, for example.  
Commenting on this draft, Tim pointed out that another limitation of my 
approach is likely to be that it is not very fundable. He is, as ever, right: 
this type of research does not add much to an evidence base for public 
health intervention, it is incompatible with the pragmatic rhetoric of “what 
works” (Perkins et al., 2010, p. 101). A public health funder would no 
doubt be astonished to receive an application for an autoethnographic 
critique of their policy. Tim asked if I think it is better to secure funding than 
not, accepting all the limitations and biases I have discussed. The answer 
to this question could be very long. In brief however, my reflections centre 
on two issues: firstly, the ethical criteria I would now apply to the sorts of 
projects for which I will seek funding (and to decide whether to accept an 
offer of funding if approached) are more refined. And secondly, it seems 
feasible to design projects that are both ethically informed and likely to be 
funded, and simultaneously to study and critique those projects as I have 
done in this thesis. The challenge with this approach would centre on the 
ethicality of such critiques and whether eventually I would alienate myself 
from funders.  
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Memory. As Coffey writes, this project has been about “experiencing and 
remembering; ordering and giving frameworks to [my] memories” (1999, p. 
127). One of the limits of this piece of work, in contrast to a more 
conventional ethnography of either Parkhood and Urbanwood themselves 
or of the project, is that it relies heavily on my recollections to interpret the 
data. On the other hand, the filter of memory, or perhaps hindsight, has 
been a helpful lens through which to regard the project. 
Marketing. Probably isn’t the solution to society’s problems. Sorry.  
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P 
Performance. The theoretical construct of a performance and its implications are 
an area for further research. In the context of commercial marketing, 
Tadajewski and Brownlie (2008) conceptualise performative marketing as 
that which is in the “sole interest of developing knowledge to enable 
marketing managers to maximise the sales of goods or services with 
minimal expenditure” (p. 9, emphasis in original). This does not seem 
related to Butler’s ideas about performance in relation to gender and 
heteronormativity; speaking of the gendered body, she states that “acts 
and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create the illusion of an 
interior and organizing gender core, an illusion discursively maintained for 
the purposes of regulation of sexuality within the obligatory frame…” 
(Butler, 1999, p. 173). To me, the latter is closer to what seems to happen 
in participatory projects when we create a discourse of empowerment; we 
are using words and gestures (for example, co-design events) which enact 
the idea that participants are being given power to influence the process, 
but there is a lack of critical engagement with the extent to which they 
really can do so. Rather than performing gender to regulate sexuality, we 
are performing grassroots engagement to legitimise and regulate the 
power of policymakers to define the issues and their solutions. This notion 
requires further study. 
Process. It’s probably the only thing you can trust. 
Positionality. I seem to have developed a relatively novel sort of positionality for 
myself in this thesis, based on issues that a researcher cares about and 
can sustain a personal interest in and energy for. A connection with 
feminist research once again, in the observation that second wave 
feminists sought to redefine power as energy, strength, motivation and 
successful mobilisation of resources for oneself and others (Maguire, 
2001). 
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R 
Responsibility. I can conclude that a useful addition to ethical codes for any 
participatory intervention is one based on the idea of responsibility. As 
explored in Chapter 3, researchers and participants can build up quite 
close links, which can be hard to let go once the project has come to an 
end. In addition to this observation however, I would note that in a 
deprived neighbourhood, the promise of empowerment and change that 
can be made by the rhetoric of participatory interventions can reinforce a 
climate of resignation founded in hopes raised and dashed; caused by the 
sheer number of well meaning initiatives that are started and then have to 
end for one reason or another (often cuts to funding or other political 
changes). While I was aware of this problem right from the start of the 
project, as I report in several chapters, I don’t think I really understood its 
extent, nor the challenges in surmounting it. If participatory inclined 
researchers are good at their jobs, they will awaken something in the 
people they work with, that is the point. And unless they plan to stay and 
personally oversee work in that neighbourhood for a long time, they cannot 
personally guarantee that the hopes they have helped nurture will not be 
left to wither away. So, what to do? In my experience of the participatory 
work I have done, there are two possibilities, one better than the other. 
The less ideal option is to make sure that a permanently employed 
individual has a leading role in the work; this person provides sustained 
interest and support after the research project ends. Better, though, would 
be to work with participants to secure their own funding and management, 
so that the neighbourhood really controls any legacy. Both have their 
issues, but both are better than simply waving goodbye at the end of a 
participatory project, taking empowerment with you.  
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Self. As we construct ourselves as academics and researchers, we are carving 
our minds into the instrument that does our work, through reading, 
reflecting, writing and experiencing the worlds we aim to study. We read 
and we think and we experience and we write so as to add something to 
the body of knowledge that constitutes our disciplines and our lives. We do 
this so that we can continue to build up our faculties, so that we can 
engage with a bigger and more complicated picture; and thus continue to 
make more and better contributions to knowledge. When musing in this 
direction, I often wonder why it is such an effort to cast aside the positivist 
inspired thinking patterns: is it because this is how we are trained to think, 
like scientists, designing a fair test, doing every measurement three times 
and taking an average? Or is it because this way of thinking about the 
world, as something real and tangible and out there that everyone can see 
in the same way (your grass is green too, right?) comes naturally to us as 
humans and other epistemological perspectives take effort to attain? 
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Z 
Zeal. I perceive a danger that, in revelling in the opportunity to critique social 
marketing (and by extension social marketers) that I become divorced 
from the messy reality in which they practice and forget that they are 
intelligent, civic minded people doing work that in many cases is of 
significant social value. As part of my attempt to write my fictional viva, I 
noted down the following dialogue between my examiners and I. An 
examiner begins: “So your colleagues, these Social Marketers you keep 
referring to. Who are they? Are they bad people?” I reply, “No, they’re not 
bad. They believe they are doing good, important work.” The examiners 
pepper the walls with my own internal questions: “Why don’t they see 
things the way you do? Won’t they be angry with you for criticising their 
work? Won’t they think you are wasting your energy on picking apart their 
ideas instead of doing something yourself?” Certainly, I can hear some 
voices, offended at a perceived criticism of their motives, arguing that what 
they are doing is beneficial for society; it’s better than using their skills to 
market Coca Cola, they reason. I can see their point. Of these affronted 
colleagues I would ask only that they acknowledge that no technique is 
neutral or independent of the political context in which it is deployed; and 
that they take some time to read the critiques of international development, 
in particular participatory development, to inform their own practice as 
social marketers.  
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Appendices	  
Appendix	  1:	  Consent	  Form	  
Getting	  involved	  in	  some	  research	  about	  drinking	  
What	  is	  this	  study	  about?	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  goals	  of	  the	  project	  is	  to	  find	  out	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  alcohol	  on	  the	  
lives	  of	  local	  people:	  what	  they	  drink,	  where	  and	  how	  much.	  We	  don’t	  just	  want	  to	  find	  
out	  about	  drinking	  though;	  we’d	  like	  to	  work	  with	  people	  to	  find	  out	  more	  about	  what	  
it’s	  like	  to	  live	  here	  and	  how	  to	  help	  people	  become	  healthier	  in	  general.	  
Who	  is	  organising	  the	  study?	  
The	  study	  is	  being	  organised	  by	  the	  Bristol	  Social	  Marketing	  Centre	  at	  The	  University	  of	  
West	  of	  England,	  and	  is	  being	  paid	  for	  by	  [PCT	  name	  redacted].	  	  	  	  
What	  will	  happen	  during	  the	  project?	  
You	  can	  become	  as	  involved	  in	  the	  project	  as	  you	  like:	  a	  little	  or	  a	  lot!	  The	  first	  thing	  that	  
we’re	  going	  to	  do	  is	  work	  with	  local	  people	  to	  understand	  more	  about	  what	  its	  like	  to	  
live	  here,	  how	  drinking	  fits	  into	  their	  lives	  and	  about	  their	  everyday	  health.	  Then,	  we’re	  
hoping	  to	  be	  able	  to	  work	  with	  you	  to	  use	  what	  we	  find	  out	  to	  help	  local	  people	  reduce	  
the	  amount	  they’re	  drinking	  and	  become	  healthier.	  
People	  generally	  enjoy	  taking	  part	  in	  research	  like	  this	  because	  it	  gives	  them	  a	  chance	  to	  
get	  involved	  with	  something	  new	  and	  interesting,	  meet	  people	  and	  make	  a	  difference	  
locally.	  But	  we’re	  not	  asking	  for	  a	  big	  commitment,	  and	  you	  can	  stop	  being	  involved	  at	  
any	  time,	  you	  don’t	  have	  to	  give	  us	  a	  reason.	  
If	  you	  do	  decide	  you	  don’t	  want	  to	  continue	  being	  involved,	  we	  might	  use	  any	  
information	  about	  yourself	  you’ve	  already	  told	  us,	  unless	  you	  ask	  us	  not	  to.	  	  
The	  discussions	  and	  meetings	  that	  we	  have	  might	  be	  recorded	  so	  that	  the	  research	  team	  
can	  remember	  what	  is	  being	  said,	  but	  what	  you	  say	  will	  always	  be	  reported	  
anonymously.	  It	  is	  totally	  confidential	  research.	  Nobody	  will	  hear	  the	  tape	  other	  than	  
the	  research	  team	  and	  the	  person	  who	  types	  it	  up.	  We	  might	  also	  take	  photos	  and	  
video,	  but	  we	  will	  always	  tell	  you	  beforehand,	  and	  you	  don’t	  have	  to	  appear	  in	  any	  
photos	  or	  videos	  if	  you	  don’t	  want	  to.	  
Are	  there	  any	  disadvantages	  in	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  project?	  
We	  do	  not	  expect	  there	  to	  be	  any	  downsides	  or	  risks	  if	  you	  take	  part.	  But,	  if	  you	  are	  
worried	  about	  anything	  please	  contact	  Katie	  Collins	  at	  the	  University	  of	  the	  West	  of	  
England,	  Tel	  [redacted]	  or	  email	  [redacted].	  
Confidentiality	  	  
All	  information	  we	  collect	  during	  the	  study	  will	  be	  kept	  strictly	  private.	  Information	  
about	  you	  or	  anyone	  else	  you	  talk	  to	  won’t	  be	  kept	  with	  your	  or	  their	  name	  so	  no	  one	  
except	  the	  researchers	  will	  know	  who	  it	  is	  about.	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All	  the	  personal	  information	  will	  be	  kept	  in	  secure	  premises	  at	  the	  University	  of	  West	  of	  
England.	  A	  password-­‐protected	  computer	  accessed	  only	  by	  the	  research	  team	  will	  be	  
used	  to	  store	  this	  information.	  	  
Ethics	  
All	  research	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  University	  of	  West	  of	  England	  is	  looked	  at	  by	  a	  group	  of	  
people,	  called	  a	  Research	  Ethics	  Committee.	  They	  protect	  your	  safety,	  rights,	  wellbeing	  
and	  dignity.	  This	  study	  has	  been	  reviewed	  and	  given	  permission	  to	  go	  ahead.	  
What	  will	  happen	  to	  the	  results	  of	  the	  study?	  
We	  will	  share	  what	  we	  find	  out	  with	  anyone	  in	  your	  community	  who	  is	  interested,	  and	  
we	  might	  also	  tell	  other	  organisations	  about	  our	  project.	  But	  we	  will	  not	  give	  out	  any	  of	  
your	  personal	  information	  to	  anyone.	  	  
If	  you	  would	  like	  to	  know	  anything	  else	  about	  the	  project	  or	  about	  what	  we	  find	  out,	  
please	  contact	  Katie	  Collins	  at	  the	  University	  of	  West	  of	  England.	  
Signature______________________________________	  
Name	  _________________________________________	  
Contact	  number	  ______________________________________	  
I	  agree	  that	  you	  can	  contact	  me	  again	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Appendix	  2:	  Case	  study	  stories	  and	  illustrations	  
Case Study 1: Young mum  
Isolated and unhappy since she gave birth as she has can’t go out with her group 
of friends anymore, so drinks to combat feelings of boredom and depression 
Lauren* is 21 years old and lives in a two-bed flat. She has a little girl who is 10 
months old.  She split up with her ex 6 weeks after her baby was born, because 
he couldn’t cope with the stress, sleepless nights and changes that a baby 
brought to their home. He still sees his daughter every week and tries to help out 
financially occasionally, but he has moved out of Parkhood to find work. 
Lauren had her first drink when she was 12, along with her mates. They always 
used to go out together as a group; they would have a few bottles of wine at each 
other’s house before they headed into town, to get drunk on less money. They 
didn’t cause much trouble, they had a laugh and were just doing what everyone 
their age did. Ever since she had the baby, Lauren has stopped going out 
regularly with these friends. She can’t even go round to have a drink with them 
before they go out, like she used to do when she was pregnant, because she 
can’t leave her daughter. In fact she can’t go out at all in the evening, and stays 
in alone with nothing to do but watch TV. 
Lauren has one brother in Parkhood, but he works full time and has a wife and a 
kid so he can’t help much. Her mum lives nearby and has limited mobility so 
would love to come over more often to help with the baby but she finds it hard to 
get out and walk to the bus stop and can’t afford the taxi fare. The only person 
Lauren has really talked to since her daughter was born is the Health Visitor, who 
keeps encouraging her to try to get out during the day to get to local toddler 
groups and meet other mums. But she doesn’t know anyone who goes to the 
toddler group, and is worried that it will be a bunch of older mums who will 
criticise her for being young and single. It is also at the other end of Parkhood 
and she feels more nervous going up there. Lauren feels let down by her friends, 
                                            
* Not their real names 
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who seem to have dumped her since she had her baby.  She used to feel like she 
had a lot of fun and friends, and that she had a lot to look forward to, but now 
feels like she will be trapped as a lonely mum for years, with no chance to get a 
proper job or get out to see her friends.   
She knows some other mums where she lives and she sometimes gets invited to 
their flats, where they get all the kids playing together then spend the afternoon 
over a few bottles of wine.  She knows this isn’t a good thing to do but she likes 
being with them most of the time because she isn’t lonely then, and she can’t be 
there and refuse a drink because they’d think she was criticising their drinking.   
They are really critical and bitchy about other mums in the area, and she doesn’t 
want them to find out what a bad mum she thinks she is, so any time she thinks 
she has done something stupid or wrong it turns into a big deal for her. She 
wants to get on with them because she knows they could really cause trouble for 
her if they wanted to. 
Lauren does worry about the amount she is drinking and that she is a bad mum; 
she is frightened to ask for help or even tell the Health Visitor how much she is 
really drinking because she is worried they might take her daughter away. She 
sometimes resents her daughter and this makes her feel worse, especially in the 
evening when there is nothing else to do but sit alone and watch TV. So she 
started having a drink when she puts her daughter to bed and now she finds she 
is drinking for at least 4 hours a night. She picks up cheap deals with her weekly 
shopping, so she feels better that she is not going to the off-license every 
morning because someone would notice. 
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Case Study 2: Carer 
A wife who is trying to live with and support someone who is drinking too much. 
They have difficulty in getting support for the person who needs help and also 
feel a lack of support themselves 
Jane* is 46 years old. She is married to Bill*, and they have a son aged 17 and a 
daughter aged 13. Bill had an accident at work three years ago, and he has very 
little mobility in his left leg now. He had to give up work and although he was 
given a good settlement, nearly all that money has gone now and he is finding it 
hard to get another job. He can’t move very far, can’t sit for long and is often in 
pain.   
As a result, Jane has had to increase the hours she works at a café in town, but 
money is really tight. Bill feels like he can’t look after his family and that he is 
failing them, and is getting increasingly depressed. He used to have a few good 
friends that he went to play skittles at the pub with a couple of times a week, but 
now his leg prevents him from going so they have replaced him on their team. He 
doesn’t really see anyone outside of the immediate family; instead he watches a 
lot of TV and gambles on the Internet.   
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Bill helps a bit with going to the shops around the corner, but can’t manage any 
of the housework or gardening, so Jane and the children divide these between 
them. Jane is exhausted a lot of the time as she has to work nearly full time, and 
then comes home to manage the house as well.   
She feels that Bill resents her for managing to juggle a job, the family and the 
home as well, but she doesn’t do it to make him feel bad - she does it because if 
she didn’t then it wouldn’t get done. She would like a bit of gratitude and 
recognition of the hard work she puts in; she struggles to cope with Bill’s 
depression, as he often gets angry and frustrated, and takes it out on her and the 
kids.   
He usually just shouts, but has recently started throwing things and has smacked 
her across the face twice. She is also worried about Bill’s drinking as this has 
steadily increased since his accident, partly to manage the pain and help him 
sleep but also partly because he is bored and depressed so he has a drink 
whenever he wants to forget the way his life has changed.  She is now sure that 
he starts drinking at lunchtime as she is measuring the amount of empties.   
She tries to restrict it by limiting the amount of money he has around the house, 
but the old man across the road is also a heavy drinker and has started coming 
over regularly to keep Bill company in the afternoons so he is also contributing to 
the problem. Their son is also drinking more of the alcohol lying round the house, 
and when she challenged him he said ‘if it’s alright for dad then it’s alright for me’. 
Jane feels certain that if something could be done about Bill’s pain and mobility 
then he wouldn’t feel the need to drink so much, but at the moment he needs 
help with his depression. She doesn’t know of any services that could help her or 
offer advice, and she doesn’t know anyone else who has gone through anything 
similar.   
Certainly none of her friends or neighbours seem to have problems like this, and 
she doesn’t want them to find out because it would be humiliating for her and her 
husband. She used to feel that they fitted in well and they were liked by the other 
people in the street, and she hates the idea of them talking about her family 
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behind her back. She doesn’t even want to tell the doctor because everyone she 
knows goes to that surgery and she’s sure it will get out.   
Although she has her family around her, she feels really alone and that she is 
trying to keep her family together on her own, and that it will reflect badly on her 
as a wife and a mother if she can’t keep it up. She is also worried about the GP 
passing it on to social services who might interfere with her kids; she doesn’t trust 
health professionals. 
 
Case Study 3: Younger man 
He experiences social pressure to keep drinking and pressure to keep things fun 
and not to seek help.  He feels he has the right to drink; he earns his money and 
can decide for himself how to spend it. If mistakes have been made while drunk, 
these are still framed as fun (e.g. injuries or crimes committed) 
Alex* is 34 years old.  He has a big group of friends that he has grown up with in 
Urbanwood, and they all go out together.  They started drinking when they were 
about 12 or 13, the same time they started smoking.  They go out Friday and 
Saturday night into town, and sometimes mid-week as well, although this is 
sometimes more local like the rugby club.  Before he goes out Alex will drink a 
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few shots or beers, depending on whether he plans on having a heavy night, 
because it will make the evening cheaper if he is already tanked up before he 
leaves.  So he regularly stocks up at the supermarket when he does his shopping 
as the cheap deals are much better than the local shop.  He works full time for a 
local construction company, and has a 2 bed house and his own car.  He doesn’t 
really get involved in the community as he usually goes outside Urbanwood for 
entertainment and just looks on it as a cheap area to live. Drinking is part of 
Alex’s identity – he thinks about himself as part of that group of friends, and 
drinking is what they do together: they keep in contact during the week via texts 
and Facebook and plan what they are going to do that weekend.   
The alcohol just makes it possible for them to act the way they want to have a 
laugh and a good time, even if he had a bad day or week at work he can forget it 
and have a good weekend.  He has no real stress or worries in his life, drinking is 
just for pleasure and he feels that it is his right to drink as much as he likes 
because he has earned it through hard graft during the week.  He resents anyone 
telling him what he should do with his own money, especially when no-one else is 
involved. He is aware that his lifestyle is not very healthy, but he doesn’t want to 
think about that now, no more than he wants to think about getting married or 
having kids – he can think about that later.   
He likes the feeling of being able to do what he likes when he’s had a few drinks.  
A lot of the men in the pubs and clubs he goes to are in their 30s and 40s, and 
they all act a lot younger after a few drinks.  He has been mistaken by girls for 
being in his mid-twenties a number of times when he’s been clowning around, 
which he quite likes.  If someone gets hurt or something gets damaged then it’s 
all just part of the fun, you make a joke out of it the next day because you never 
know how the night is going to turn out.  His sister did ask him to cut back after 
his mate broke his own foot one night, and she might have a point because Alex 
couldn’t work if he was injured like that.  But he wouldn’t listen to her or anyone 
else really, because if he did then the rest of his mates would take the mickey – it 
would be ok if they all decided to cut back but if he just wanted to drink less on 
his own then he’d have to find a different group of mates.  And he couldn’t 
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imagine dropping them, they’d definitely hassle him about it and say he thought 
he was better than them. 
Alex doesn’t think that he has a problem with drinking, or that it is risky – apart 
from if someone got seriously hurt which would be unlikely because they don’t 
usually drink and drive.  He thinks people who do have a problem with alcohol 
are old and often homeless street-drinkers, who buy cheap booze every morning 
from the off-license and start drinking before lunch.   
 
Case Study 4: Older man 
He has been drinking too much for a while and now lost things that are important, 
such as job, wife and children. He has reached the ‘bottom’ and it is now more 
acceptable to seek help 
Michael* is 56 years old.  He used to live with his wife and two children in a 3-bed 
house, where he ran his own business as a cab driver.  He grew up in 
Urbanwood, with his brother and parents.  His dad was a heavy drinker and used 
to regularly beat him and his brother from a young age.  He was constantly 
nervous because he didn’t know when his dad would strike out at him.  He fell out 
with his dad when he was 17, and didn’t speak to him again.  His dad died 15 
years ago from liver cancer.  Michael started drinking at home when he was 
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young – he used to steal some of his dad’s booze.  When he left home aged 17 
he was already drinking every day, and he used it to help him relax and sleep at 
night. 
He didn’t used to see drinking as a problem.  He would go out with his friends for 
a few pints two or three times a week, when they would play darts or skittles.  
He’d have a few glasses of whisky when he got home too.  But then the pubs 
changed and stopped offering the games, so they just spent all their time drinking 
instead.   The work dried up as well, and he had more time on his hands so he 
started drinking in front of the TV in the afternoon.  His wife moaned at him to get 
out the house, so he used to go to the pub instead, for some peace and quiet.  
The pub was the only place he could think of going - he didn’t know of anywhere 
where men his age could go and do something other than drink.  This extra time 
drinking meant that he couldn’t take up the odd bit of work that did come through, 
because he’d had too much to drive.  So his business gradually folded, and his 
wife kept blaming him because they couldn’t afford the things that they used to be 
able to buy.  He felt like a failure because he had built his business up, and so he 
went to the pub more often to get away from the house and everything that 
reminded him.  He found that he was drinking there on his own more and more, 
especially after a couple of his close friends died.   
Michael didn’t think he had a problem with alcohol, but he knew that he was 
depressed.  But he didn’t feel able to go to the GP or speak to his wife, because it 
would be admitting to another weakness or failure on top of losing his business 
and putting his family in debt.  He knew that his friends would also tell him to 
keep it together for his family, and that he was no use to them if the doctor sent 
him away for treatment.  He thought it was a private family matter and he didn’t 
want any outside person interfering.  It was up to her to tell him when she wasn’t 
prepared to put up with it anymore, and then he could do something about it.  But 
she didn’t, she just decided to take the kids and leave. 
This was four years ago - his wife then remarried and his children who are now 
15 and 12 years old have taken on their new step-dad’s surname.  Michael had 
to move out, and now lives in a room in his friend’s house.  He doesn’t sleep well 
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and he doesn’t get up until lunchtime because he doesn’t need to go to work.  He 
finds it difficult to get up because there’s nothing pushing him to and he often 
feels depressed about the day ahead so then it’s easier to skip breakfast and go 
straight into lunch and a beer.  His friend is also a fairly heavy drinker, and they 
share the cost of rent and food between them and then spend the rest on alcohol.  
On a good day Michael feel like he wants to do something to cut down his 
drinking, because he knows how much he has lost as a result of it.  But on a bad 
day he feels really low and worthless, because he has lost his business and 
family and his children don’t even want to share his name anymore. On these 
days he feels like he wants to drink to forget.   
When he does think about wanting to get help and cut down drinking, Michael 
doesn’t know what he would do with his time.  The men he knows are all 
drinkers, though some of them now encourage him to get help because they can 
see how much he has lost through drinking.  He wouldn’t think to get involved 
with any community activities because he thinks these are for women and 
children, not divorced middle-aged men.  So the only places he can think to go to 
get him out of the house would all be places where he could drink, and all the 
people he now sees regularly have a drink in their hands. 
 
